This is Life!: Revolutions Around the Cruciform Axis

Conservative Index

Human Events Online gives a list of the Ten Most Harmful Books of the 19th and 20th Centuries:

HUMAN EVENTS asked a panel of 15 conservative scholars and public policy leaders to help us compile a list of the Ten Most Harmful Books of the 19th and 20th Centuries. Each panelist nominated a number of titles and then voted on a ballot including all books nominated. A title received a score of 10 points for being listed No. 1 by one of our panelists, 9 points for being listed No. 2, etc. Appropriately, The Communist Manifesto, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, earned the highest aggregate score and the No. 1 listing.

Each book is accompanied by a short 'graph of rationale. But here's just the straight list.

1. Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
3. Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao
4. Alfred Kinsey, The Kinsey Report
5. John Dewey, Democracy and Education
6. Karl Marx, Das Kapital
7. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique
8. Auguste Comte, The Course of Positive Philosophy
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
10. John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money

The list of scholars follows the (longer) list of honorable mentions.

Pope Pledges to End Orthodox Rift

CNN reports Pope pledges to end Orthodox rift:

"I want to repeat my willingness to assume as a fundamental commitment working to reconstitute the full and visible unity of all the followers of Christ, with all my energy," he said to applause from the estimated 200,000 people at the Mass.

Words aren't enough, he said, adding that "concrete gestures" were needed even from ordinary Catholics to reach out toward the Orthodox.

"I also ask all of you to decisively take the path of spiritual ecumenism, which in prayer will open the door to the Holy Spirit who alone can create unity," he said.

Benedict has said previously that reaching out to the Orthodox and other Christians would be a priority of his papacy, and his call to ordinary Catholics to take the charge as well built on that agenda. . . .

In his greetings at the start of the Mass, Archbishop Francesco Cacucci of Bari referred to the city's Orthodox ties, saying the arrival of St. Nicholas' bones in 1057 "built a bridge between the East and West that neither time nor divisions have ever demolished."

"Even in these days, many brothers of the eastern churches have been united with us, encouraging us to continue with renewed commitment and enthusiasm on the path of prayer and ecumenical dialogue," the archbishop said.

In a bid to improve relations, the Vatican's top ecumenical official, Cardinal Walter Kasper, proposed this week at the Bari conference to hold a synod, or meeting of Catholic and Orthodox bishops, news reports said.

Father Vladimir Kuciumov, rector of the Russian Orthodox Church in Bari, said Benedict had already made a good start toward improving relations with the Orthodox in some of his inaugural homilies and speeches.

"We hope for the best," he said in a telephone interview Sunday. "We still have to see, but there is a hope to improve our relations."

Personhood Backwards and Forwards and Monergism's Essence

Kevin replies to my "Till . . . We Have Faces" in his "Masks and Modes." As his reply unfolds along two lines of thought, so, too, will my reply.

1. Personhood Backwards and Forwards

Kevin goes to some lengths to defend himself from my charges of modalism. Unfortunately, the way he does so leaves my charges unanswered. Instead of showing how it is that his position does not radically identify person with nature, and thus logically entails modalism, he utilizes the terms I introduced into the issue but reads into them both more and less than I intended. This is, perhaps, not unjustified since the terms hypostasis and prosopos do have a range of meanings that differ somewhat between philosophical and theological contexts. I'll take on the responsibility for not more carefully clarifying the terminology.

That being said, however, the substance of my charges against Kevin's position remain and should be clear: he identifies person with nature. To do so in (strictly speaking) theological terms is to propose modalism. While Kevin is right to draw some distinctions between human and divine persons, what is true of both, as I have argued, is that a person is not strictly identifiable with his nature.

While Kevin has asserted that he thinks the same thing--i.e., that persons are not radically identifiable with their natures--nothing in his own arguments provides a basis for that assertion. Indeed, this has been my point. It is the substance of his argument itself that substantiates my charges. He has had ample opportunity to show, by way of argument instead of by mere assertion, how it is that his belief in monergism does not entail such a radical identification of person and nature. But he has yet to do so. Or, if he has, he has been too subtle for my poor thickheaded mind.

But so as to be clear about the mapping of personhood, backwards and forwards, onto God: I take as the fundmental starting point for talk of human personhood, the divine personhood of the Trinity and Christological personhood. In other words the Trinity and Christology are revelational facts that are not derivable from human experience and reason. Apart from revelation we would not know there is a Trinity or Christ is the incarnate God. We cannot argue from human personhood to Trinity or the Incarnation. But if the Trinity and the Incarnation are facts--and Christians take them to be so--then they are the fundamental realities that define human personhood. From these points only is it helpful to derive our concepts of human personhood as made in the image and likeness of this God who is Three-in-One and incarnate as two natures and two wills in one Person.

However, in that human personhood is intimately and inescapably connected to Trinitarian and Christological Personhood, what you say of one you say of the other. Any deviation from the Church's understanding of the Trinity will affect one's Christology and this will deform one's understanding of personhood. Similarly, if one has a deficient understanding of human personhood, this will inescapably affect one's Christological and Trinitarian understandings. So, it is not per se illegitimate for me to "backwards map" what I take to be Kevin's understanding of human personhood on to Christological and Trinitarian dogma, because there is a related and necessary consistency that must be upheld among all three. What remains, then, is for Kevin to prove how his understanding of human personhood does not violate the Church's understanding of Trinitarian and Christological realities.

This has consistently been my point. I believe that monergism is a heresy not because it emphasizes that humans cannot save themselves, not because it emphasizes the priority and sufficiency of God's grace, but because its understanding of human personhood necessarily results in a deficient Trinitarianism and Christology. Kevin has yet to disprove my contentions.

So most of the substance of his recent reply to me, in that it focuses on disabusing me of the terminology I used to draw the distinctions between synergistic and monergistic views of personhood and their respective logical entailments, important though it is in terms of clarifying these matters, fails to do that which is necessary: arguing how it is that he can both maintain his understanding of salvation in the terms he accepts and not also logically conjoin his argument (if not his avowed beliefs) with modalism.

Take, for example, this paragraph:

The substance of Clifton's response to me is an an argument that I regard personhood as an instantiation of a particular nature. Any prosoponic references are to be understood in this sense: as a name for the instantiation of a particular nature. But when, after arguing for what he believes my postion to be, he tries to show that it ends in modalism by mapping it onto God, Clifton has thrown in an unwarranted equivocation for the use of prosopon. If I believed that a nature and a person were the same thing or even if I subscribed to hypostatic personhood but believed that the relationship between the hypostasis and the ousia was such that there could only be a one to one correspondence, this would not be enough to convict me of modalism. At most, mapping these views onto God would result in unitarianism, that is, a denial of the Trinity. While modalsim also denies the Trinity, it offers the added bonus of trying to explain God's manifestation as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in terms of various modes or masks.

While it is true that unitarianism does not necessarily also entail modalism, clearly in Christian history and thinking, unitarianism and modalism have largely gone hand-in-hand. But I hardly think that Kevin wants to deny that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and therefore he does not adhere to simple unitarianism. So while his quibble here is not without warrant, in terms of the diablog we've engaged in for a couple of months, it's a red herring. If he holds to a radical identification of person and nature and that God is--in some way--Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then logically speaking he must hold to modalist conceptions of the Trinity (which would then entail a certain form of unitarianism).

So, let his technical clarifications of the terminological vocabulary (as it applies to this argument) stand. It still remains for him to demonstrate how it is his monergistic convictions do not entail modalism.

Let me further address a comment regarding what he takes me to assume in my arguments on personhood.

From what I can tell, Clifton's understanding of my view of personhood is colored by an unspoken assumption; namely, that substantive personhood is only possible where there is libertarian free will.

This is true, but only in part. Rather, substantive personhood makes possible, and real, libertarian free will. That is to say, I do not argue from indeterministic willing back to personhood, but rather found indeterministic willing on the concept of personhood which undergirds synergistic views. In other words, substantive personhood makes real libertarian free will. If you hold one, I contend, you must hold the other. Obviously, I do not think Kevin's is a substantive view of personhood, but is, if you will, a two-dimensional construct.

Finally, let me clear up one misunderstanding with regard to personhood, willing, modalism and this "backwards mapping" that Kevin demonstrates in a lengthy paragraph.

Clifton's attempt to map my views of personhood onto God and Christ is, at best, backward. Consider the charge of modalism. In light of my interpretation of Jesus' prayer in the garden, this cannot be the case. Whereas Clifton has presented the statement, "Not my will but yours be done," as an interplay between the two wills of Christ- human and divine, I have presented it as an example of the Second Person of the Trinity talking to the First Person of the Trinity. Whatever legitimate criticisms anyone may have for this interpretation, "modalistic" is not one of them. No modalist is going to claim that one person of the Trinity can have a meaningful conversation with another person of the Trinity. In fact, modalists interpret all of the prayers of Christ in precisely the same way that Clifton has interpreted the prayer in the garden: Jesus' human nature is praying to his divine nature.

While modalism and monothelitism are related in certain ways, Kevin combines two aspects of my attack on monergism and comes to a mistaken conclusion. My argument regarding Christ in the garden is primarily about libertarian willing based on Christological Personhood. It has little to do with charges of modalism per se. It is related, true, but nonetheless does not address specifically the concern he mentions.

My point about Jesus' prayer had to do with the nature-willing schema more so than it did the person-nature schema. Here's what I wrote:

Furthermore, on Kevin's schema, a will cannot but will what its nature directs, specifically, it will always will in the direction of its strongest inclination. This is problematic, however, in the case of Jesus. Kevin and I agree that Christ had two natures, human and divine, and two wills, human and divine. Kevin notes that in Christ the union of those wills was accomplished in that the wills both willed the same thing. However, I don't think the Scriptural witness bears him out. I turn to the Garden of Gethsemane (Matthew 26:37-44/Mark 14:33-41). There Christ asks that if it be possible that the cup he was about to drink (his death) might pass from him. Then he says, “Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done.” Kevin's view that Jesus' two wills both willed the same thing cannot hold in light of this verse. For if they willed the same thing, then Jesus had no need to deny the object of his human will (drawing back from death), and would simply have acquiesced to the Father's will.

Note carefully, though, what I am not saying. I am not saying that Jesus' human will was opposed to his divine will. Nor am I saying that Jesus' two wills were not in union. Let me be clear: there is no opposition, and there is union. But under Kevin's schema, this cannot be the case.

I grant you that my argument may not have been clear enough and might have led Kevin to his erroneous conclusion about my use of the wills of Christ in the Garden. Hopefully this has clarified that.

Kevin goes on about our divergent interpretations of Christ in the Garden:

But this interpretation has its own set of problems, which can be seen if I turn the tables and map Clifton's understanding of human willing onto Christ. I will agree with Clifton that willing, of any kind, is a function of personhood rather than nature. Note carefully, however, that I do not predicate the same thing of the will. Willing and the will are not identical. The one is a conscious act perfomed by a person. The other is the the faculty of choosing. As far as I have been able to tell, Clifton's primary mistake is found in confusing the two. He has applied dithelitism, not to the faculty of choosing, but to conscious desire. Go back to his objection to monergism (or, more specifically, to the compatibilist views of the will underlying some forms of monergism) and to his interpretation of Jesus prayer in the garden. Monergism = practical monothelitism. Why? Because, if it is the case that human nature is such that the human will cannot cooperate with the divine will, then, even if Christ technically had two wills, his human will must have been suppressed so that only his divine will was functional. Clifton's solution? Posit libertarian free will. Which is fine except that he takes the concept far too literally. Rather than granting Christ libertarian freedom as to his person, he gives this libertarian freedom to his human will. Thus, when Jesus prays, "Not my will but yours," his human will, instead of being involuntarily suppressed as [supposedly] would be the case if compatibilism were true, submits itself to his divine will in a libertarian free act. This presents a problem. The issue is not whether the human will of Christ had libertarian freedom but that Clifton has even allowed for the possibility. It would be just as bad if he believed that the human will of Christ had compatibilist freedom. These are options predicated, not of the faculty of choosing, but of a person. If the human will of Christ is capable of free submission to Christ's divine will, then, it is not a faculty of choosing but is the conscious exercising of choice. On this reading, Christ's human will has done something that is only meaningful as a function of personhood. In order for Christ's wills to function in the manner that Clifton has predicated- either freely submitting or requesting submission, each will must have its own hypostasis. How this understanding of the interactions between the wills of Christ is not Nestorian is beyond my ability to explain.

I certainly understand Kevin's point here. But he's apparently missed what I have actually said about this. For the most part I concur with with his comments above about willing and the will. I just don't see how they apply to me. In a previous reply to Kevin I said the following:

It should be clear then that persons do not act by the necessitation of their wills and the strongest inclinations at the moment of willing preceding the act, but rather act by the employment of the will according to their personal mode of existence. This is true of the Trinitarian persons, of the Christ, and of humans. In the Trinity and the Christ, the personal mode of existence is such that person, nature and will are fused in such a way that the willing which accompanies their personal mode of existence is, properly speaking, non-deliberative. The Trinitarian Persons have no need to discriminate among the good acts available to Them, since all such goods acts are Their own generation. Similarly, the Person of the Logos has deified the human nature and will in the union in his Person of God and man, and in so doing, fixed the two natures and wills such that there is no need to discriminate among the real goods, since all such goods are immediately known to him, the human nature and will participating hypostatically in the goods brought forth by the Trinity. But in human persons prior to the eschaton, the person, nature and will are not so fused, and the personal mode of willing is precisely the deliberative will necessitated by the pre-eschaton human mode of existence. It is the nature of the human will, even when fallen, to seek its true object in the Creator. But since the human person is not deified, its discrimination among goods is not fixed in prudential virtue, and in the personal mode of willing human deliberation is capable of directing the will away from its natural object toward an apparent good.

In short, it is not that the will directs the person to an act, but that the person, in the employment of the will from his mode of existence, directs the will toward an act. This is not to say that human acts are never determined by the strongest inclination of the will. After all, akratic acts are a reality of human existence prior to the eschaton. But it does not follow that since some, or even most, human acts are so constituted that all human acts must be so constituted.

In other words, humans are not so constituted that they must always naturally will sin, which would attribute sin to God and would be a blasphemy. Rather, humans can freely will the good--as they have been created to do--and can employ their wills according to their personal mode of existence in such a way that they can truly and really choose to do acts that are good. But then it does not follow that since humans can freely will some acts that are good, namely they can freely will to choose their own salvation, that they are able to accomplish what they will to choose. No human can accomplish his own salvation. Only God's grace can accomplish that salvation both in the willing and the choosing, and in the long ascetical pursuit of deification which God's grace must also accomplish, not only universally in Christ, but particularly in the person. And, indeed, no synergist would ever claim differently.

Hopefully this will set the record straight.

But now we proceed to what has been the heart of my contention regarding monergism: it is essentially heretical.

2. Monergism's Essence

What is the essence of monergism? Kevin appears to state that it's all about God having done everything necessary for salvation; that there's nothing left for us to do. But he gets at that negatively, by attempting to assert that will and nature have nothing to do with it. Yet he is not successful in divorcing monergism's essential point from nature and the will.

Kevin wants to keep the monergism debate tightly within Protestant soteriological debates, indeed wants to ignore the matter of willing. But this won't help him.

Finally, there is the matter of monergism. Even though Clifton only mentions it in the last paragraph of his post, it is the main topic of the series. He wants to identify monergism as heresy; however, his focus is too narrow- specifically, the relation between monergism and the will. In any event, the will does not become a primary factor in the defense of monergism until we get to the intra-Protestant debate between Calvinism and Arminianism. Here, the question concerns the relationship between faith and regeneration. What is the order? For the Calvinist, regeneration precedes faith. In Reformed theology, faith alone is the instrument of our justification. The order, then, is regeneration, faith, justification. This should not be taken to imply that faith is something that we must do in order to be justified. No one who is not justified is saved; however, all who are regenerated are saved. It is not the case that, of the those who have been regenerated, some might fail to exercise faith and thus fail to be justified. This is not so much a temporal order of conditions as it is a logical order of results. Faith, which is sufficient for us to be declared righteous, is the necessary evidence of our regeneration. Regeneration results from our union with Christ in his death and resurrection. We are regenerated because he is risen. This union results in our actual righteousness, which, before the return of Christ exists in an already/not yet state and which, after his second advent, will be made complete. Justification is the legal declaration that this righteousness is the case. Faith is the instrument of the legal declaration and not of our actual possession of righteousness. The actual possession of righteousness is that, without which, faith cannot be exercised. Once regeneration has occurred, the question of our salvation is settled. Because we have nothing to do with that regeneration, salvation is monergistic.

Kevin himself cannot get away from the matter of the will. Regeneration here is something God does, to whomever he does it (which isn't everyone, since not everyone will be saved), and God does it irrespective of our willing it, since according to monergism, we can't even will it. Despite Kevin's contention that this is all about God, in fact, this is inescapably about human nature, the will, and, to be frank, double predestination. Salvation, damnation, it's all God.

How this avoids the issue of willing and nature is beyond me. Perhaps Kevin can clarify how the will is not involved here from the get-go.

But more to the point, Kevin introduces a truncation of salvation that is not Scriptural, and certainly is not the historic Church's position. If salvation is monergistic, then even if Kevin accepts synergistic sanctification, which he has, sanctification is not, logically cannot be, in fact, salvation. But this just doesn't make sense.

Even if we grant Kevin that monergism is not about temporal process, but about logical categories, the fact of the matter is, under his terms, even sanctificatory synergism is still, ultimately, monergism. For if someone can resist God's salvation after regeneration, then they can ultimately, through their own willing, fail to be saved. But if they can, through their own willing fail to cooperate with God in their own salvation, then what prohibits them from cooperating with their own willing in the regeneration God effects. If synergistic regeneration somehow fails to uphold God as sole and necessary source of salvation, surely a failure of perserverance after regeneration does so as well. So, in effect, the human will and human nature both before and after regeneration are radically identified. But if this is true, even of regenerate humanity, then the implications for Christology and the Trinity should, by this point in the diablog, be clear.

I still await Kevin's argument showing this to not be the case.

Despite himself, after specifying all the details about when will enters the monergist picture, he goes on to say:

For the sake of argument, let me agree with the most un-Calvinistic of monergists and deny both total depravity and total inability. I will only affirm that everyone is sinful enough to stand in need of salvation. What is it then that makes synergism impossible? It is this and only this: everything that can be done has been done. As I have stated before, monergism is not the denial of a synergy between the human and the divine in the work of salvation. This synergy is found in the incarnate Word. The triune God has done everything necessary for our salvation. Even if we wanted to contribute, even if Calvinists were completely wrong and the will were not an issue, monergism would still be true for the simple fact that, when it comes to our salvation, there is nothing left for us to do. All of these discussions about the will and its relation to soteriology, Christology, and Trintitarian theology are fine in their own right and worthy of debate. Yet, inasmuch as they do not address the deeper point of monergism, which is not about the will, they have nothing to do with Clifton's thesis that monergism is heresy.

On the contrary, despite Kevin's stipulations, he cannot hold to the monergism he believes apart from a specific conception of the human will and of human nature. Monergists and synergists both believe that God has accomplished salvation for all men, that in terms of what is necessary for salvation, there is nothing more for God to do. In fact, monergists and synergists would both agree that God is the sole source of salvation, that man cannot save himself apart from God, that man cannot believe and live in that faith apart from God. The difference, however, between monergists and synergists is inescapably and precisely in the arena of divergent understandings of human nature and human willing. Monergists, I contend, have an understanding of human nature and human willing that ultimately distorts and perverts Christology and Trinitarianism. I believe that in this diablog I have solidly established this as a fact.

I'm still waiting for Kevin to demonstrate through argument how his monergistic convictions do not lead to the logical entailments I have claimed. I long ago agreed that Kevin does not follow his logic to its conclusion. I don't believe that Kevin's Christology or Trinitarianism are necessarily heretical--since he denies the specific heresies I have mentioned. But they avoid heresy not because Kevin's monergism is, itself, biblical or orthodox, but because he steadfastly continues to jump off the train before it heads off the cliff. This is a good thing: his conscience won't let him crash with the monergism train. But he could avoid all this by simply allowing monergism's own logic to eat its own entrails, abandon monergism and accept the orthodox (and Orthodox) synergism of the historic Church and the Scriptures.

Top Ten Conservative Colleges

Young America's Foundation recently (last fall) compiled their list of the Top Ten Conservative Colleges. Unlike the MSN Encarta lists, this one is serious-for-real. These colleges embody, so thinks YAF, real conservative princples (and not just political ones). A description accmpanies each. From the YAF page:

In the market of American colleges and universities, a wide variety of rankings exist. Each year, U.S. News & World Report releases its "America's Best Colleges" edition. The magazine grades each institution based on factors such as peer assessment, graduation and retention rates, faculty resources, and student selectivity. Yet, it does not rank the overall experience that colleges offer. That is why Young America's Foundation presents the following list of ten institutions that offer a holistic conservative experience for students.

Although there are more than ten colleges and universities that could make the list, Young America's Foundation deemed these ten institutions the best, but not in a particular order. Each year, we intend to re-evaluate these rankings.

Many conservative students seek 'conservative' alternatives in higher education, but they may not know that many institutions nationwide fit these criteria. The 2004-2005 "Top Ten Conservative College" list features ten institutions that proclaim, through their mission and programs, a dedication to discovering, maintaining and strengthening the conservative values of their students. The listed colleges offer an alternative to the liberal status quo, because they allow and encourage conservative students to explore conservative ideas and authors. Most offer coursework and scholarship in conservative thought and emphasize principles of smaller government, strong national defense, free enterprise, and traditional values. Many have a religious affiliation, but some do not.

This is not an exhaustive list of conservative institutions and should not be taken as such. Nor should it be the only source consulted in a college search. Young America's Foundation recommends that this list serve as a starting point. Parents and students should read several sources and admissions materials, consult with friends and counselors, and make visits.

His Eminence, Metropolitan PHILIP: On the Hope for Orthodox Unity in America

From the OCF's most recent issue of The Basil Leaf:

After thirty-nine years in the Episcopacy, I have become convinced that Orthodox unity in America must begin on the grass roots level. You, the laity, and in particular the young adult laity, are the conscience of the Church and the defenders of the faith. Consequently, I would like to see a strong Pan-Orthodox lay movement, totally dedicated to the cause of Orthodox unity. Insist that the unity of our Faith must transcend all other interests. Insist that we silence those forces that would divide us. Insist that we witness our Faith to North America without boundaries. Without the laity, our churches would be empty and our liturgical and sacramental services would be in vain. The clergy and laity, working together, are the “LAOS TOU THEOU,” the “People of God” and together we constitute the Holy Orthodox Church.

We bring to mind the visionary words of the late Fr. Alexander Schmemann. One can almost visualize the glorious and blessed day when all Orthodox bishops of America will open their first Synod in New York, or Chicago or Pittsburgh with the hymn, ‘Today the grace of the Holy Spirit assembled us together,’ and will appear to us not as ‘representatives’ of Greek, Russian or any other jurisdictions,’ and interests but as the very icon, the very ‘Epiphany’ of our unity within the Body of Christ; when each of them and all together will think and deliberate only in terms of the whole, putting aside all particular and national problems, real and important as they may be. On that day, we shall ‘taste and see’ the oneness of the North American Orthodox Church.”

Finally, let us always remember to ask our Lord for His guidance and strength: "Be mindful, O Lord, of Thy Holy Orthodox, Catholic and Apostolic Church; confirm and strengthen it, increase it and keep it in peace, and preserve it unconquerable forever." (from Morning Prayers)

Abstinence and Natural Family Planning Links

Though I am initially impressed with the following links, I haven't thoroughly reviewed all the following, aside from the Orthodox NFP link, particularly for theological content. Caveat lector.

Orthodox Natural Family Planning Association

Abstinence Clearinghouse

One More Soul

Couple to Couple League

The Fatherhood Chronicles LXVI

Baby Healy Number 2 Update

Well, Anna saw the midwife last Friday. Things are looking great so far. We've got about five weeks to go and the baby is already in position. Head down low, back toward Anna's right. It's kinda freaky to be able to feel around Anna's tummy and recognize, "Oh, that's his back. And there's his shoulders. And there's his head."

Now, I've used the English generic "his" here. My readers should not assume that we know the sex of the baby. We don't. I may have my husbandly man's intuition. And there may be some proverbial indications (the way the wind blows my wife's hair at the quarter-moon on a Tuesday, for instance). But we'll have it confirmed for us when the baby's born. It's just I'm lazy and don't want to keep typing "his/her" and I just have an aversion to "its."

The thing though is, we only have five weeks to go. I've been thinking, "Five weeks, heck that's plenty of time." But truth to tell, with the baby in position like he is (remember: generic "he"), the birth could happen any day. In fact, last week Anna was really feeling some pressure, though that has since subsided somewhat. But if the baby comes early, I'd really like it if he (generic) could wait till I've finished my last Loyola paper and turned in the first draft of my thesis. Let's say: after 1 June. Hey, the baby's not due till 28 June, so I don't think that's asking too much.

Still and all . . . wow. I'm about to be a father all over again. Wow.

Please pray for us--Anna, Sofie and me--and the baby. For health and safety of Anna and the baby. For me as a father and husband. This is the way God is saving me. May he make me worthy of these great and precious gifts.

Wow.

One Man's Garbage . . .

In a Chicago Tribune article, we learn that NASA science uncovers texts of Trojan Wars, early gospel. If you like Greek, archaeology, and ancient history, this will make your day.

The scholars at Oxford University are not sure how it works or why; all they know is that it does.

A relatively new technology called multispectral imaging is turning a pile of ancient garbage into a gold mine of classical knowledge, bringing to light the lost texts of Sophocles and Euripides as well as some early Christian gospels that do not appear in the New Testament.

Originally developed by NASA scientists and used to map the surface of Mars, multispectral imaging was successfully applied to some badly charred Roman manuscripts that were buried during the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in A.D. 79. Examining those carbonized manuscripts under different wavelengths of light suddenly revealed writing that had been invisible to scholars for two centuries.

Now scientists are shining the multispectral light on the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, an enormous collection of texts unearthed from the rubbish heaps of the vanished city of Oxyrhynchus, about 100 miles south of Cairo.

First excavated by two Oxford archeologists in the late 19th Century, the hoard of papyrus from Oxyrhynchus has long been a source of fascination and frustration for scholars: Fascination because it holds some of the lost masterpieces of classical literature, frustration because much of it is in such poor condition it's impossible to read. . . .

In the past few weeks alone, researchers have succeeded in deciphering a 70-line fragment from a lost tragedy by Sophocles and a 30-line fragment from Archilochos, a Greek soldier-poet who chronicled the Trojan Wars.

The Archilochos fragment confirms what scholars have long suspected: that the Greeks got lost on their way to invade Troy and mistakenly landed at place called Mysia. There they fought a battle, lost and had to regroup before heading off again for Troy.

The Archilochos fragment will be published later this month. The newly discovered lines from Sophocles are scheduled for publication in August. . . .

The Oxyrhynchus collection, housed at Oxford University's Sackler Library, consists of more than half a million scraps of papyrus. Some of it is in excellent condition, but much of it is worm-eaten and darkened by time.

All of it was collected from the rubbish dumps of Oxyrhynchus, a city that flourished after the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 332 B.C. The city remained prominent in the Roman and Byzantine periods but declined after the Arab conquest in A.D. 641.

For a thousand years, the inhabitants dumped their trash in the desert. Over time the dumpsites were covered by sand, and they remained covered until 1896 when Oxford archeologists Bernard Grenfell and Arthur Hunt began excavating the area.

At first, Grenfell thought that what he and Hunt had found was "nothing but rubbish mounds," but they quickly came to appreciate that they had found a remarkable window into the literary and ordinary lives of the ancients.

There were plays by Sophocles and Euripides, poems of Pindar and Sappho, and some of the earliest documents recording Christianity's spread to Egypt. The gospel of Thomas, for example, records the "Sayings of Jesus" in a manner that some scholars of early Christianity believe is more authentic than the Gospels in the New Testament.

Classics Links

Classical Christian Homeschooling: Introduction to Classical Education

American Classical League

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Ethics and Sextus Empiricus

Sextus Empiricus lived in the late second, early third centuries AD. He was a physician and a philosopher, and the last of the followers of Pyrrho of Elis (fourth/third century BC), an early Greek sceptic. One of Sextus' works, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (or here) (Gr. Purroneioi Hupotuposeis), is most known for this formulation of the earlier sceptical arguments. Pyrrhonian sceptics do not deny knowledge altogether. Rather, they deny that there is any way we can know something to be true. That is to say, the problems are (as in the three most important of the Agrippan modes): a) infinite regress (i. e., that one's belief is justified by something else, which itself needs justified by something else, and so on ad infinitum), or b) circular reasoning (i. e., that one's belief is justified by something else, but that other thing receives its justification by the belief in question), or c) dogmatism (i. e., that one's belief is justified by simple assertion of its truth, but this is no justification). Further, and this will have bearing on our ethical discussion in a moment, there is the problem of the criterion, that is to say, the problem of getting behind how a thing appears to us and to its essential reality. (Yes, folks, this was long before Kant said the same thing in the eighteenth century, some 1600 years later. This is why I study ancient philosophy: Ad fontes!)

In the Outlines, Sextus' criticism of ethics comes in his account of the tenth of the ten modes (at Book I Chapter XIV/146-163) and in his examination of the good, the bad and the indifferent (at Book III Chapters XXI-XXIII/168-187). Sextus issues his criticisms on two fronts: on the strength of the conflict of different ethical accounts, and on the inability to actually define the essence of the good, bad or indifferent are and to determine whether things are good, bad, or indifferent by nature.

In the tenth mode, Sextus notes that ethics is based on rules of conduct (choice of a way of life or of a particular actions adopted by one person or many), habits (joint adoption of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not actually punished), laws (written contracts among members of a state, the transgressor of which is punished), legendary beliefs (acceptance of unhistorical and fictitious events, such as the legends about Cronos), and dogmatic conceptions (acceptance of a fact which seems to be established by analogy or some form of demonstration). He then proceeds to show the contradictory nature of these five things in themselves (e. g., by opposing habit to habit and law to law; so, some of the Ethiopians tattoo their children, but we do not; or, A Roman man who renounces his father’s property doe not pay father’s debt, but among the Rhodians he always pays them), as well as opposing each of these five things to one another (e. g., by, among other options, opposing habit to legendary belief, and rules of conduct to law; so, Cronos devoured his children, whereas we protect our children; and homicide is forbidden, but gladiators destroy one another). In other words, since there is no agreement among the things in themselves, or between them, making up ethics, then we must suspend judgment about ethical matters, for there is no way we can judge between them as to which is true or not.

In the last half of Book Three, he returns once again to ethics, this time examining it from the standpoint of our rational conceptions about the good, the bad and the indifferent, and on the nature of these things themselves. He looks the definitions of these three concepts in three ways: essentially, accidentally, and as productive of certain ends. The differences in the definitions of these terms shows our inability to get at the "real thing." But if we define these concepts in terms of properties, we aren't dealing with the essential thing itself, nor can we know if these adhere to an essence if we do not know what the essence is, and if other "essential things" have similar properties, then we are even further removed. And finally, if we cannot know the essence of the thing, then we cannot know if something is productive of ends related to that thing (e. g., happiness to the good). Since we cannot know what the good, the bad or the indifferent is, in itself, we must suspend judgment.

Furthermore, since there is substantive discrepancies among accounts of the good, and one cannot argue for one account or another lest he become a partisan for that account and lose objectivity, we must suspend judgment. But even if, for the sake of argument, we take up a particular claim about the good, to what does that good apply: the body, the soul, or both together? But if to the body, then that is irrational and we cannot know it. But if to the soul, then the soul and its parts are not able to be sensorily apprehended, and we cannot know it. And if not either, than not both together. In other words, good, bad and indifferent cannot be accounted for "by nature." As Sextus puts it: "[I]t is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and assent or judgment that this object is choiceworthy and good, and that object to be avoided and evil" (III.XXIII/187).

The upshot of this, however, is not what one might first think. Pyrrhonian sceptics are not relativists. They do not think there is no truth, or that all "truths" are true. They are saying that we cannot know whether those things we think are true, are, in fact, true. On what the good is, we may certainly have an opinion, but it is just that, an opinion, which cannot be grounded in reason alone. But sceptics are not anarchists. As Sextus writes:

Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, Another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically. (Outlines, Book I Chapter XI/23-24)

The end of the Pyrrhonian sceptic is ataraxia, quietude of soul. One is not torn between judgments and impressions, but holds the opinions he holds undogmatically. In practice, in terms of ethics, the sceptic does not make ethical judgments but simply holds to appearances without conviction. That is to say, sceptics are utterly conventional in their morals, following the general dictates of society, though not dogmatically asserting that one must do so.

But here we are into the sceptical way of life, and this is beyond my point. What I can say is that Sextus shows very well the failure of the modernist paradigm: that reason can be the sole arbiter of ethical claims. But he also shows the failure of postmodern relativism (though I have not highlighted how this is the case in the summary above). That is to say, it is a non sequitor to move from "we cannot know the good" to "there is no good to know."

No, contra postmodernism, we are reason-endowed creatures, and that reason is a powerful tool. But contra modernism, our reason is not the final arbiter of truth. We need something extra-rational to ground truth and our claims to knowledge and ethical certainty. Apart from such grounding, reason collapses in upon itself. But reason is, nonetheless, an inescapably powerful tool for knowledge, even if real and ultimate knowledge is, as Christianity asserts, Personal.

Thus ends the summary.

[Note: Additionally, one should consult Sextus' Against the Ethicists (Gr. Pros Ethikous), which historically came to be grouped with some other works under the title Against the Mathematicians (Gr. Pros Mathematikous) as the eleventh and final book of that collection. Jonathon Barnes and Julia Annas, The Modes of Scepticism is also a must read.]

Sextus Empiricus

I'm now into my paper on Sextus Empiricus. I was undecided as to my paper topic until yesterday. I decided to focus on the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment with regard to ethics, and, with that, on the "sceptical mode of life."

A couple of interesting links to give some historical context and an overview of ideas:

Rhetoric, Skepticism and Sextus Empiricus

This link looks like a pretty good introduction to Sextus. I didn't read through all of the introductory material closely, but it looks pretty accurate. The contents of book one are a great introduction to the Outlines.

Ancient Greek Skepticism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

This is a more general historical overview of ancient scepticism itself. A good contextualization.

Free Will Paper, the Semester Ends, and Odds and Ends

Well, the beast is done. My twenty-eight page free will paper, The Nature of Indeterministic Free Will (pdf file), can be viewed online for those who can stomach it. I essentially compare and contrast Robert Kane's and Timothy O'Connor's views on indeterministic free will, and find O'Connor's account wanting. I don't know that this is my best work on the subject, but it is my best under current conditions. I still think it's fairly decent. Your mileage may vary.

In other news, I graded all my final exams and final papers. I now just have to wing my way on over to Oakton's Skokie campus and turn in grades this evening. Then I am done, done, done. I am glad the semester is over, but not because I had horrible classes. Rather, I will now get to be home in the evenings, instead of gone two nights a week. Life will temporarily be at a less hectic pace--till the baby comes, of course.

My classes, as I said, weren't horrible. They were both pretty decent. Actually, my ethics class was very enjoyable. And though my logic class dwindled down to six members by the end (about half the original total), those who remained were, for the most part, the best of the starting bunch. That being said, overall I am disappointed with the performance of the class. I took some personal gut checks through the semester, changed course a couple of times, added extra in-class demonstrations and so forth. I offered help a gazillion times. No takers. In the end, the poorer performers have to take responsibility for their performance. That's not to say my logic class can't be improved, in fact, this semester is an improvement over the previous logic class last spring. But I can't inject the subject matter into their brains. Yet I can't shake the feeling that their performance is a direct reflection of my own.

Yesterday was a most productive day, I have to say. The family worshipped at All Saints as per usual. Then when we got home my daughter thankfully took a two hour nap. I got my paper done just minutes before she woke up. (Though I got up early again this morning to revise it a little bit more.) I also got done some of the honey-do list items that had been sitting incomplete for some time. One of which involved power tools. Or, at least, I made sure it involved power tools. (God bless cordless drills! Can I get an "Amen!"?) I also got done some laundry, made a pot of chili, and got to enjoy the regular evening routine with my daughter of bath, story time, prayers, hymns and sleep.

And to top off my productive day, I completed grading two sets of final exams and one set of final papers. And all by ten o'clock, when I climbed weary but satsified into bed.

(Good heavens, can you imagine if this sort of day became typical? I wouldn't know who I was anymore!)

Scientific Study Reveals the Danger a Previous Abortion Poses to Later Children

In a report, entitled, "Revealed: how an abortion puts the next baby at risk", a French study of more than two thousand abortions reveals some seriously disturbing facts about surgical abortion:

Having an abortion almost doubles a woman's risk of giving birth dangerously early in a later pregnancy, according to research that will provoke fresh debate over the most controversial of all medical procedures.

A French study of 2,837 births - the first to investigate the link between terminations and extremely premature births - found that mothers who had previously had an abortion were 1.7 times more likely to give birth to a baby at less than 28 weeks' gestation. Many babies born this early die soon after birth, and a large number who survive suffer serious disability.

The research leader, Dr Caroline Moreau, an epidemiologist at the Hôpital de Bicêtre in Paris, said the results of the study, which appear in the British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, provided conclusive evidence of a link between induced abortion and subsequent pre-term births.

Last night anti-abortion campaigners seized on the evidence to demand that all women seeking a termination be warned, routinely, that they are jeopardising the well-being of future babies. A series of earlier, smaller studies had failed to provide clear evidence of a link and so women currently opting for an abortion are not warned of the risk.

Dr Moreau said: "Clearly there is a link. The results suggest that induced abortion can damage the cervix in some way that makes a premature birth more likely in subsequent pregnancies."

Her study compared the medical histories of 2,219 women with babies born at less than 34 weeks with another 618 who had given birth at full term. Overall, women who had had an abortion were 40 per cent more likely to have a very pre-term delivery (less than 33 weeks) than those without such a history. The risk of an extremely premature baby - one born at less than 28 weeks - was raised even more sharply, by 70 per cent. Abortion appeared to increase the risk of most major causes of premature birth, including premature rupture of membranes, incorrect position of the foetus on the placenta and spontaneous early labour. The only common cause of premature birth not linked to abortion was high blood pressure.

Mr Peter Bowen-Simpkins, a spokesman for the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and a consultant obstetrician at the Sancta Maria Hospital in Swansea, said the study revealed that abortion might not be as safe as previously supposed. "This study shows that surgical termination of pregnancies may have late complications and may not be without risk," he said.

I bet you won't find Planned Parenthood even acknowledging this study.

Folks, abortion cannot be justified on any grounds. Abortion not only kills the living baby in the womb, it also doubles the odds of the next baby dying. That's a pretty efficient killing mechanism; two babies for the price of one.

An Occasion of Monumental Importance at the Healy Home This Morning; or, What My Free Will Paper Is About

This morning, having dutifully fed Sofie breakfast, having fixed my lunch and a pot of coffee, having showered, and having already spent time working on my paper, I had approximately forty-five minutes before I needed to leave for work. This entire scenario was set in motion by previous choices, motives and efforts on my part, though the scenario was not absolutely determined by those choices, motives and efforts.

That is to say, in very brief summary, I chose, among other options, to marry. It is not clear to me what sort of options I had in choosing to marry Anna, for though I suppose I could have chosen to marry any of a number of young women I dated in college, I cannot say that such an option was realistically among any set of reasons or motives relative to my choices with regard to these relationships. I could, however, have chosen not to marry Anna. Among the many choices I have made since marrying Anna, two of them bear out on my current scenario: I choose to pursue a PhD in philosophy, and among the results of my efforts, motives and choices, am doing so in Chicago at Loyola University; and I chose, with Anna, to procreate. This is not to say that all of the results of all these choices were absolutely up to me: Loyola might not have accepted my application, Anna might have turned down my offer of marriage, and we might not have successfully conceived Sofie. But that my choices brought about through my actions further results, even if I wasn't completely in control of directing all those results, I am as much responsible for this morning's situation as if the outcome were entirely up to me.

All of which is shorthand to say: in the forty-five minutes I had prior to leaving for work I was faced with a moral and a prudential choice: did I work on my free will paper or did I acquiesce to my daughter's pleadings for attention? All the accretions of my past decisions, choices, motives and efforts--along with events and occurrences not within my control--were ingredients in the mix of the branching paths presented to me.

The reasons and motives for either option were very strong. On the one hand, completing my free will paper was (and is) very important to me. There are many excellent reasons for so doing. I have obligated myself in a freely-willed duty to complete the paper. Completing the paper will ensure further progress in a degree program I desire to finish and the rights and responsibilities granted to me upon completion of said program are imminently desirable. This sort of activity utilizes traits and abilities that I derive pleasure from using and doing. Economically, the sooner I can complete my program, the less debt I will incur and the less financial burden and stress I will place on my family. I gave my word to my wife that I would complete these papers prior to our coming baby's birth.

On the other hand, attending to my daughters' wants and needs is very important to me, and there are very many excellent reasons for so doing. I have freely taken on the possibility and obligation of parenthood, specifically of being Sofie's father. As part of those duties is the obligation to ensure my daughter's emotional well-being, and this entails frequent embraces, kisses, assurances of love as well as shared time and attention in play without any external structures or constraints (here I'm thinking of the constraint of writing my paper). Sofie clearly wanted my attention, embraces and co-playing activity. Indeed, she demanded it with some tears. Furthermore, I greatly enjoy the pleasure of attending to my daughter's various needs and of spending large amounts of unstructured and unconstrained time with her. We frequently have Saturday morning daddy-daughter dates which I look forward to all week. And even were her tears absent, and her demands less insistent, the pull to spend such time attending to my daughter would have been no less strong.

Now, according to libertarian concepts, I was faced with competing sets of motives and reasons, each very strong. This struggle of my free will between the competing sets of attractions could only be indeterminately brought to a resolution by my so willing a resolution. It was not simply that I willed to do one or another, but that I willed to resolve my indecision so as to do one thing and not another. And in bringing that struggle to a resolution, I am ultimately responsible for whichever choice I make. But which choice I make is indeterminate up to the moment of choosing.

Furthermore, being moral and prudential choices, they are teleological in nature, that is to say, oriented toward an object of my will that "goes beyond" as it were, the mere choice itself. Whichever choice I make, I will be making a teleological one, but in either case, I will resolve the indecision brought about by the competing motives and reasons (which themselves were brought about in part by my own past choices, efforts and actions) toward some end related to that choice.

So, what did I do?

I read a book to Sofie, and spent some time holding her in my lap.

And I also wrote on my paper.

If the competing motives and reasons were limited to a simple binary relation of opposition, I'm not sure whether I actually resolved my indecision or not. On the other hand, in that I resolved my indecision with a different choice than the seemingly all-encompassing options apparently present to me, one could say that this is a prime example of free will indeterminism. Up until the moment of decision I did not know whether or not I would resolve my internal struggle with one or another of the options presented to me. In the end, I combined the options in a third choice.

This is not to say that the third choice was not present to my will to so voluntarily resolve the impasse. But one might argue that it's motives and reasons were not such as to draw my will in its direction; that is to say, the other options were stronger in motive force. But I chose against them for a third option with less distinct reasons and less compelling motives. Indeed, it is not, strictly speaking, an instance even of akratic, or weak, willing. For it is not as though I turned against long-term interest and duty for self-interest and immediate gratification. My third choice instantiated an aquiescence to both long-term interest and duty, but did so in a way that aligned the competing motives and reasons, even if in temporal sequence, rather than rejecting one or another of them.

Now the question is: did the production of this choice arise from my undetermined free will, or is there a property unique to myself as an agent that produced the choice by way of that property? At this point--and I am nearing the end of my paper--I cannot see any way to legitimately claim a unique property that produced the choice. I'm not exactly sure what is added to the explanation of my resolving the choice by affirming (with due argumentation to support the capacity itself) that I have an inherent capacity so to produce such choices and resolutions. If I can simply appeal to the actions I take as an agent, what more is added by asserting an extra-event causal property? I do understand that the premise is this inherent capacity seems to answer the questions with regard to agent control over choices, but if one does not demand absolute control and only ultimate control (i. e., indeterminate responsibility), then positing an extra-event causal capacity is wholly unnecessary.

Of course a compatibilist would simply say that I was determined akratically to refuse to choose between the competing options, and willed that which my akratic nature desired most strongly. This was not an instance of libertarian free will, but of soft determinism.

But then a soft determinist would have to say something like that.

More Baptist Debacle Stuff: You Know, I've Seen the Evidence and It Still Proves My Point

Bailes takes me to task for not listening to the pastor's sermon tapes:

One Chattablogger, who has been a sympathetic supporter of the embattled pastor (didn't this blogger hear the audio tapes of Rev. Chandler's sermons?!), explains how he too has been in similar circumstances as a minister.

But his link only takes me to an ABC News story on the fracas, and a Google search didn't turn up any audio of the actual sermon. So . . . let's go with what ABC News says (trusting, of course, their journalistic integrity not to edit the sermon content in such a way so as to promote one or another subjective side to the story).

ABC News, to which Bailes linked, provides excerpts from the sermon. ABC intros the pastor's remarks with:

Indeed, though some media reports have repeated Chandler's claim that this was all just a "misunderstanding," the full content of that sermon seems very clear.

Then ABC gives only a portion of the "full content":

"We have a society of preachers who are afraid to get up in the pulpit and speak the truth," Chandler said in the taped sermon. "There are people in the congregations, leaders--deacons, teachers, Sunday school teachers--people who pay their tithe and let the pastor know it very loudly, that tell the pastor he cannot say anything political. He can say that it's all right for you to support someone that does not support abortion. But you can't name names."

"'You start naming names,'" Chandler said he was told, "'we're gonna ask you to leave.' " But that's a cop-out, "hiding behind the pulpit," Chandler claimed.

"We've been catering to Satan, catering to the enemy, we've not been making the stand that God wants us to make," he said. Then he said Kerry voters need to repent or resign.

He said in the sermon that he doesn't care if he offends anyone: "I want to make the Who's Who list in heaven, not yours." Later in the sermon he said, "If you're going to be offended today, take it up with the most high. I am merely the spokesperson. Don't kill the messenger."

Directing his comments to Kerry supporters seated in the pews, Chandler asked: "Why do you support an unbeliever over a man who says, 'This is the day when I saved and now my life changed'? Why do you support an unbeliever over a believer? Let me see, do I support a Christian or a non-Christian? Do I support someone who kills babies or I support someone who says, 'Let's let 'em live.' Do I support someone who says, 'Let's marry the gays,' or someone who says, 'Let's uphold God's law and not'?"

Now, color me naive, but it seems pretty darn clear what the impetus is for Pastor Chandler's actions, and it's not party affiliation per se. It's two fundamental Christian beliefs: that the practice of abortion and homosexual behavior are sins. On abortion, the differences between the parties and the candidates are clear. On homosexual behavior, the differences are not so clear, though I suppose the pastor would point out President Bush's tepid support of a marriage amendment over against Kerry's opposition to such an amendment. (Though neither candidate opposed civil unions, and both were opposed to calling same sex unions "marriage" in the same way heterosexual unions are marriage.)

In other words, Pastor Chandler's story sticks: The issue is about abortion and other Christian moral matters. The pastor apparently thinks that one cannot uphold Christian beliefs and morals and at the same time vote for the Democratic party candidates, but that one can uphold Christian beliefs and morals and at the same time vote for the Republican party candidates, or at least the ones who oppose abortion and homosexual behavior and same sex unions.

Now, I'm not saying I agree with the pastor's logic. Nor do I agree with his characterization of Kerry as a non-Christian over against Bush as a Christian (though I understand Baptists have a problem accepting Roman Catholics as Christians--I have no such issue). In fact, I never have said that I agree with the pastor's logic. I do believe that for me to vote for a Democratic party candidate the candidate would first have to oppose certain Democratic party platform items (such as abortion), which candidate would be a rarity to be sure. But if a Democratic candidate presented himself or herself as an articulate advocate (with practical evidence in voting record and political activity) of Christian beliefs and morals, I could in good conscience--and especially if the other candidates held views in opposition to Christian beliefs and morals--endorse such a candidate.

In other words, I think Pastor Chandler paints with too broad a brush when applying his beliefs and morals to the political arena.

That being said, Kerry did fit his criticisms, and he was justified in calling his flock to oppose Kerry on the basis of Christian beliefs and morals. Similarly, on the same basis, he could encourage his flock to vote for Bush.

As the ABC News story points out: Chandler did nothing different than did certain progressivist churches when they endorsed Kerry . . . on the basis of their beliefs and morals.

Last year, many black preachers endorsed Kerry in churches across the country.

"To bring our country out of despair, despondency and disgust, God has a John Kerry," the Rev. Gaston E. Smith said last October at Friendship Missionary Baptist Church in Miami.

In Philadelphia, right after a pro-Kerry appearance by fellow Massachusetts Democrat Sen. Edward Kennedy, the Rev. Ernest C. Morris Sr. told about 1,500 worshippers, "I can't tell you who to vote for, but I can tell you what my mama told me last week: 'Stay out of the bushes.' "

And in Cincinnati, Temple African Methodist Episcopal Church Pastor Donald H. Jordan Sr. said of Kerry's running mate, former Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C., "I'm not worried about the law. I'm asking you to support him."

If Christian ministers and pastors, Jewish rabbis, and Muslim imams, cannot provide their flocks with reasoned arguments applying their respective beliefs to the political arena, then we might as well just tear up the first amendment. Separation of church and state does not mean muzzling the church.

Much as the whiny progressivists all up in arms over Pastor Chandler might like to think so.

They're hypocrites all. I sure don't hear the whines when the Dems visit their churches and stump from their pulpits. And if that isn't endorsing a particular candidate, I've got a bridge I'd like you to buy.

If Preachers Stop Misappropriating Scientific Theories, We'll Stop Ridiculing Them

What do you do if your bishop starts to preach about the "new physics" and the uncertainty principle, and to make theological claims on those things? Well, you take him out to the woodshed and beat some sense into him--in a manner of speaking, of course.

Seems one Canadian Anglican bishop, Michael Ingham (yes, that Michael Ingham) gave evidence recently of his utterly ignorant appropriation of physics in his Easter sermon. The good Michael Davenport has a PhD in this stuff and decides to tell the good bishop what utter crap his sermon is in Quantum Unbelief (pdf file).

Ingham's message has to be read to be believed. For example, did you know that Jesus hasn't yet ascended all the way to heaven?

The new science has serious implications for Christian theology. The late Carl Sagan - still one of the most widely read modern scientists today - pointed out, for example, that if we take the biblical story of the Ascension of Jesus Christ literally we have a problem. If Jesus' body lifted off from the earth two thousand years ago, as the Bible says, and even if it reached the speed of light immediately (which Einstein says is the fastest speed any matter can travel) then it would have taken him a year to pass Pluto and after two thousand years Jesus is still trapped in the solar system. He's not yet ascended to heaven, Sagan said, unless we mean something else by `heaven.'

Or perhaps you didn't know that Easter, like the uncertainty principle, makes all certain knowledge impossible (including this certain proclamation that all certain knowledge is impossible)?

Easter, for example, is much more than a story about the body of Jesus walking out of a tomb. Easter is a kind of uncertainty principle thrust into the heart of our tidy, ordered universe, undermining all our theories about how things ought to be. It's an event that makes everything unstable.

Perhaps you didn't know that Diarmuid O'Murchu is not only an authority on God but on physics as well?

Diarmuid O'Murchu in Quantum Theology: the Spiritual Implications of the New Physics says we should stop thinking of God as a supernatural Being located outside the universe. Instead, he says, we should think of the universe itself as a pulsating, vibrant dance of energy alive with benign and creative potential in which God calls to us from within, not without.

Except that Ingham's calculations on Jesus' bodily ascension are flawed, the uncertainty principle does not make science uncertain and Diarmuid O'Murchu is neither a physicist nor a theologian.

Ingham would have done better to just keep it to "Happy Easter, folks!"

In any case, read all of Davenport's five-page essay linked above. It is more than worth the few minutes' satisfaction to see the sort of "scientific" nonsense Ingham spouts utterly gutted by a real scientist--and (small-o) orthodox Christian. If you want, read Ingham's message, but if you've ever listened to or read any liberal theologian's take on the "new physics" you've read what Ingham has to say.

[Note: Mike Davenport is a senior research scientist at a high-tech company in Richmond, a husband, father, and member of St. Johns (Shaughnessy) church. He has a PhD in theoretical physics from UBC, based on his research into the spin-glass statistical mechanics of recurrent neural networks.

Michael Ingham . . . doesn't.]

Another Thought Experiment

Many Christians oppose abortion but support its legalization. "I oppose the practice of abortion, but the choice to abort is between a woman and her God."

Let's see how that reasoning works with other things.

"I oppose the practice of child molestation, but the choice to molest is between the sexual predator and his god."

"I oppose the practice of suicide bombing, but the choice to kill dozens of people when one kills oneself is between the suicide bomber and his god."

"I oppose the practice of genocide, but the choice to kill off an entire group of persons is between the exterminators and their god."

Of course all of these are morally evil and repugnant, and legally prohibited to boot.

But how is the above sentiment with regard to abortion in any way objectively and metaphysically different from these obviously evil comments? If one is opposed to the practice is it on moral grounds? If it is on moral grounds, then one cannot condone it. If it is just on the grounds of preference and taste, then on what basis can one object to the heinous statements which follow?

Let's restate the abortion defense above in less euphemistic terms: "I oppose the practice of abortion, but the choice to kill her baby boy or baby girl in the womb is between a woman and her God."

No, the "personally opposed, but legally for" is an empty defense which makes no sense.

The Intolerance of Tolerance

I submit to you this thought: Those who claim to be tolerant of all persons are the most intolerant of all persons.

Tolerance is the ubervirtue of modernist secular society. Modernist secularists abrogate rather arrogantly to themselves this ultimate compassion: the acceptance of all. The trouble is, it's all one big fat lie.

Don't believe me? Let's try a little thought experiment, shall we? We can take it as a given that modernist secularists are accepting of the lifestyle behaviors of gay and lesbian persons. But let's take that and push it around a bit, shall we? What does a modernist secularist do with, say, an ex-gay or ex-lesbian person? Have you ever see a conference devoted to tolerance and diversity in which one has equal representation and coverage of both gay and lesbian activist groups and, say, Exodus International? I thought not.

Or, let's try this one on for size. Modernist secularists are tolerant of people of all faiths. Er, except for those who hold faiths that are exclusivist: which pretty much boils down to conservative and/or traditional Christians. Roman Catholics can always be counted on to play the bad guy role, or at least can be mocked. But conservative evangelicals can always be counted on to play the role of sexually repressed, homophobic, misogynistic bigot. Orthodox Jews would receive much more mocking than they do except that the modernist secularist has this guilt complex over the Holocaust which does not allow him to break that tolerance taboo. And Orthodox Christians would be more denigrated more often if Americans had any idea just who the heck they were.

No, we can be tolerant of Islamist fascist terrorists and their supporting regimes--it's not their fault, it's the poverty, it's the American agressive world diplomatic policies, etc.--but not of Christians who claim some form of absolute truth. Modernist secularists do believe in the Antichrist, and they name him Benedict the XVI.

No, the calls to tolerance of modern day advocates are empty and hollow calls to simply conform to the Borg. And that's not tolerance at all.

No, give me the intolerance of a Mother Teresa who never countenanced one iota the evil of abortion. Give me the intolerance of Metropolitan Iakovos who could march against the evils of racism precisely because he believed that there is absolute truth that excludes those beliefs that contradict it. Yes, I'm intolerant in that way, and hope to become ever more so every remaining day of my life.

Daily Bailout Still Gets It Wrong

John Bailes purports to give a Response to APOLOGIA at Revolutions Around the Cruciform Axis. He feigns to take exception to my guarded defense of Pastor Chan Chandler, which Bailes claims to be a political maneuver.

Healy's point is to sympathize with the position of the pastor over that of the nine members who were expelled for not signing an oath to agree with the minister's moral and political views.

That is to say, he still gives the impression that I am defending Pastor Chandler on his political views. I have said clearly enough that this is not true, so I won't go over the ground again. Furthermore, I'm not sure where Bailes could even get the idea that I would be a Republican or ever agree that a minister should assert his authority so as to direct his flock to vote for a particular candidate or party. I did, of course, give negative criteria by which one could be exhorted to not vote for a particular party or candidate, one of which is, of course, the huge evil and sin of abortion.

He does, admittedly, claim that my sympathies are with the pastor's moral views as well. But Bailes still doesn't get it, not really. For he goes on to indict me for the worst secular sin of all.

What was more critical, however, to contributing to my characterization of Healy's blog was his emphasis of fetal protection over Christ-like tolerance.

Yep. That's right. My stance on abortion is (gasp!) intolerant.

Good. I'm glad Bailes thinks so. For the fact of the matter is, the practice of abortion is one moral matter about which Christians are to be utterly intolerant. Bailes apparently missed, or didn't take time to read over, my link to the teaching of the historic Church, so let me highlight it here:

The Church Fathers and Ancient Councils on Abortion

Furthermore, I also suggest that Bailes may not be fully familiar with the actual practices of abortion (warning: link contains graphic and disturbing pictures and information), particularly the brutal practice of late term abortions, in which "fetuses" (that is to say, human beings, full persons, who have not yet been born) feel pain and suffer as they are killed by the abortion doctor. Perhaps Bailes is not familiar with the position of one of the largest abortion providers in America, Planned Parenthood, that no one is a person until they take their first breath.

If he were aware of these things, I suspect he would be less inflamed over my intolerance for these practices. And if he were aware of both the ancient Church teaching on abortion and of the actual practices involved in killing unborn babies, he would then, I suspect, be less inflamed over my sympathies with a pastor who correctly labels a national party and their platform which espouses abortion as a party that, indeed, it is legitimate to call into question as to whether Christians can support such a party and also be faithful to Christian teaching.

Bailes apparently thinks that this is "single-issue" voting, and claims a contradiction in my own points that the issue of abortion is enough to bar a Christian from voting for a candidate or party that espouses its practice and that a Christian is not to decide matters political on a single issue only. In fact, there is no conflict, for just because the Republican party rejects the practice of abortion in their platform, does not mean that Christians are free to vote for a Republican candidate or the party as a whole. There may well be other matters of Christian doctrine which would bar a Christian from so voting.

Unlike Bailes, however, I do not take intolerance to be a sin. But of course, I'm talking about intolerance of specific practices. I can be loving and tolerant of a person who practices those things I as a Christian am required to reject. In fact, I exercise such tolerance every single day as I encounter those who espouse all sorts of beliefs and practices which contradict and oppose Christ and the Gospel, some of which I find irritating others of which I find absolutely abhorrent. Although Bailes does not say so, I suspect his view of tolerance is such that one must not only forebear the person but also his or her practices. Unfortunately, Christianity is not a religion that allows that sort of forebearance. We are called in virtue of our witness of the exclusive Christ to name evil that which is evil. Abortion is one such evil we are called to testify about. And that means calling other Christians to their own God-given responsibilities as well.

Can't Get Enough Terry Tate?: "This Is My World! You Just Work Here, Baby! Wooooooo!"

milkandcookies has a slough of links to the various Terry Tate, Office Linebacker videos.

Some of them should be gently parentally discretioned.

But of course!

Wanna know when a fetus becomes a person? Dr. Cullins tells ya (emphasis added):

All kinds of people--theologians, philosophers, scientists, lawyers, legislators, and many others--hold very different views about when life begins. In fact, both the egg and the sperm are living things before they meet and join. There's no real argument there.

The really hot question is, "When does being a person begin?" Most medical authorities and Planned Parenthood agree that it starts when a baby takes its first breath.

Some of our oldest religions have changed their views about this question many times over the centuries. Today, some people sincerely believe that being a person begins when the egg is fertilized. Some, just as sincerely, believe that it begins with birth. And lots of others believe it begins somewhere in between.

What we are all sure about is that a pregnant woman is a person. We know for sure that she has morals, feelings, human needs, and a conscience. Because of this, we know that she is the only one able to make a decision about her pregnancy options. She does it based on her own needs, ethics, and religious belief about when being a person begins. It would be wrong to force her to observe someone else's religious belief.

But is anyone really surprised? After all, how could PPFA, Inc. not assume that a fetus is not a person until he breathes, when they advocate and their clinics perform "dilation and extraction," aka partial birth abortion?

Monstrous.

[PPFA, Inc. link via Dawn Eden.]

Humor To While Away the Minutes

Links open videos in browser.

Squirrel Tag

Terry Tate Office Linebacker

Talking Dogs

Cat Hilarity

Your Abortion Industry at Work

Caution: The testimony of what amounts to infanticide at an abortion clinic given here is wrenching, and if you've had a hard day or are emotionally drained, come back to this later.

Abortion staff ignores baby boy born alive?

Wrote Angele [the mother]: "He was perfect, slightly pale and a little translucent. His eyebrows were pale but wide and well-defined. You could see little hairs on his face and head. He had the tiniest little fingernails and toenails. I noticed they already had a little bit of growth. His mouth was lovely. He was this perfectly formed one pound, one ounce human being. He was beautiful. He had been so strong.

"I wrapped him in [a] blue pad instead of one of the wet blankets. I just kept kissing him and telling him I loved him so much. I told him I was sorry I couldn't get anyone to help us and I was so sorry for ever coming here." . . .

"I wondered if babies went immediately to heaven. Are they immediately given wisdom, perspective and understanding? Could Rowan see that I loved him? Could he see that I wanted him with me and that I tried to help him stay with me? Could he see everything that happened while he was here?"

Read the entire article at the above link.

[via Touchstone's Mere Comments]

Some Free Will Links

I'm currently working on my paper on free will. Unfortunately, I decided to just scrap the first paper I submitted and start completely over from scratch. I also spent the last two days trying to figure out what I was going to write. I finally decided to write on Robert Kane's teleological intelligibility and Timothy O'Connor's agent causation. This saves me from the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate, and also gives me a chance to explore why I'm attracted to Kane's understanding of free will rather than O'Connor's, which attraction at this point is largely uninformed.

I've done a little searching on the web and wanted to pass on to you some very interesting links. For what it's worth I'm an incompatibilist libertarian on free will, but I include determinist/compatibilist links for some balance.

From the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

• Free Will
• Compatibilism
• State of the Art: A Supplement to Compatibilism (supplemental to the preceding article)
• Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will
• Arguments for Incompatibilism

And from the The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website:

• Ted Honderich: Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem
• Ted Honderich: After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
• Harry Frankfurt: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
• J. M. Fischer & M. Ravizza: Morally Responsible People without a Freedom

From Timothy O'Connor:

• Agent Causation (pdf file)
• Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views (pdf file)
• Why Agent Causation? (pdf file)
• Introduction to Persons and Causes

From Robert Kane:

• Reflections on Free Will, Determinism and Indeterminism
• The Dual Regress of Free Will and the Role of Alternative Possibilities (pdf file) via Google Scholar Beta
• Lecture: Can a Free Will Requiring Ultimate Responsibility be Reconciled with Modern Science? (17 MB download opens in ogg [audio] file, will play in Winamp) via The Garden of Forking Paths blog

And last but not least:

The Garden of Forking Paths blog and the related Papers on Agency and Related Issues

Pope Benedict and the Orthodox Churches

Martin Mosebach writes a wonderful piece on Pope Benedict in the NYT's "The Pope Without a Country." But I especially appreciated two of the last paragraphs:

The name Benedict is clearly indicative of the new pontiff's program. Even as a cardinal, the pope struggled against a tendency that saw the Second Vatican Council as some kind of "supercouncil," as if the history of the church began in 1962. "Benedict" plumbs the depths of that history down to the first Christian century, when the Latin and Greek churches were still united. The great Latin liturgy and Gregorian choral chanting have special ties with the Benedictine order. At his installation, the new pope reverted to a wool pallium in the style worn by the pontiffs of the first millennium. He had the Gospel chanted in Latin and Greek, as once was done at every papal Mass. Clearly he sees in the ancient liturgy a sign of unity between East and West.

His strictness in matters of doctrine is in part an answer to a perceived loss of clarity in both dogma and liturgy following the Second Vatican Council. But his main goal in restoring the liturgy is reconciliation with the Byzantine church. Exactly how charged this project is may be seen in the words he spoke as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, that in reconciling with Rome, the Orthodox Church should not be expected to accord any greater primacy to the pope than it did before the schism.

Another Great Article by Metropolitan JOHN Zizioulas

His Eminence, Metropolitan JOHN, has a very good article online, "One Single Source," on the filioque and its role in Roman Catholic and Orthodox relations. He finds a recent statement by the late Pope John Paul II, very helpful in both clarifying the Catholic position as well as providing hope for eventual unity between the two Churches.

St. John's Prayers Continue for My Household

I became aware, almost a year ago, that St. John the Wonderworker, Archbishop of Shanghai and San Francisco, had through his intercessions established a watchcare over me and my family, particularly with regard to our finances. Through his prayers, God has provided me with the necessary jobs and income to honorably provide for my family, as well as graced us in difficult times (as when we totaled our car) with blessings far beyond what we deserve. (You can read about some of these things, here.)

St. John's intercessions continue to be efficacious for us. I just got word that I will be teaching an ethics course at Loyola in the fall. I will also be teaching a logic course at Oakton. Although it's incredibly tight for us, I can sustain our family on this sort of income.

I'm still praying for a summer course. Anna's current part-time job will end then, and I'm not sure what our financial situation will be like without me having additional income outside of my full-time work at the library.

The Blessing That Is Bright Week

Bright Week is the week following the Bright Resurrection of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ. During this week there is no fasting, and the customary greeting is "Christ is risen!" During this week the normal hours of prayer of the Church and home are replaced by the Paschal Hours. It is a week of celebration and rejoicing.

I have not had much to rejoice in this Lent just ended, save in the rich mercies of our God. What began well, yet again ended miserably. Not merely in external conformity to Lenten rules, themselves only tools to greater goods. Rather my inward house was full of rot and stench, and I allowed sloth and despondency to rule my soul. This seems to happen every Lent. It is excruciatingly humiliating, though it's benefit is clearly wrought by Christ to keep me from delusion and pride.

But just as has happened every Pascha, when St. John Chrysostom's Paschal homily is read, tears of simultaneous repentance and thanksgiving well up. This year it was these words in particular that freed me from myself to celebrate Christ's Resurrection:

And if any have tarried even until the eleventh hour,
Let him, also, be not alarmed at his tardiness.

For the Lord, who is jealous of his honour,
Will accept the last even as the first.
He giveth rest unto him who cometh at the eleventh hour,
Even as unto him who hath wrought from the first hour.
And He showeth mercy upon the last,
And careth for the first;
And to the one He giveth,
And upon the other He bestoweth gifts.
And He both accepteth the deeds,
And welcometh the intention,
And honoureth the acts and praises the offering.

Wherefore, enter ye all into the joy of your Lord;
Receive your reward

"He both accepteth the deeds, and welcometh the intentions"! What sinner like myself cannot but feel remorse and tearful joy at those words. I came to Pascha with the words of Esau: "Bless me, even me." For I, too, had sold my inheritance for pottage. I, too, had disregarded whose I am. But the Lord condescended in his grace to accept me with his saints and warriors, I who wandered off and ate the food of swinish passions.

So, it was with further joy that as I began another cycle of reading through St. Benedict's Rule yesterday, the first day of Bright Week, that I heard again the gracious message of God:

Listen carefully, my son, to the master's instructions, and attend to them with the ear of your heart. This is the advice from a father who loves you; welcome it and faithfully put it into practice. The labor of obedience will bring you back to him from whom you had drifted through the sloth of disobedience. This message of mine is for you, then, if you are ready to give up you own will, once and for all, and armed with the strong and noble weapons of obedience to do battle for the true King, Christ the Lord.

First of all, every time you begin a good work, you must pray to him most earnestly to bring it to perfection. In his goodness, he has already counted us as sons, and therefore we should never grieve him by our evil actions. With his good gifts which are in us, we must obey him at all times . . . . (Prologue 1-6)

In the mercies of the Lord, Pascha has brought me yet another chance to begin again.

Joe Sachs' Translations of Aristotle and Plato

One of the important considerations in doing ancient philosophy, especially if one is not proficient in ancient Greek, is the selection of trustworthy and accurate translations of the texts one will encounter. Thankfully, we are seeing today another surge in excellent translations of Plato and Aristotle by various translators. I want here to recommend five texts translated by Joe Sachs of St. John's College (Annapolis). All the texts strive for understandability while also being faithful to the linguistics of the original. Sachs' own genius is his ability to bypass the accumulated Aristotelian technical vocabulary which we in the West have inherited through Latin (e. g., substance, actuality, virtue, etc.), and get back to the sort of common everyday words that Aristotle himself used. So, for energeia, translated traditionally into English via Latin as "actuality," or "activity," Sachs translates as "being-at-work." This is a cumbersome rendering, to be sure, but it more carefully articulates Aristotle's actual meaning. (So, too, for entelecheia, which Sachs translates as an unwieldy, but clearer "being-at-work-staying-itself.") My only quibble, and it's Sachs' own quibble, is his translation of ousia, as "thinghood." For Sachs, ugly as he admits this is, it is the best translation he can think of. And he's being doing this for thirty years.

So, here are the seminal Sachs translations of Aristotle's major works:

Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study (Masterworks of Discovery)

Aristotle's Metaphysics (Sachs' introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics, is here.)

Aristotle's On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Last year Sachs jumped into Platonic territory. Although I've not read the translation, and Plato's vocabularly is significantly different than Aristotle's, still I'm excited to read this Platonic text on knowing and knowledge.

Plato: Theaetetus

On Aristotle and Unrestraint (Nicomachean Ethics Bk VII)

Well, I finished another one of my papers. This one is on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VII, on unrestraint (akrasia). The problem Aristotle examines is how one may, to put it differently than the Philosopher, "know the good one ought to do" and yet fail to do it. (You can read a copy of it online, in pdf format, here.)

Next up, a paper on free will. It's actually already written, but since I attempted to examine the phenomenon of free will through Aristotle and did so in ways that the professor seemed to think didn't fit the requirements, I was asked to rewrite it. I'm not sure yet whether it will be a major revision, or just the inclusion of some extra writing to bring the paper into conformity with his standards. We'll see.

After that it's Sextus Empiricus, topic to be determined, and a final one on Aristotle and the relationship between divine intellect and human intellect. That last, on Aristotle, was a directed reading I set up to test the waters for my dissertation topic. So this paper will be the seedbed for my dissertation proposal.

And with the completion of the Aristotle paper on akrasia, I'm back on my writing schedule. Here's to hoping this free will paper doesn't take longer than this week to do.

Wish me luck!

[Update]: Yikes. I reviewed the notes on my free will paper. It looks as though the revision will have to be massive: essentially the writing of a new paper. *sigh* [rolls up sleeves] Time to get to work.

The Bright Resurrection of Christ, the Pascha of the Lord

Thy Resurrection, O Christ our Savior, the angels in heaven sing,
enable us here on earth to glorify Thee in purity of heart.

Christ is risen from the dead,
trampling down death by death,
and upon those in the tombs bestowing life.

It is the Day of Resurrection, let us be radiant, O ye people; Pascha, the Lord's Pascha: for from death to life, and from earth to heaven, Christ God hath brought us, as we sing the hymn of victory.

Let us purify our senses, and we shall behold Christ, radiant with the unapproachable light of the Resurrection, and we shall hear Him say, "Rejoice!" as we sing the hymn of victory.

Let the heavens be glad as is meet, and let the earth rejoice, and let the whole world both visible and invisible, keep festival: for Christ is risen, O gladness eternal.

Having beheld the Resurrection of Christ, let us worship the holy Lord Jesus, the only Sinless One. We worship Thy Cross, O Christ, and Thy holy Resurrection we hymn and glorify; for Thou art our God, and we know none other beside Thee, we call upon Thy name. O come all ye faithful, let us worship Christ's holy Resurrection, for behold, through the Cross joy hath come to all the world. Ever blessing the Lord, we hymn His Resurrection; for, having endured the Cross, He hath destroyed death by death.

Jesus, having risen from the grave as He foretold, hath given us life eternal and great mercy.

Peeps and Bunnies Silliness

Apparently there is a bunch of scientific research being done on/with those cute little chicks and bunnies.

Check out the Bunny Survival Tests webpage.

There's also the Bunnies Strike Back site.

And don't forget the Peep Research page.

Last, but not least, go see a different kind of Peep Research

Enjoy.

Pope Benedict's Pre-Election Prayer: "Don't do this to me."

According to an AP report, Pope Benedict Prayed Not to Be Elected. In speaking to a German audience, Benedict said:

"As the trend in the ballots slowly made me realize that — in a manner of speaking the guillotine would fall on me — I started to feel quite dizzy," a smiling Benedict said, clearly joking. "I thought that I had done my life's work and could now hope to live out my days in peace. I told the Lord with deep conviction, 'Don't do this to me.'"

He recalled saying to God in his prayers: "You have younger, better, more enthusiastic and energetic candidates."

"Evidently, this time He didn't listen to me," Benedict said.