This is Life!: Revolutions Around the Cruciform Axis

Which of Hume's writings has that inductive argument on cosmological design? Do you know of any critiques of Hume (especially his "On the Stanadard of Taste")

Karl:

No, I'm sorry, I don't. The book didn't give a cite.

If I were a guessin' man, I'd say it's problem in the Dialogues on Natural Religion--but then, that's the obvious guess.

Let me see if I can dig something up.

Aha! I was right. It's in Part II. And it is the prologue to Hume's critique of the design argument:

Hume criticizes the argument on two main grounds. First, Hume rejects the analogy between the material universe and any particular human artifact. As Hume states the relevant rule of analogy, "wherever you depart in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty" (Hume, Dialogues, Part II). Hume then goes on to argue that the cases are simply too dissimilar to support an inference that they are like effects having like causes:

If we see a house,… we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect (Hume, Dialogues, Part II).

Since the analogy fails, Hume argues that we would need to have experience with the creation of material worlds in order to justify any a posteriori claims about the causes of any particular material world; since we obviously lack such experience, we lack adequate justification for the claim that the material universe has an intelligent cause.

Second, Hume argues that, even if the resemblance between the material universe and human artifacts justified thinking they have similar causes, it would not justify thinking that an all-perfect God exists and created the world. For example, there is nothing in the argument that would warrant the inference that the creator of the universe is perfectly intelligent or perfectly good. Indeed, Hume argues that there is nothing there that would justify thinking even that there is just one deity: "what shadow of an argument... can you produce from your hypothesis to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world" (Hume Dialogues, Part V)?

I happen to think that Hume is mistaken. If one sets up a similarities/tables differences--and if one uses a more generic and dynamic model of machines--one will find that the similarities go to the essence of the composition of a machine and the cosmos.

That being said, I do think that Hume is right that arguing the origins of the cosmos in an intelligence does not automatically necessitate a personal, theistic intelligence (cf. Aristotle).

"I do think that Hume is right that arguing the origins of the cosmos in an intelligence does not automatically necessitate a personal, theistic intelligence"

I concur. Thanks for looking that up!

It seems there is a more fundamental problem with the analogy since a machine or a house is constructed from pre-existing materials whereas the universe, in the Judeo-Christian understanding, is created ex nihilo. At most, then, it may indicate a designer, but only one who designed from materials which either existed prior to the designer or in conjunction with the designer. (This observation is, of course, nothing new; Maimonides treatment of it in The Guide of the Perplexed forms the basis for his limitations on human (philosophical) knowledge and the need to find instruction in the Law.)

There also seems to be another fundamental problem and that is the fact when we see a house or a machine, we recognize them as such as being crafted by the only intelligence we know by virtue of possessing that intelligence, i.e., human intelligence. A house and a machine are specifically human artifacts which do not occur on their own in the natural world. However, we are not human artifacts nor is the sun, the moon, or the stars. The composition of the planet does not come from human design. Now, in the case of a machine or a house, we get a sense of its unique character as being a human creation by, perhaps, comparing it to what occurs naturally in the world. However, what do we compare a rock or a beach or the ocean to? We know human beings could not have crafted them, but how could we ever come to suppose anything crafted them but mere chance? It seems there has to be an a priori belief that there is an intelligence out there already or that everything that exists not known to be crafted by the only intelligence we can always confirm (i.e. human intelligence) is designed (rather than randomly occuring).

Ok, I freely open this up to as much criticism as possible. The second paragraph is mostly a string of questions I find floating around in my head now and again that stops me short of making intelligent design arguments on the basis of human reason alone. Feel free to blow them apart. :)

Gabe:

Thanks for your response. Let me try to clarify some of the points of the argument re: your questions.

First of all, note that the point of the analogy is not the materials from whence a machine or nature is constructed but rather the purposive relations of the parts of the machine or nature. Certainly a house, a machine, and so forth consist of parts that are purposively related or connected. The analogy does not touch on nor, I think, does it need to, whence the materials for the purposively related parts.

Secondly, I should note and emphasize that this argument does not prove the existence or even the necessity of a designer. Indeed, that's one of the arguments made as to the secularity of the ID position and why it can be taught in schools. But as ID proponents such as Dr. Behe have noted, the ID position can lead to the logical inference of a designer. It's just that there is no logical necessity for such.

Again, the point of the analogy is not the fabrication of a machine, a house or nature, but rather the purposively related parts of these things. And that, I am submitting, humans do induce from the natural world around them. And given that they can induce a human intelligence behind purposively related parts of things designed by humans, then it is fair to induce some sort of intelligence behind the purposively related parts of nature and the design induced from them.

I hope this answers your questions.