Kevin has given a reply to my last post in our exchange: What We Have Here. Much of that reply is rehash of what has gone before, so I will not deal with it as extensively as I have before. Indeed, once again Kevin's reply does not serve to advance the discussion any further, though it does serve to highlight even more our differences. For this reason, and due also to the encroachment of Great and Holy Lent, this will be my final response to Kevin. If he chooses to reply to this my final post, I will link to it on the main page of my blog, and allow him to have the last word. For my purposes, this is my last word on the matter between us.
(Note: A list of all the posts in this dia-blog to date, not including this one, follows at the end of this post.)
Kevin once again objects to my interpretation of his comments:
Clifton's latest response is largely filled with the claim that he had indeed substantively captured my argument and refuted it, even though I didn't, and still don't recognize this argument as put in his own words.
But this is all he has ever said about these things: that he doesn't recognize my purported interpretation. He says I've gotten his argument wrong. But it's not yet been demonstrated that I've in fact gotten him wrong or that the conclusions and implications I draw from his arguments are in fact themselves invalid. So, I maintain still that I have grasped Kevin's argument and drawn the proper valid inferences and conclusions. Kevin may not like the end result, but he can choose only from a few options: to keep his opinion in the face of the demonstration of its errors, revise his opinion to address the errors, or give up his opinion.
He next quibbles that I've misconstrued what connotations he intends by his use of tradition:
To the main point, though. Clifton concludes, "For the record we stand where we first did: Kevin arguing that (true) Tradition is nothing more than the propositional and inferential content of Scripture, and me arguing that Scripture is part of Tradition, the same in essence but different in material." For may part, this doesn't quite capture it. The fault could well be my own. I have said that the whole of tradition has been inscripturated; however, I did not mean to imply that it has been stripped of its life and is now nothing more than propositional and inferential content.
This is a diversion. I've never indicated that his understanding of tradition is void of life. But even if I had, the issue is whether his understanding of tradition is correct, true and valid. I have contended that it is not.
He next finally begins to address the main point of our extended dia-blog:
This discussion is limited to those who at least agree on the divine authority of Scripture (or, at a minimum, the "Protestant 66"). Within these parameters, those who add to this propositional base and those who do not are advocating contradictory claims. Furthermore, the burden of proof is on the one who wants to make the additions. Here is the place to bring up Clifton's refrain that one of my favorite fallacies is assuming that lack of proof for the other side consitutes proof for my own. I wouldn't go so far as to say that it constitutes proof of my own, since, any minute now, he could pull out all that proof that he's been saving back. But, until this happens, it does constitute excellent grounds to think that my position is the more reasonable option. Our positions (within the parameters described) are not merely contrary, such that only one of us might be right but both could be wrong. They are contradictory positions, such that one of us must be right and the other must be wrong. Add to this that the burden of proof is on his side and his own lack of proof is a bigger problem for his position than he seems willing to admit.
Here he claims to not be proving his argument through the purported absence of proof of my own argument, but in point of fact, when he demands a shifting of the burden of proof to me and that I must be the one to present proof that Tradition is legitimately larger than the inscripturated Tradition, he assumes his position by default. How does he put it? "I wouldn't go so far as to say that it constitutes proof of my own, since, any minute now, he could pull out all that proof that he's been saving back. But, until this happens, it does constitute excellent grounds to think that my position is the more reasonable option." But why should we assume that his position is the "more reasonable" one? That is exactly the point at issue. This begs the question, and despite his protestations it is