August 27, 2003

The Price of Status

Scott's entry and the New York Times's article on Steven Levitt's work at the University of Chicago was fascinating. I really identify with Levitt's work and the questions that come naturally to him. Some may think his work is trivial, for example, his paper on why drug dealers still live with their moms. It's funny reading the title, and on the face of it it would not appear to address some the most pressing questions of our day. But consider the findings: drug dealers live with their moms because, as it turns out, the take-home pay for a dealer is comparable to that of a burger-flipper. If I worked with drug dealers trying to convince them to change their occupation, I would want to be armed with this information. It seems like most gang counsellors try to persuade dealers to quit despite the fact that they would take a huge pay-cut. Well, perhaps the pay cut would not be so drastic after all?

His work of examining the financing of a gang as if it were a corporation gives me some encouragement that there may be a future for my ideas about the price of status. Like some of Levitt's work, it would require "measuring the immeasurable." Economists have shown that when people buy goods, they often are not only purchasing the good itself, but also a secondary good, such as when someone buys fashionable clothes, they are also buying the status that comes along with owning those goods (if anyone can remember where they've seen this, please let me know--I can't remember the title of the paper).

Another important crutch of this idea is the anthropology theories that define our quest for status, similar to animals, in terms of our desire to find a good mate. A lot of it is based on evolutionary biology, but I don't understand all of that too well yet.

So what interests me is that it seems that the price of status is vastly different within different communities. In some cases this price is completely straightforward: among wealthy businessmen, status is very expensive: Italian Sports Cars, ten thousand dollar watches, Italian suits, etc. The high price of status is set by the high income of the community.

But among other groups the status issue is much more interesting. Let's take, for two examles, hippies and young African-Americans in the rap comunity (my biggest problem so far is avioding angering people for using racial stereotypes--I will have to be very careful). Among the hippies, status seems downright cheap, a pair of cords bought at the thrift store for less than $5, an old VW had for less than a couple thousand, or in some cases, a nicer microbus worth as much as $8-10 thousand. However, there's a lot of anthropological research to support this; the community still has to be able to differentiate who's in and who is not. There are a lot of obvious things, like dancing style (if you have ever been to a Phish concert, you know what I mean), language, etc. that take some time to learn in order to be considered a part of the community.

But what I think is interesting is that the the community seems to raise the relative price of status (to put up barriers to define the boundries of the community) in the status symbols themselves. What I mean is, within the style of hippies, there are elements that reduce one's earning potential to where a $5 pair of cords can be a significant investment, and a VW certainly is. The fact that the hippies with the most status have long dreads and do not subscribe to mainstream olfactory tastes (they often smell like a combination of patchouli and natural body odor, but that is not to say they are not clean. The point is that many outside the community think they aren't clean, like potential employers), serves to reduce their earning potential to raise the relative price of status. Also, the value placed on travel, including following bands such as Phish, eats up much of their income, and further reduces earning potential because they tend to not stay at jobs for a long period of time between trips. A second interesting thing about this community is that it gives a comparative advantage to "trust fund kids" who have money even though they have little earning potential, therefore they can consume a great deal of status at a relatively low price.

The Hip-Hop community, on the other hand, is quite different. It seems to me that the price of status is set by the few people with extremely high incomes: basketball players, rap stars, and gangsters (though Levitt's aforementioned study might cause me to revise this), and the vast majority of the members of the community have very low incomes. This creates a peculiar situation (the implications of which I would like to investigate), where status is extremely expensive relative to average income. The community barriers (like language mentioned above) make it even more difficult. Someone who has consumed a lot of status in this community will also have reduced earning potential. He will be perceived to be unprofessional because of his appropriation of the group's language and mannerisms (see How Hip Hop Holds Blacks Back ).

Another barrier in the community (and any community for that mattter) is arbitrary change of status. Among the hippies, this change is extremely slow--what bought you status 5 years ago will buy you just about the same amount today. But in the hip-hop community it changes very rapidly. As a friend who worked in the inner city told me, 10 years ago you needed gold if you wanted status. 5 years ago that arbitrarily changed to platinum, so you had to get rid of all your gold and buy platinum. Now in the last couple of years it has changed back to gold. These changes cause status prices to skyrocket.

So originally my theory was that relative status prices remain somewhat constant because they are set by the imcome of the community that defines the status. But it seems that status prices can vary, especially if the prices are set by a subgroup within the community that has a very different income than the rest of the group, as seems to be the case with the hip-hop comunity. I am interested in whether this is indeed the case, and if so, is it unique to this community, or are there other examples? Also, how do we work to reduce the price of status in order to increase the welfare of the group? Asking this question sort of violates the assumption in economics that one cannot judge the preferences of another--they are maximizing utility based on what they value. But are preferences really exogenous, that is, are they accounted for by something outside the model that we cannot change? Or can we change people's preferences within the model? A reduction in the price of status could be effected by a reduction in its demand (trying to convince people that they would be better off consuming less). Or perhaps by increasing supply (making it cool to wear less expensive things)? or both?

The point is not to change what people wear. The issue is not that black guys should look like white guys because white guys dress better. The problem that I think should be addressed is how can we help lift the African-American inner city population out of poverty by building social capital that will help them make decisions cosistent with the long-term goal of climbing out of poverty. I think that understanding the preferences and goals behind the purchases of popular goods can help us understand the people many of us are trying to help build stronger communities and better lives. The difficulty is that we are dealing with people's identity, not just their stuff.

Posted by Matthew Pearson at August 27, 2003 10:50 AM | TrackBack
Comments

I love this theory, and think there are a lot of avenues you can pursue. For one, some of the work sounds similar to Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action. You may want to look at status as being a component of club theory - that the status is a price needed to eliminate free-riding, since the good being consumed and produced is actually, not status, but the community in question. So, for instance, it's ultimately initiation into the club that is of value, yet to reduce free-riding - which is always present in collection action - club managers force members to bear various costs, such as high-priced goods, or intiation rites. For instance, think of the effect that initiation into gangs would have on free-riding - in NYC, there is that ongoing rumor that gang initiation requires pushing a stranger in front of an oncoming subway car. This requirement essentially guarantees far more committment among the customer, as well as increasing the value of memberhsip itself. After I've murdered someone, do I really want to just be casually acquainted with my gang? They offer me protection, comraderie, and absolution. So, there's some ways of thinking as status from this perspective.

Another thing that came to mind when you wrote this was the idea that for the hippie, status is cheap. But can't you also think of it as expensive? For instance, as you mentioned to me once before, the sloven appearance essentially reduces my marketability. I can't get a job with long hair (let's say). So, even though the price of the status-good is cheap, in nominal terms, it's real price could be very high, since it reduces one's opportunties on the market.

One interesting tangent on that is to think about a special I saw on 20/20 a while back about Japanese businessmen who cover their bodies in tattoos, but the tattoos are in places that can't be seen. One Japanese businessman was in a suit and tie, and looked very professional. He took his jacket and shirt off, and something like 80% of his body was tattoo'd, but he had been careful to have them stop at the point of his shirt's cuffs and neckline. It was really interesting.

You definitely don't want to change people's preferences, though. You want to assume preferences are stable over time, and homogenous across a distribution. You might want to check this book out, too:

Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxfore University Press, 1985), by Robert H. Frank.

Posted by: scott cunningham at August 27, 2003 12:20 PM

Sorry, I meant to include a link to the Frank book.

Posted by: scott cunningham at August 27, 2003 12:24 PM

Thanks for the comment Scott. I meant to imply that the status among hippies is expensive considering the reduced earning potential that the lifestyle brings. But since nominally it's cheap, it gives a huge advantage to the trust fund kids.

And for the purposes of an economic study, you would want to assume preferences are stable, but I should have mentioned that changing preferences is the work of another after the study is done (much like the gang counsellor appropriating Levitt's work to persuade the dealer to take up another occupation). It may not be the job of the economist, but few would disagree that there is work to be done to raise the standard of living and economic opportunity of this group, and building social capital necessarily changes preferences--hopefully it changes lives, but alas, I took off my economist hat and put on my community development ministry hat without mentioning it.

Also, I think the club theory is very interesting, and I have thought of it many times from the perspective of fraternities and my own experience in the Marines. You rarely hear anyone even constructively critize these groups, because of the cognative dissonance (thanks Psych 101) associated with being critical of a group that you made a huge sacrifice to become a part of. I have considered applications to my ideas on status, but I have yet to really figure out where it fits. Heck, this was my first attempt to put any of this into writing. Great comment, Scott, thank you.

Posted by: Matthew Pearson at August 27, 2003 12:35 PM

One thing about the Levitt study - even though takehome is so bad, it could be that the expected utility is still high, since more than likely, the spread is going to be fairly wide - ranging anywhere from really bad pay, to extroadinarily great pay. For the risk-loving person, this might be worth the risk, and so they may not really want the alternative job, since there, the expected income is more or less going to be fairly stable. Becker talks about this kind of behavior in his 1968 JPE article, "Crime and PUnishment: AN Economic Approach," which I mention only because I had to read it for class today. Anyway, the point being, they may be inclined towards gangbanging, even in spite of the fact that the takehome, on average, is really low, because the spread is still really wide. And if they're riskloving - and many from that demographic are - then that might explain why they're willing to undertake substantial risks for such a low probability of high return.

Posted by: scott cunningham at August 27, 2003 05:07 PM

One last thing - when you get a chance, you might enjoy this article, forthcoming in the JEBO by Bryan Caplan. I think it's titled something to the effect of "Becker-Stigler vs. Myers-Briggs". Caplan, I think, has some background in behavioral economics, and draws upon a rich amount of empirical and theoretical work in personality psychology to argue that Becker-Stigler's assumption that preferences need be identical is not, empirically, the case. But, interestingly, the personality psychology literature does support the idea that preferences are stable over time. There are roughly five agreed upon personality dimensions (similar to the four outlined by Myers-Briggs), and while these are distributed randomly throughout the population, people with them are not prone to change their preferences over time - or at least, after the age of 30. So, there's some support for the idea that preferences don't change. Behavioral changes may be sought after by using the neoclassical approach that changes may be a result of income, prices, past consumption (ie, human capital) or changes in supply, and not merely becuase of a change in preferences.

Posted by: scott cunningham at August 28, 2003 05:35 AM

good god, man, write some stuff

Posted by: jeremy at September 8, 2003 11:17 PM

Matthew is showing himself to be unworthy of this blog. We should stage a coup d'etat.

Posted by: scott cunningham at September 10, 2003 05:26 AM

Uhhh.....Pearson, where will you be watching the UT/UF game? Just trying to tone things down to my level. I must come out of the closet and tell you guys how much I have enjoyed reading your stuff. I stumbled on Chronic Murmurings and have been reading it occasionally. A quick update. Amy and I are back in the office after a summertime spent in China. Speaking of which I think there is some fascinating stuff going on there in an economical sense as the culture adjusts to the rising tide of what I would now call restrained capitalism. Anyway, we plan on stopping our travels next spring and will in all likelihood end up in Chicago. Take care guys and keep writing.

Posted by: todd haberkost at September 11, 2003 09:45 AM
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