This is Life!: Revolutions Around the Cruciform Axis

What Have We Here? (My Final Reply to Kevin. Period.)

Kevin has given a reply to my last post in our exchange: What We Have Here. Much of that reply is rehash of what has gone before, so I will not deal with it as extensively as I have before. Indeed, once again Kevin's reply does not serve to advance the discussion any further, though it does serve to highlight even more our differences. For this reason, and due also to the encroachment of Great and Holy Lent, this will be my final response to Kevin. If he chooses to reply to this my final post, I will link to it on the main page of my blog, and allow him to have the last word. For my purposes, this is my last word on the matter between us.

(Note: A list of all the posts in this dia-blog to date, not including this one, follows at the end of this post.)

Kevin once again objects to my interpretation of his comments:

Clifton's latest response is largely filled with the claim that he had indeed substantively captured my argument and refuted it, even though I didn't, and still don't recognize this argument as put in his own words.

But this is all he has ever said about these things: that he doesn't recognize my purported interpretation. He says I've gotten his argument wrong. But it's not yet been demonstrated that I've in fact gotten him wrong or that the conclusions and implications I draw from his arguments are in fact themselves invalid. So, I maintain still that I have grasped Kevin's argument and drawn the proper valid inferences and conclusions. Kevin may not like the end result, but he can choose only from a few options: to keep his opinion in the face of the demonstration of its errors, revise his opinion to address the errors, or give up his opinion.

He next quibbles that I've misconstrued what connotations he intends by his use of tradition:

To the main point, though. Clifton concludes, "For the record we stand where we first did: Kevin arguing that (true) Tradition is nothing more than the propositional and inferential content of Scripture, and me arguing that Scripture is part of Tradition, the same in essence but different in material." For may part, this doesn't quite capture it. The fault could well be my own. I have said that the whole of tradition has been inscripturated; however, I did not mean to imply that it has been stripped of its life and is now nothing more than propositional and inferential content.

This is a diversion. I've never indicated that his understanding of tradition is void of life. But even if I had, the issue is whether his understanding of tradition is correct, true and valid. I have contended that it is not.

He next finally begins to address the main point of our extended dia-blog:

This discussion is limited to those who at least agree on the divine authority of Scripture (or, at a minimum, the "Protestant 66"). Within these parameters, those who add to this propositional base and those who do not are advocating contradictory claims. Furthermore, the burden of proof is on the one who wants to make the additions. Here is the place to bring up Clifton's refrain that one of my favorite fallacies is assuming that lack of proof for the other side consitutes proof for my own. I wouldn't go so far as to say that it constitutes proof of my own, since, any minute now, he could pull out all that proof that he's been saving back. But, until this happens, it does constitute excellent grounds to think that my position is the more reasonable option. Our positions (within the parameters described) are not merely contrary, such that only one of us might be right but both could be wrong. They are contradictory positions, such that one of us must be right and the other must be wrong. Add to this that the burden of proof is on his side and his own lack of proof is a bigger problem for his position than he seems willing to admit.

Here he claims to not be proving his argument through the purported absence of proof of my own argument, but in point of fact, when he demands a shifting of the burden of proof to me and that I must be the one to present proof that Tradition is legitimately larger than the inscripturated Tradition, he assumes his position by default. How does he put it? "I wouldn't go so far as to say that it constitutes proof of my own, since, any minute now, he could pull out all that proof that he's been saving back. But, until this happens, it does constitute excellent grounds to think that my position is the more reasonable option." But why should we assume that his position is the "more reasonable" one? That is exactly the point at issue. This begs the question, and despite his protestations it is a fallacy.

In the comments to the post to which I'm replying, he clarifies his "burden of proof" contention to one of his commenters who thinks the burden of proof is his:

As to the burden of proof, you're disagreement is begging the question. That he is "simply stating the ancient church's stance" and "has changed nothing" is what is in dispute. The debate is whether Holy Tradition, as understood by the Orthodox, really was a part of Christianity from the start. Our common ground will have to be found elsewhere. This is in Scripture. We both accept it is a rule of faith and practice, but I argue that it is the only binding rule. It may be that you are right about the church. However, burden of proof cannot be based upon what is in dispute, but upon what is not in dispute.

While it is true that Kevin and I agree on Scripture being a/the rule of faith and practice, what he wants to argue, "that Scripture is the only binding rule" is, indeed, in contention. I do not accept it. Just as he does not accept my argument regarding the Tradition. In other words, my contention is that Scripture is not the only binding rule. If what he is saying about burden of proof is going to be applied to my argument about the Tradition, then it must be applied to him as well. If he wants to reply that the Scripture itself makes this claim, then he can provide evidence for it.

As he sets up the examination of my views, he says (in a refrain familiar to our readers): "Not to worry, though, I can still assume the invalidity of expanded tradition based on the fact that he has not met that burden of proof." In point of fact, no, he cannot assume invalidity simply because the burden of proof hasn't been met. This is a logically fallacy. (I am mystified that he cannot see this.) The only valid and logical claim he can make is that I've not met the burden of proof. Or to say it more technically: if he can demonstrate the invalidity of my argument, he can say I have an invalid argument, that I haven't met the burden of proof. But he cannot assume that the claim itself is not true or that a valid argument cannot be made. And this, in fact, is what he is doing. It is convenient for him to do this, because he can then claim his opinion in correct. But that is an invalid and illogical claim. One ought not be fooled.

Think of it this way: We have been making two arguments both in parallel and in response to one another, he arguing for a view of inscripturated Tradition, me arguing for a view of Tradition in which Scripture is included. But these are two distinct arguments, they are not simply the positive and negative side of the same question. Therefore, he cannot claim "burden of proof." If they were truly the positive and negative sides of the argument, it would be me arguing that Tradition is authoritative alongside Scripture, and him arguing that there is only inscripturated Tradition. But my argument has never been that Tradition and Scripture are parallel authorities, but that the authority itself is the Tradition, one manifestation of which is the Scripture.

Furthermore, his intimation that I have not provided proof for my position is disingenuous. In point of fact, I have provided proof of my argument, itself limited to the very Scriptures he claims are the only legitimate form of the Tradition. That he disagrees with my interpretation of certain passages is evident. But primarily what he has done is gainsay my interpretations. And this is where the matter stands: we disagree on the proper understanding of the seminal texts undergirding our respective positions.

Kevin then goes on to rehash the different interpretations of Matthew 18:18-20, 1 Timothy 3:15, and John 16:13. With regard to Matthew 18, he says nothing new and again fails to address the promise of binding and loosing in matters of discipline that Christ gives to the Church and the infallible discernment necessary for such a promise to be realized. I'll leave it to our readers to determine who has the better read of this passage.

With regard to John 16:13, Kevin still attempts to make distinctions in Jesus' promise between the promise being one of the Apostles writing the Scriptures, and later followers interpreting them. He claims the infallibility adheres to the former and not to the latter. But this is a distinction unsupported by the text. Kevin has to limit what Jesus meant by "truth" here, because his argument demands it, but he cannot prove it. He can import his tendentious readings into the text, but this only begs the question, which is no proof. In point of fact, what Jesus promised was that the Holy Spirit would lead them into all truth. Kevin presumably knows his argument is weak here, so he does admit that the Holy Spirit goes on then to illumine the members of the Church to understand the Scriptures. But in so doing, he has simply confirmed the tenor of my reading of John 16:13. He's just gotten to it in a roundabout way. In other words, we once again disagree on the interpretation of John 16:13, but I'll leave it to our readers to determine whether it makes sense from the text itself to interpret it the way Kevin does or the way I do.

With regard to 1 Timothy 3, the only thing he adds is that for my interpretation of the Church's infallibility in this passage to be true, I must argue that the Church's infallibility is necessary. It's not clear what he means by this. For if the Church is, as he admits, a pillar and ground of the truth, then it is necessary that the Church be what Paul says She is. He further admits that this claim (the Church is a pillar and ground of the truth) is compatible with his own contention that the Holy Spirit and the inscripturated word are similarly infallible pillars and grounds of the truth. But he doesn't want to admit the reality of an infallible Church, so if we have the Holy Spirit and the inscripturated Tradition, there's no need, so he claims, for an infallible Church. But this only dances around the text. For if the Scripture is infallible, which he admits, and the Scripture calls the Church a pillar and ground of the truth, then it is necessary that the Church be that very thing. Where Kevin and I differ, then, is what it means for the Church to be a pillar and ground of the truth. I claim it means infallibility, for if the truth itself is upheld and founded upon the Church (in complete harmony with the Scripture and the Holy Spirit), then the Church cannot err, or fail in terms of the truth. Kevin hasn't addressed this claim from the infallible Scriptures. He's avoided it. He has to, because it is fatal to his argument. Whether our readers think Kevin or I have the better interpretation of 1 Timothy 3, I'll leave to them.

Though I have clearly stated that this issue is one of hermeneutics, Kevin wants to commit my argument to the terms of epistemology. Though I admit hermeneutics and epistemology are related, they are necessarily distinct. So I'm not persuaded it's a matter of epistemology. After all, neither of us is arguing as to whether knowledge is itself possible or impossible, rather, we are arguing as to whether any particular disputed interpretation of a given text can be trusted. This is not a matter of whether or not we can know anything at all, but how it is we can know the truth of the Scriptural texts. And that is a hermeneutical problem.

I should be clear: my argument on the Church's infallibility is based on the Scriptural texts and the proof of what the Church is and has been promised. I have not made the argument that since there is a need for authority in deciding between interpretations, therefore the Church must be infallible. Whether or not there is a need for such interpretive authority is beside the point of my argument. The question is whether Scripture predicates infallibility of the Church. I argue that it does. If my argument from Scripture is both valid and true, and if there is, indeed, a need for such an infallible interpreter, then the Church can fill that need. But whether or not the Church is infallible is not predicated upon the need. Or at least I have not done so in my argument.

So when Kevin replies to my uncovering of three of his red herrings--"But this is not a tu quoque [an logical fallacy]. The main reason is that Clifton has presented ecclesiastical interpretive infallibility as the answer to epistemological uncertainty. I am responding to his argument, not to Clifton himself, by denying this."--he is just simply incorrect. My argument is not that infallibility is an answer to the need of hermeneutic (and not epistemological) uncertainty. My argument is that infallibility is a quality of the Church. Period. Yet despite that I have clearly articulated this argument, Kevin still replies, "[G]iven that Clifton is the one who brought up the necessity of an infallible church for settling interpretive disputes, I find this point disingenuous." That may well be what he finds it, but in the face of my clear articulation of my argument, if he cannot substantiate that I am predicating infallibility on the need for settling hermeneutic uncertainty, he can call it disingenuous all he wants, but it will not refute the argument.

That being said, however, there is, in fact, such a need to guide interpreters through hermeneutical disputes. For if the matter of Scripture and Tradition does ultimately come to, as I contend, a problem of hermeneutics, then, as Kevin puts it,

How can one know what the Scripture means? . . . How does one know whose interpretation is authoritative?

As has been demonstrated in our exchange, the inescapable issue really becomes one of trust and authority. (And this is why, I think, Kevin keeps thinking that my argument is predicated on this need.) Kevin wants to claim that no matter how one states the question, it will always boil down to the decision of the individual interpreter: "The question of who to trust, whether it is one's own interpretation of Scripture or the interpretation of the group, including any and all churches, is still a matter of individual decision." And as he states again only sentences after that assertion: "[I]t is still up to the individual to indentify the infallible authority among competing claims."

Presumably Kevin thinks by this relativization to deflate my argument for the Church's infallibility. It seems that his argument is that instead of an infallible Church resolving interpretive differences, everything still boils down to the individual making the determination. But this relativization not only does not deflate my argument, it actually strengthens it.

First of all, Kevin has merely confirmed the conclusions I've traced from his argument, for if Christ did not, in fact, promise infallibility to His Church, then it ultimately makes little difference whether or not the Scriptures are infallible. For that claim itself (that Scripture is infallible) is a result not of an unequivocal, "Thus saith the Lord," book-chapter-verse, declarative statement in Scripture, but an inference--that is to say, an interpretation--made on the basis of other propositions one finds in Scripture. Indeed, in admitting from the start that Tradition is nothing more than the propositional and inferential content of Scripture, Kevin imports hermeneutics into his very definition of Tradition. This is the fundamental question-begging, and fallacious, nature of his account that I have been demonstrating from the beggining. His argument fails from the beginning because it is fundamentally circular.

Secondly, Kevin's relativization cannot escape its solipsism. If the scenario really is what he says it is, then not only do I, nor does anyone else, have any reason whatsoever to follow his interpretation, in the end, neither does he. It is another form of the cogito: "I interpret, therefore I am." I should be clear to note that he has, in an earlier post, admitted that in hermeneutical disputes one should submit to the interpretation of one's church's leaders. One would well ask why that should be the case, if in the end the individual interpreter is the final arbiter, but no sooner does one frame the question than Kevin adds that if one has a conviction that to obey one's leaders would be to disobey God, then one should disobey one's leaders. So, he does consistently finally return to the individual interpreter.

Thirdly, it appears that Kevin thinks that by denying the infallibility of the Church he has strengthened the case for the infallibility, and sole authority, of the Scriptures. But as is by now obvious, in reality he has only affirmed the practical infallibility of the individual interpreter. He resists this conclusion, indeed, he would likely deny it is a valid conclusion. But despite his denial, it is inevitable. An infallible Scripture will always, must always, be interpreted. If the Church is not an infallible authority, it will make no difference whether or not Kevin actually argues for an infallible interpreter, in the way he frames his argument the individual must necessarily function as though he were infallible. Not even Kevin can get around this, which he has shown here by explicitly resorting to it.

In actual fact, however, I dispute what Kevin contends. That an individual is always an interpreter when it comes to Scripture, and that an individual is called to discrimination and discernment of interpretive and authority claims, we may take as a given. But this does not necessarily end in hermeneutic uncertainty. As Kevin himself has concluded, it does boil down to trust. Indeed, I would contend that epistemology itself (as distinct from hermeneutics) ultimately comes down to faith, even if that is a faith in reason. Both Kevin and I would argue that our faith is placed in God's Spirit to lead us into all truth. The difference between us is that Kevin thinks the individual is finally and ultimately competent to be that conduit of truth, whereas I think the Church is that entity.

Kevin's final two paragraphs ask some questions as to the relation of the Church's infallibility and soteriology. As these paragraphs take us away from the argument proper, I will not address these in detail. I will only note briefly that the Orthodox understanding of salvation is predicated on the synergy expressed in Philippians 2:12-13, Ephesians 2:10, and James 2:17-26. I will also note that it is in that latter reference that the infallible text says: "You see that a person is justified by works and not by faith alone" (emphasis added).

Final Note: For all the posts in this discussion, cf. the following:

No, You Do NOT Have a Right to Depart from the Tradition (Initial post by Clifton)
Inscripturated Apostolic Tradition (Initial response by Kevin)
My Reply to Kevin re: Tradition and Scripture (Clifton)
Response to Tradition and Scripture (Kevin)
My Account of Scripture and Tradition (Secondary post by Clifton reflecting on Scripture and Tradition in general)
Voiding the Word (Kevin's reply to "My Account of Scripture and Tradition")
Tradition and Scripture Continued: My Response to Kevin (Clifton's reply to Kevin's "Response to Tradition and Scripture")
A-Voiding the Word: My Response to Kevin's Other Post (Clifton's Reply to Kevin's "Voiding the Word")
Epistemological Comfort Blankets (Kevin's combined reply to the previous two replies by Clifton)
Hermeneutics and Infallibility, or, As Expected, the Impasse Has Quickly Been Reached: A Reply to Kevin (Clifton's reply to Kevin)
Morphemics: Vicious Interpretive Circles (Kevin's reply)
Vicious Interpretive Circles, Indeed! (A Final Reply to Kevin?) (Clifton again)
What We Have Here (Kevin's penultimate [?] reply to the above post and that to which this post is a reply)

If Kevin replies to this post, I will link to it on the main page, and update this list of links to include both this reply and Kevin's last words, if any.

Posted by Clifton at March 9, 2005 03:00 PM | TrackBack