This is Life!: Revolutions Around the Cruciform Axis

Kerry has made the mistake of paying attention to the fetus. He has allowed the argument to be taken to a focus on the baby in the womb. And every time--every time--the abortion argument gravitates to the nature of the life in the womb, the abortion argument will fail. Because the argument has to either deny the humanity of the unborn child--which then forces the question as to when do we become human--or argue for the right to kill a human being--which then forces the question of why those rights only apply in utero.

Not at all. The right to abortion may be justified by the principle that a woman has the right to refuse to act as a physical life-support system for a developing fetus, even if that fetus is held to be a full human being. After all, we don't compel a parent to donate tissue or organs--not even a small amount of blood--to save the life of her born child, even if she is the only match and the child will certainly die without it, and even though the burden of such a donation may be much less than the burden of completing an unwanted pregnancy.

Jim:

Clearly there is not equivalence between your two examples: the willful act of failing to provide the remedy to save a life is not at all the same as the willful act of intentional killing a life.

And the law clearly recognizes these distinctions.

That abortion is legal is so only because the full humanity of the fetus (and thus the moral principle of its inalienable civil rights) must be ignored in favor of the mother.

No advocacy of abortion can consistently maintain its arguments on its own terms if it is going to affirm the full humanity of the fetus.

Clearly there is not equivalence between your two examples: the willful act of failing to provide the remedy to save a life is not at all the same as the willful act of intentional killing a life.

But in abortion, a woman is simply refusing to allow a fetus to use her body as a physical life-support system. The fetus would die as a result of being deprived of that life-support system even if the abortion were performed in such a way that the procedure itself did not kill it (such as by surgically removing the living, intact fetus from the woman's uterus). I see a huge moral difference between killing a person who can live independently of me, and refusing to allow a person to use my body as a physical life-support system to sustain his own life. I think most other people see this moral difference, too, which is one reason why they are not willing to treat abortion as the equivalent of murder, or, in most cases, as any kind of crime at all.

Note that this principle is independent of the humanity of the fetus. It applies even if a fetus is considered to be a full-blown human person. I don't actually consider fetuses to be persons, but that's a separate issue.

Well, with the degree of viability of the fetus outside the womb being pushed back earlier and earlier in the pregnancy, your principle here doesn't really make any sense.

More to the point, however, it is not the case that the mother is merely refusing to allow the fetus to use her as life support (which is a complete misconstrual of the biological processes of pregnancy, and thus an irrational position in that it does not conform to reality). She, or the person performing the abortion, must take active measures to kill the fetus.

So the difference you suggest, even if it were a majority opinion in our culture, is another moral fiction.

Furthermore, you still cannot escape the entanglement of the humanity of the fetus and the obligations that that humanity entails. Because it is not simply the refusal to provide "life support" as you put it. And indeed, we do prosecute parents who do not provide the sort of care and nurture for the already-born children for whom they care. The difference is, when they don't provide the sort of parenting necessary these children are not normally killed, as are babies in the womb.

Well, with the degree of viability of the fetus outside the womb being pushed back earlier and earlier in the pregnancy, your principle here doesn't really make any sense.

I don't see why not. The principle is sensitive to viability, but I don't understand why you think that means it doesn't make any sense. A 3-month-old fetus, for example, obviously isn't viable under any current medical technology.

More to the point, however, it is not the case that the mother is merely refusing to allow the fetus to use her as life support (which is a complete misconstrual of the biological processes of pregnancy, and thus an irrational position in that it does not conform to reality). She, or the person performing the abortion, must take active measures to kill the fetus.

Yes, an abortion is a positive action, rather than a passive inaction, but so what? Why is that so important to the moral question? This is especially true in cases of rape. The woman did nothing to cause her body to be used as a physical life-support system in the way. Why, then, does she not have the right to disconnect herself from the fetus, just as she would have the right to refuse to give life-saving blood or tissue to her born child?

Or take Judith Thompson's famous thought-experiment. Suppose you woke up one morning to find yourself physically connected by tubes to another person's circulatory system. The other person is sick and needs to remain attached to you for 9 months, in order to keep his blood clean, after which time he will have recovered and can be disconnected. If you disconnect the tubes before 9 months have passed, he will die.

What are we to say of the act of disconnecting the tubes? Is it murder? Should it be a crime at all? Don't you have a right to refuse to use your body in this way? If you do, why doesn't a woman have a right to terminate her pregnancy?

Furthermore, you still cannot escape the entanglement of the humanity of the fetus and the obligations that that humanity entails. Because it is not simply the refusal to provide "life support" as you put it.

What else is it, then?

And indeed, we do prosecute parents who do not provide the sort of care and nurture for the already-born children for whom they care. The difference is, when they don't provide the sort of parenting necessary these children are not normally killed, as are babies in the womb.

No, the relevant difference is that such parents can turn their children over to someone else to care for. So if their children die from neglect while in their custody, we hold them culpable on the grounds that they could have prevented it at little or no cost to themselves. But a pregnant woman has no such option, at least not prior to viability. She, and she alone, has the ability to sustain the fetus's life. She can't turn it over to someone else to care for.

First of all, this "pregnancy as life support" is a complete fallacy. Part of the reason JJT's analogy is just completely unworkable--and a fiction--is that fully 96% of abortions fall outside the context of forceable rape/incest (1%) or the health of the mother (3%). Which is to say that in nearly every case, abortion takes place in the context of the mother's voluntary sexual acts.

So JJT's example would be better if it were modified in such a way so that the person in question knowingly engaged in an activity which would bring it about that she would be "forced" to provide life support for this person. But then again, if JJT's scenario were modified in such a way, this would make the agent culpable for the other's death, and take some of the sting out of the point JJT is trying to make.

First of all, this "pregnancy as life support" is a complete fallacy. Part of the reason JJT's analogy is just completely unworkable--and a fiction--is that fully 96% of abortions fall outside the context of forceable rape/incest (1%) or the health of the mother (3%). Which is to say that in nearly every case, abortion takes place in the context of the mother's voluntary sexual acts.

Then let's restrict our discussion to rape cases for the moment. A rape victim is no more responsible for her pregnancy than the person in Thomson's scenario is responsible for being physically connected to the sick person. So if the person in Thomson's scenario has a right to unplug himself, even though that act will cause the other person to die, why doesn't a pregnant woman have the right to terminate her pregnancy, even though it will cause the fetus to die?

Or do you think the person in Thomson's scenario should be legally prohibited from disconnecting himself for 9 months, too?

Since JJT's scenarios has no real connection to the normal abortion, there's no need for me to speculate as to various legal possibilities with regard to it.

I understand that most abortion advocates want to limit themselves to the instances of rape because these are quite obviously the most difficult of the abortion cases. And given the compassion and sympathy we want naturally to show to the rape victim, abortion advocates know that an audience would be more sympathetic to their case in such an emotionally devastating scenario.

But let me be clear, these are the rarest of exceptions to the practice of abortion and so it is not necessary, in terms of revealing exactly what a monstrous practice abortion is, to dwell on these exceptional circumstances. But this does not mean that abortion opponents such as myself should not deal with them, nor that the case for opposing abortion is in any way invalidated or compromised in dealing with these exceptions.

I have already addressed the exception of rape, so it's not clear to me what you're after. I've mentioned that the rape victim needs counselling, community and medical support, and, of course, support from her parish home. Aborting the fetus will not eliminate this need for counselling, for the trauma derives not from the fact of the pregnancy, but from the fact of the rape. Furthermore, since, by their own testimony, many, indeed, most, women who have had abortions feel intense guilt for having aborted their babies. And this being so, we can, I think, safely extrapolate and note that the abortion, far from alleviating the trauma experienced from the rape, will only increase the psychological damage. Thus abortion is not an appropriate response to the rape. Furthermore, if the mother does not find herself able to care for the child--for whatever reason--then an adoption would be the most humane and life-giving response to the rape.

I've made most of the above explicit, so it's not clear to me what you intend me to answer.

Since JJT's scenarios has no real connection to the normal abortion, there's no need for me to speculate as to various legal possibilities with regard to it.

In what morally-relevant respects do you believe Thompson's scenario to be different from abortion? It seems to me that the two situations are very similar in all important respects. Analogies like this can help to illuminate our moral premises and reasoning.

The reason I wanted to limit the discussion (for now) to rape cases is to address your objection that Thompson's scenario involves the involuntary use of one person's body as a life-support system for another, whereas in abortion the pregnancy is usually the result of a voluntary act of sex. Limiting consideration of abortion to rape cases eliminates that objection, because a rape-induced pregnancy is also involuntary.

If you want to limit the discussion to rape, then you also need to limit the application of JJT's example to rape, because it is the only connection to the abortion discussion that it has. JJT's example does not in any way apply to 99% of the abortion cases, therefore, it is mostly an irrelevant heuristic device.

So, Cliff, do you want to outlaw abortion all together?

I would think it both more just and more human to make abortion, as such, illegal.

And that may be why the "rape debate" is a useful one. This seems to be the extreme of the issue (3%), but that extreme will be the focus because some people will not be able to back down from their stance.

It may be two issues. You know? At least to some.

It is one thing for a young couple to have intercourse and have the condom break, and decide to have the child because they have the support of family and friends etc at their beck and call.

It may be another for someone who is the victim of violence and, perchance, socially isolated to deal with the situation in the same way.

I am not entirely sure where I come down on it all. I remember speaking to a young woman (24) who was living in poverty in Chicago's west side about how she was thinking about having her tubes tied. She was on child number six and the next one could very well kill her.

Drug addict.
Single mother.
All the kids in foster care.
Her family not much different.

That was a tough conversation. "Chaplain, what do you think God would want me to do?" Wuff.

Get clean.
Learn to be a mother.
Get in church or something like it.

Have a nice day. I'll see you next time around. It is a tough row to hoe.

Tripp:

Rape/Incest as the reason for abortion is 1%, not 3%. The 3% are the abortions done for reasons of "health of the mother" (though health is unspecified).

Exceptions make bad law. If we legislate exceptions, we end up with legal (and moral) chaos. Better to legislate the norm, and allow, as i noted in one of these chains of coments, for exception application.

Clifton:

If you want to limit the discussion to rape, then you also need to limit the application of JJT's example to rape, because it is the only connection to the abortion discussion that it has.

I am, for now. The analogy is as follows:

Person involuntarily connected to sick patient = woman involuntarily made pregnant through rape.

Sick patient = fetus.

Being connected to sick patient for 9 months = Being in a state of pregnancy for 9 months.

Disconnecting tubes from sick patient = having an abortion.

Death of sick patient through disconnection of tubes = death of fetus through abortion.

If the person in Thompson's scenario has a right to disconnect himself from the sick patient, will you please explain why you think the pregnant rape victim does not have the right to an abortion? What morally relevant differences do you see that confer the right in one case but not the other?

JJT's example does not in any way apply to 99% of the abortion cases, therefore, it is mostly an irrelevant heuristic device.

Well, there are over a million abortions a year in America. So the 1% that result from rape pregnancies represents over 10,000 abortions a year. I would imagine that being deprived of the legal right to have an abortion would matter a great deal to those 10,000 rape victims per year. So I don't think you can just dismiss this matter of rape as an inconsequential or trivial part of the issue. 10,000 women and 10,000 fetuses are not trivial.

Indeed, ten thousand fetuses are not trivial. On that you and I completely agree.

Unfortunately, the JJT analogy still doesn't work. First of all, pregnancy is not equivalent to life support. Second of all, an adult human is not the same as an unborn baby. Thirdly, the incapacitations of the JJT analogy do not in anyway reflect the incapacitations of the pregnanct rape victim (that is to say, in sheer terms of the physiological aspects of the pregnancy). But to take away the incapacitations of the JJT analogy reduces the rhetorical effect of the analogy. So the JJT analogy still does not work, because the distinctions are so different, and so significant in their differences, that there is no equivalence, and therefore no equivalency of application.

But for the sake of the heuristic argument--and not admitting its validity for the abortion argument--I would argue from my stance on abortion and say that the person hooked up on life support ought not be disconnected.

I expect, of course, that you will reply to my answer with horrified objection (while perhaps somewhat pleased that you have somehow "backed me into a corner" and gotten me to admit that which you would find objectionable).

Given that I am now prepared to challenge you on your own terms, I'll simply let this moment stand that you may bask in your pleasant reveries.

Unfortunately, the JJT analogy still doesn't work. First of all, pregnancy is not equivalent to life support.

What morally-relevant differences do you see between pregnancy and the state of being physically connected to the sick patient in Thompson's scenario?

Second of all, an adult human is not the same as an unborn baby.

Well, I don't think so, no. I think a born person has much greater value and rights than a fetus. But for the sake of argument here I'm granting your premise that a fetus is a person, or that it has the same value and rights as a person. So I don't understand your point here, either. What morally-relevant differences do you see between an "unborn baby" and an adult human?

Thirdly, the incapacitations of the JJT analogy do not in anyway reflect the incapacitations of the pregnanct rape victim (that is to say, in sheer terms of the physiological aspects of the pregnancy).

I assume that by "incapacitations" you mean the incapacitations that pregnancy causes to the pregnant woman and the incapacitations that physical connection causes to the person in Thompson's scenario. Why do you say they are not comparable? Are you saying that pregnancy is much less incapacitating or burdensome than the physical connection in Thompson's scenario? How so?

But for the sake of the heuristic argument--and not admitting its validity for the abortion argument--I would argue from my stance on abortion and say that the person hooked up on life support ought not be disconnected.

Do you think the government should have the power to legally compel the person to remain connected for 9 months? If not, why should the government have the power to compel a rape victim to endure 9 months of pregnancy, then childbirth? And please don't just respond again that the situations are different, describe the nature and significance of those relevant differences, as you see them.

"I assume that by 'incapacitations' you mean the incapacitations that pregnancy causes to the pregnant woman and the incapacitations that physical connection causes to the person in Thompson's scenario. Why do you say they are not comparable? Are you saying that pregnancy is much less incapacitating or burdensome than the physical connection in Thompson's scenario? How so?"

Of course they are different, and obviously so. A 200 pound, presumably bed-ridden & immobile man is very different from a 5 pound baby contained within the mother. The mother has total freedom of movement, can continue the normal routine of her daily life and is not normally physically restricted until the later stages of pregnancy. A person so sick as to require connection to another for survival would necessitate an almost total restriction of a person's normal life.

"Do you think the government should have the power to legally compel the person to remain connected for 9 months? If not, why should the government have the power to compel a rape victim to endure 9 months of pregnancy, then childbirth? And please don't just respond again that the situations are different, describe the nature and significance of those relevant differences, as you see them."

If that is the only way that the individual can survive, then yes, the government should compel the continuation of that connection. I find it remarkable that you would argue that one person's choice is more important than the other person's life in such a situation. Why should your choice in this matter out-weigh the other person's right to live? Or do you believe that an individual actually has no right to life if their existence somehow impinges on another's freedom?

Of course, the relevant differences are also obvious. 1) Biological reproduction is a natural part of life, whereas this "thought experiment" is completely alien. 2) A growing fetus is not an illness, nor is it ill. 3) Your scenario is an inaccurate representation of reality. It should really go something like this:

"You wake up one morning after being traumatically and forcibly connected to a completely innocent person who happens to require your support for 9 months in order to surive. The connection was made by a violent third-party and not the sick individual. Furthermore, the sick individual is in such a state that he/she cannot speak, and presumably will not have the brain functions required for rational decisions until many years after he/she is disconnected. Furthermore, the trauma from the attack that connected you to this individual may have so seriously affected you that it may be years before you are able to declare yourself 'recovered' and until then, your thinking about the results of that attack may be clouded...."

Do you get my drift? Your simplistic example does not in any way relate to the reality of the situation.

Jim:

Nathan responded more eloquently than I could, and I affirm his answer in full.

I should further add to my re-write of the scenario in question:

"This connection is also something that in other circumstances you would welcome and cherish, to the point that you would take this individual into your life and remain committed to them through thick and thin until the day you (or they) die. In fact, you would likely become so committed to them that you yourself would choose death in order to save their life. You will spend countless hours with them and work for decades of your life in order to provide a safe, supportive home, foster their education and help them to undertake their own connections to other "sick" people."

Nathan:

Of course they are different, and obviously so. A 200 pound, presumably bed-ridden & immobile man is very different from a 5 pound baby contained within the mother. The mother has total freedom of movement, can continue the normal routine of her daily life and is not normally physically restricted until the later stages of pregnancy. A person so sick as to require connection to another for survival would necessitate an almost total restriction of a person's normal life.

Then assume that the sick patient is a young baby who you can carry around with you while you are connected to it. And assume also that the connection induces in you nausea, vomiting, back pain, labored breathing, fatigue, frequent urination, and the other debilitating conditions that commonly attend pregnancy. Also, assume that disconnecting now will impose little or no physical burden on you, but that disconnection after 9 months will be a physically and mentally traumatic and risky procedure comparable in magnitude to delivering a child through c-section or vaginal birth.

But since I see that you think the government should have the power to compel the physical connection anyway (a position that not even Clifton has taken), I'm not sure why the differences with pregnancy matter, anyway.

If that is the only way that the individual can survive, then yes, the government should compel the continuation of that connection.

Okay. I think you just lost 99% of the population. Do you also think that the government should compel one person to donate blood, tissue or non-vital organs (a lung or kidney, for example) to prevent the death of another person, in cases where no voluntary donation is available?

I find it remarkable that you would argue that one person's choice is more important than the other person's life in such a situation.

I don't know why. It is your position that is remarkable, not mine. In no area of the law do we require one person to make a sacrifice or to assume a burden even remotely as great as being physically connected to another human body for 9 months in order to prevent someone else from dying. Even so-called "good samaritan" laws, where they exist at all, impose only the most minimal legal duty to prevent another's death. And this has always been the case. Our legal tradition has never imposed a general duty on one person to give of himself to rescue another.

Why should your choice in this matter out-weigh the other person's right to live?

Because my right to refuse to accept the burden of being physically connected to someone for 9 months outweighs his right to life.

Or do you believe that an individual actually has no right to life if their existence somehow impinges on another's freedom?

No, I think there is a right to life and that it justifies encroaching on another's freedom in some ways and in some circumstances. But that right isn't nearly sufficient to justify forced physical connection or forced pregnancy.

Nathan:

Of course, the relevant differences are also obvious. 1) Biological reproduction is a natural part of life, whereas this "thought experiment" is completely alien.

But the pregnancy in this case resulted from rape. Do you really consider that "natural?" And what if the pregnancy were produced by artificial insemination? Or in-vitro fertilization? They're not "natural," either.

2) A growing fetus is not an illness, nor is it ill.

But why is that relevant to the moral question? If the objection to abortion is that it deprives a fetus of life, why doesn't that objection apply equally to disconnection in Thompson's scenario, which deprives a person of life?

3) Your scenario is an inaccurate representation of reality. It should really go something like this:

"You wake up one morning after being traumatically and forcibly connected to a completely innocent person who happens to require your support for 9 months in order to surive. The connection was made by a violent third-party and not the sick individual. Furthermore, the sick individual is in such a state that he/she cannot speak, and presumably will not have the brain functions required for rational decisions until many years after he/she is disconnected. Furthermore, the trauma from the attack that connected you to this individual may have so seriously affected you that it may be years before you are able to declare yourself 'recovered' and until then, your thinking about the results of that attack may be clouded...."

Okay, let's change the scenario in all those ways. Do you still think the government should compel the victim of that forced connection to remain connected for 9 months, on pain of being prosecuted for murder? It seems to me that your changes above have made your position even harder to justify.

Jim:

I'll let Nathan answer as he wishes, but surely you are rational enough to distinguish between the unnatural means (rape) and the natural consequences (pregnancy following conception). Simply because the baby conceived of rape was conceived through immoral and unjust acts, does not in any way make its own life, development and birth "unnatural."

On the other hand, JJT's thought experiment is an unnatural scenario, precisely because it does not reflect any natural processes. The act of connection is forced, and therefore immoral and unjust. And no natural processes have ever occurred such that a woman was hooked up to another person and was the sole means of keeping them alive.

You still haven't established how JJT's example is in any way pertinent to the abortion debate. It doesn't fit any of the known realities of abortion: the nature of pregnancy, the act rape, health of the mother--none of it fits because all of the distinctions are radical (that is, are essential differences) and incommensurable.

Jim:

"No, I think there is a right to life and that it justifies encroaching on another's freedom in some ways and in some circumstances. But that right isn't nearly sufficient to justify forced physical connection or forced pregnancy."

So, do you admit, then, that abortion is justified only in terms of rape or the health of the mother, but unjustified in all other instances?

"Then assume that the sick patient is a young baby who you can carry around... Also, assume that disconnecting now will impose little or no physical burden on you, but that disconnection after 9 months will be a physically and mentally traumatic and risky procedure comparable in magnitude to delivering a child through c-section or vaginal birth."

I did not say that pregnancy poses no change in the life of the mother, only that it was not as restrictive as your thought experiment suggested. Yes, women do frequently suffer from those things while pregnant, and yet most are still able to adequately perform their work & family duties, and enjoy a wide freedom of movement and activity. Additionally, the symptoms you describe vary in intensity & duration in different women. But I find it absurd that you would suggest giving birth is somehow more mentally traumatic than having an abortion. Clifton has already cited statistics about the number of women who experience intense feelings of guilt and psychological trauma from their abortions. Are you able to cite similar statistics for women who gave birth?

"Okay. I think you just lost 99% of the population. Do you also think that the government should compel one person to donate blood, tissue or non-vital organs (a lung or kidney, for example) to prevent the death of another person, in cases where no voluntary donation is available?"

No, I do not. First, there are other options to keep people alive in most situations - artificial blood agents, skin from cadavers, dialysis machines, etc. Second, this is not similar to the scenario you described. It presents an accomplished act; the person is connected and there is nothing you can do to change that without killing the person. In the case of an organ/tissue donation, this is not the case. You are not actively killing anyone, which is what is happening in abortion.

"I don't know why. It is your position that is remarkable, not mine. In no area of the law do... And this has always been the case."

First, the arena of legal thought is not the determinant factor in decisions of morality. A Nazi solder who resisted orders to exterminate Jews would have been morally right but acting illegally. When I said the government should compel the connection, it is because that is the moral thing to do, but you are correct when you say our laws do not reflect that morality. I think Clifton's post on legislating morality speaks to that somewhat.

"Our legal tradition has never imposed a general duty on one person to give of himself to rescue another."

You just said that it did, only not at the level described in your thought experiment. So which is it? Is there an imposition or not?

"Because my right to refuse to accept the burden of being physically connected to someone for 9 months outweighs his right to life."

Upon what is your right-to-refuse based?

"No, I think there is a right to life and that it justifies encroaching on another's freedom in some ways and in some circumstances. But that right isn't nearly sufficient to justify forced physical connection or forced pregnancy."

What precisely are those "ways and circumstances"? How do you determine the point at which your right to personal freedom outweighs someon else's right to life? Also, you are being imprecise in your language. In the case of abortion and your experiment, the government is not forcing a connection - that was done by the 3rd party who is not a government agent - the government is preventing you from severing that connection. There is a significant difference between the government forcing you into such a connection and preventing you from dissolving it.

"But the pregnancy in this case resulted from rape. Do you really consider that 'natural?' And what if the pregnancy were produced by artificial insemination? Or in-vitro fertilization? They're not 'natural,' either."

I agree with Clifton that the criminal act of rape does not make the resulting pregnancy in any way unnatural. Can you detail any naturally occuring situation where 2 animals or people are connected in the way you describe?

"But why is that relevant to the moral question? If the objection to abortion is that it deprives a fetus of life, why doesn't that objection apply equally to disconnection in Thompson's scenario, which deprives a person of life?"

It does apply equally. I was simply showing another point of difference. In your scenario, one of the people is too sick to live without the connection. Such a comparison to a fetus necessarily implies that the fetus is somehow defective - it is not.

"Okay, let's change the scenario in all those ways. Do you still think the government should compel the victim of that forced connection to remain connected for 9 months, on pain of being prosecuted for murder? It seems to me that your changes above have made your position even harder to justify."

I do not see how it makes my position harder to justify. Considerations of the woman's emotional & mental stability after the rape may factor into a prosecuting authority's decision on what to charge her with, but I do not see how my description makes the life of the fetus somehow less important.

Jim?

Nathan:

You said that you think the government should be able to legally compel the person in Thompson's scenario to remain connected to the sick patient for 9 months (and Clifton agrees with you). What type of crime would you seek to make the act of illegal disconnection? Murder? A much less serious crime than murder? Or what?

And since you think the government should compel the connection in that scenario, do you also think the government should be able to compel the donation of life-saving blood, tissue or non-vital organs in cases in which no voluntary donation is available? What type of crime would you seek to make the refusal to donate?

Nathan and Clifton:

I agree with Clifton that the criminal act of rape does not make the resulting pregnancy in any way unnatural.

Okay, since you don't consider a rape pregnancy to be unnatural, consider a pregnancy involving IVF and a surrogate. An embryo is created by in-vitro fertilization from an egg and sperm donated by a couple who are otherwise infertile, and the embryo is then implanted in a second woman's uterus. In this situation, the fetus has three biological parents: the father who donated the sperm, the mother who donated the egg and the second mother who gestates the fetus.

This kind of pregnancy never occurs in nature, just as Thompson's scenario never occurs in nature. Both are "unnatural." Both require artificial intervention and advanced technology.

Do you consider the abortion of such a pregnancy to be less wrong than the abortion of a "natural" pregnancy? Do you think the abortion of such a pregnancy should be prosecuted as a less serious crime than the abortion of a "natural" pregnancy? If not, why is this natural/unnatural distinction morally or legally relevant?

Note that I'm not asking you whether you approve of the use of IVF or surrogate mothers. I assume that you do not. I'm asking you about the moral and legal status of the abortion of such pregnancies, given your natural/unnatural distinction.

Nathan:

But I find it absurd that you would suggest giving birth is somehow more mentally traumatic than having an abortion. Clifton has already cited statistics about the number of women who experience intense feelings of guilt and psychological trauma from their abortions. Are you able to cite similar statistics for women who gave birth?

Again, I don't know why. Pregnancy and childbirth is always physically traumatic and often mentally traumatic. An abortion, by contrast, usually imposes little or no such trauma. An abortion performed very early in pregnancy using the morning-after pill is virtually undetectable. And an abortion performed during the early stages of the first trimester using a chemical abortifacient such as RU486 is almost always far less traumatic than a completed pregnancy; most women experience it as a heavy period. Almost 90% of induced abortions in America are performed during the first trimester. Overall, a woman is about ten times more likely to die from completing a pregnancy than from having an abortion. Pregnancy and childbirth is historically one of the leading causes of death for women of childbearing age. Pregnancy and childbirth also impose significant health risks, especially in women with pre-existing conditions such as diabetes, hypertension or heart disease. These health risks also increase as a woman ages--a pregnancy at 40 is much riskier than a pregnancy at 20. There is also no serious evidence that emotional or psychological trauma induced by abortion is a widespread phenomenon, whereas mental trauma induced by pregnancy and childbirth (e.g., post-partum depression) is well-documented and relatively common.

No, I do not. First, there are other options to keep people alive in most situations - artificial blood agents, skin from cadavers, dialysis machines, etc.

But I'm talking about a situation in which there is no alternative. Either the patient receives the blood or tissue or organ from the donor, or he dies.

Second, this is not similar to the scenario you described. It presents an accomplished act; the person is connected and there is nothing you can do to change that without killing the person. In the case of an organ/tissue donation, this is not the case. You are not actively killing anyone, which is what is happening in abortion.

But the connected person has no responsibility for his condition. He is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. If the government should have the power to force him to shoulder the burden of remaining connected for 9 months, on pain of criminal prosecution, why should it not have the power to force someone to donate life-saving blood or tissue or a non-vital organ, on pain of criminal prosecution? Surely the burden of donating, say, a pint of blood is far, far less onerous than the burden of being physically connected by tubes to another human being for 9 months and using your circulatory system to clean his blood?

When I said the government should compel the connection, it is because that is the moral thing to do, but you are correct when you say our laws do not reflect that morality.

Right. Our laws have never imposed a burden even remotely as great as 9 months of physical connection to another body in order to save another person's life. So surely it is your position that is "remarkable," not mine.

You just said that it did, only not at the level described in your thought experiment. So which is it? Is there an imposition or not?

I'm not sure what you're referring to here. As I said, some states have "good samaritan" laws, but even those create only a specific, rather than general, legal duty, and the duty is minimal.

Upon what is your right-to-refuse based?

It's an aspect of my liberty right, which I possess in virtue of my nature as a person.

What precisely are those "ways and circumstances"?

I don't have an exhaustive list to hand. But it would include things like taxing one person to pay for life-sustaining food or shelter or health care for another.

How do you determine the point at which your right to personal freedom outweighs someon else's right to life?

Through my judgement of the magnitude of the rights involved.

Also, you are being imprecise in your language. In the case of abortion and your experiment, the government is not forcing a connection - that was done by the 3rd party who is not a government agent - the government is preventing you from severing that connection.

Okay, by "forcing the connection" I mean forcing you to to remain connected. Prohibiting you from disconnecting. I understand that the government didn't force the connection to be made initially, just as it didn't force the creation of the pregnancy in the rape situation.

Nathan:

Considerations of the woman's emotional & mental stability after the rape may factor into a prosecuting authority's decision on what to charge her with, but I do not see how my description makes the life of the fetus somehow less important.

But in the absence of evidence of mental instability that would justify a lesser charge in the case of a rape victim who killed her child after it had been born, what crime do you think the rape victim who aborted her embryo with the morning-after pill or some other chemical abortifacient should be charged with? Murder? Something less than murder?

As a factual matter, there would have to be overwhelming evidence of such a mitigating condition before a DA would consider a lesser charge than murder. A woman who kills her child is presumptively guilty of murder, and in almost all cases is charged with murder. Her mental state would be an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial. Her defense attorney would need to provide extensive psychiatric evidence of insanity or some other clinical mental illness in order to relieve her of criminal responsibility for her act. The insanity defense rarely works. As I told Clifton, even the woman in Texas who drowned her young children last year was prosecuted for murder despite clear evidence of mental illness.

Jim:

The natural/unnatural distinction was not meant to clarify the justify or condemn abortion per se. The distinction was made primarily to underscore (yet again) that JJT's analogy just doesn't work. I think that has been well-established by now, though I doubt you are convinced of that. We have had to now alter her original analogy in so many of its essential points to get it to actually fit the reality it attempts to describe (an act so far futile) that it's moral and rhetorical force are diverted and depleted.

I don't know Nathan's views on IVF, though I would guess he and I may share certain convictions about it, but for me and for many abortion opponents, IVF does carry serious moral questions. Due to the expense and therefore the "need" to produce a viable embryo for implantation, several eggs are actually fertilized, in effect, creating many embryos (babies, persons). These "extras" are either destroyed or reserved for other attempts in the case the first one(s) fail or used for other research.

Since it is the position of abortion opponents that human life, and therefore personhood, begins at conception we have the morally untenable position of the willful killing of many human lives or the equally questionable scenario of involuntary scientific experimentation on human subjects.

Jim:

Could you go back and answer or clarify my question noted above?

You said: "No, I think there is a right to life and that it justifies encroaching on another's freedom in some ways and in some circumstances. But that right isn't nearly sufficient to justify forced physical connection or forced pregnancy."

I asked: "So, do you admit, then, that abortion is justified only in terms of rape or the health of the mother, but unjustified in all other instances?"

I await your response.

Jim:

You said: "An abortion, by contrast, usually imposes little or no such trauma."

This is just simply a bald untruth. It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion, which in ninety-six percent of abortions is a freely chosen act. Rather the norm is for women to experience:

*Low self-esteem
*Grief (mild to profound)
*Depression (sometimes to the point of suicidal thoughts and attempts)
*A sense of alienation from family and friends
*A feeling of being 'numb,' not able to feel joy from activities that used to be pleasurable
*Isolating self from others to avoid discussing the abortion experience with them
*Guilt and shame
*Difficulty concentrating
*Anger toward self, or the child's father, or others involved in the abortion decision
*Sleep disorders
*Abortion-related nightmares, flashbacks or even sounds of a baby crying
*Alcohol and drug problems, to dull the sorrow
*Desire for a 'replacement' baby
*Anniversary reactions of grief or depression on the date of the abortion or the baby's expected due date
*Problems bonding with her other children (being over-protective but emotionally distant)
*Fear that God will punish her, or is punishing her

Abortion is not a simple elective surgical procedure. It kills a baby and traumatizes the mother.

Given this reality, isn't it legitimate to ask whether you should alter your position? Does Planned Parenthood or other abortion providers tell women about this? I think it clear they do not. Isn't this a grave injustice to women (apart from the fact of the killing of the babies in their wombs)?

"What type of crime would you seek to make the act of illegal disconnection? Murder? A much less serious crime than murder? Or what?"

I don't know. Having never before considered a scenario like this "thought experiment," I'm not sure what charge would be appropriate. However, I believe such a criminal act should carry weighty penalties, including a significant jail term.

"Okay, since you don't consider a rape pregnancy to be unnatural, consider a pregnancy involving IVF and a surrogate."

I share Clifton's concerns about IVF.

"Do you consider the abortion of such a pregnancy to be less wrong than the abortion of a 'natural' pregnancy?"

No, I would not consider such an abortion to be a lesser crime or moral wrong because, and here's the key, both involve natural biological reproduction! Conception by the sharing of genetic material bewteen egg & sperm is natural, no matter how they are introduced. IVF represents a manipulation of a naturally occuring process, not a completely alien process like the one in your scenario.

"Again, I don't know why. Pregnancy and childbirth is always physically traumatic and often mentally traumatic. An abortion, by contrast, usually imposes little or no such trauma. An abortion performed very early in pregnancy using the morning-after pill is virtually undetectable...Pregnancy and childbirth is historically one of the leading causes of death for women of childbearing age...There is also no serious evidence that emotional or psychological trauma induced by abortion is a widespread phenomenon, whereas mental trauma induced by pregnancy and childbirth (e.g., post-partum depression) is well-documented and relatively common."

I know from personal experience with a woman who had an abortion and from other research that you are incorrect about abortion not causing mental trauma. Its a lie, plain & simple. Yes, a first tri-mester abortion is only slightly physically risky when compared to giving birth, and I'm sure that women who took the morning-after pill suffer less psychological turmoil because they have absolutely no way of knowing if they are pregnant. The state of Utah used to (and perhaps still does) execute people by firing squad. All but one of the squad members was given a live round, the other was given a blank. None of them knew which they had in their rifle and each could console themselves with the possibility that they actually had the blank round in their rifle, thus alleviating their guilt. The same is true for the morning-after pill and as such, it is inappropriate
to include that in a discussion on the mental trauma of abortion.

"But the connected person has no responsibility for his condition. He is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. If the government should have the power to force him to shoulder the burden of remaining connected for 9 months, on pain of criminal prosecution, why should it not have the power to force someone to donate life-saving blood or tissue or a non-vital organ, on pain of criminal prosecution? Surely the burden of donating, say, a pint of blood is far, far less onerous than the burden of being physically connected by tubes to another human being for 9 months and using your circulatory system to clean his blood?"

"Right. Our laws have never imposed a burden even remotely as great as 9 months of physical connection to another body in order to save another person's life. So surely it is your position that is 'remarkable,' not mine."

Again, you conflate morality with legality. Just because the law does not currently require such a burden does not mean your belief that your right to be comfortable outweighs another man's right to life is not "remarkable."

"Through my judgement of the magnitude of the rights involved."

Ok, how does the government make such a decision?

"Okay, by 'forcing the connection' I mean forcing you to to remain connected. Prohibiting you from disconnecting. I understand that the government didn't force the connection to be made initially, just as it didn't force the creation of the pregnancy in the rape situation."

Then surely you see the difference between the government actively compelling the donation of tissue and the government preventing an act that will lead to someone's death. They are morally different situations.

"But in the absence of evidence of mental instability that would justify a lesser charge in the case of a rape victim who killed her child after it had been born, what crime do you think the rape victim who aborted her embryo with the morning-after pill or some other chemical abortifacient should be charged with? Murder? Something less than murder?"

There is no medical test that could prove pregnancy within the window of the morning-after pill, so that would be a difficult case to prosecute. Once pregnancy has been confirmed, however, things change. Again, I'm not sure what charge would be appropriate, and I would actually suggest that legislatures write laws specific to abortion related crimes. For instance, a doctor who performs an abortion may be guilty of first degree murder since it was premeditated and he profited from it, while the mother may be guilty of 2nd degree murder or manslaughter. Such a distinction is up to the states to decide, but I fully support the criminlization of abortion.

Nathan:

IVF represents a manipulation of a naturally occuring process, not a completely alien process like the one in your scenario.

How so? IVF plus surrogacy creates a type of pregnancy that never occurs in nature. One woman gestates an embryo created artificially using the egg of another woman. Yes, gestation itself is a “natural” process, but so is the dialysis of blood in Thompson’s scenario. In Thompson’s scenario, artificial means are used to cause one person’s body to perform the “natural” function of dialysis on another person’s blood. In surrogate pregnancy, artificial means are used to cause one person’s body to perform the “natural” function of gestation on another person’s embryo. So in what meaningful sense is the latter “natural” but the former “completely alien?” They both use artificial means to employ “natural” processes in an “alien” way. So I don’t see how you can seriously claim that one is natural and the other unnatural.

And the fact that you would apparently impose similar kinds of criminal penalty (“significant” prison terms) for the act of disconnection in the Thompson scenario and for abortion of a surrogate pregnancy implies that whatever difference in “naturalness” you see between the two types of situation, it is of limited moral and legal significance.

Nathan:

Then surely you see the difference between the government actively compelling the donation of tissue and the government preventing an act that will lead to someone's death. They are morally different situations.

I think there is a moral difference between causing death through active intervention, and causing death through passively failing to intervene, but I don't understand why you think that difference is of such magnitude in this comparison as to justify a significant prison term in one case and no kind of criminal penalty at all in the other. If the government may justly compel a person to endure such a huge burden as 9 months of physical connection--effectively 9 months of physical confinement--to save enother person's life (on pain of a significant prison term), why may it not justly compel a person to endure the vastly smaller burden of donating, say, a pint of blood, or some bone marrow, to save another person's life? Yes, the latter situation would represent active intervention rather than passive non-intervention, but the situation in Thompson's scenario was the result of active intervention, anyway. Disconnection would represent the undoing of a forced life-saving intervention that you agree was never justified in the first place. Moreoever, you obviously do not attribute such significance to the active intervention vs. passive non-intervention difference in other contexts. For example, though you presumably would advocate significant criminal penalties for a mother who actively intervened to kill her born baby, you would surely not argue that a woman who caused her baby to die by failing to provide it with food, water, warmth, etc., should be free from all criminal liability for that neglect. So if the government may justly compel one person to endure a huge burden to prevent another from dying, and if causing death through failing to intervene in the case of a newborn baby should be a crime, why shouldn't it also be a crime to cause a death by refusing to intervene in the case of blood or tissue donation?

Jim:

Could I ask if you are ignoring my questions, or simply unable to answer them?

Nathan:

I know from personal experience with a woman who had an abortion and from other research that you are incorrect about abortion not causing mental trauma. Its a lie, plain & simple.

I'm sure it does cause mental trauma in some cases, especially amoung women who have an abortion despite believing that their fetus is equivalent to a baby, or who come to believe that after they have had the abortion.

But there is no credible evidence that emotional or psychological trauma caused by abortion is a widespread phenomenon. The primary emotional response to abortion is likely to be relief. The risks to mental health from completing a pregnancy are much greater. If you still dispute this, show me your evidence establishing that abortion-induced mental trauma is widespread.

Ok, how does the government make such a decision?

Through the democratic process.

For instance, a doctor who performs an abortion may be guilty of first degree murder since it was premeditated and he profited from it, while the mother may be guilty of 2nd degree murder or manslaughter. Such a distinction is up to the states to decide, but I fully support the criminlization of abortion.

Why don't you seek first-degree murder charges against the woman, too? In almost all cases, the abortion is premeditated. She plans ahead of time to, as you would have it, kill her unborn baby. It's not an act she performs in a moment of passion or a fleeting loss of temper. It's something that she decides ahead of time to do. So why isn't she also guilty of first-degree murder, under your premises? The criminal penalties for first-degree murder generally involve a lengthy prison sentence or life imprisonment, and in some cases the death penalty.

Clifton:

I asked: "So, do you admit, then, that abortion is justified only in terms of rape or the health of the mother, but unjustified in all other instances?"

The answer is no. Apparently, you think something I said previously implies that I should believe that abortion is justified only in cases in rape or health of the mother. I don't think I did say any such thing.

It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion,

Show me your evidence for this claim.

Nathan:

Again, you conflate morality with legality. Just because the law does not currently require such a burden does not mean your belief that your right to be comfortable outweighs another man's right to life is not "remarkable."

I'm not conflating morality with legality. I agree with you that the fact that something is legal doesn't mean that it's moral. What I was contesting here is your claim that it is my position, rather than yours, that is "remarkable." My position is squarely within the mainstream of public opinion on abortion. Your position is far over on the anti-abortion extreme. Few anti-abortion organizations in America take the position that a woman who has an abortion should be prosecuted for a serious crime, let alone for the crime of murder. Historically, even when abortion was illegal, it was never punished so harshly. Women who had an illegal abortion typically faced no criminal penalties at all. Your position on abortion is radical, extreme, unprecedented in the history of our law and culture. The fact that your position is radical and unprecedented doesn't mean that it's wrong. Obviously, I think your position is wrong, but not simply because it is extreme.

Clifton:

Does Planned Parenthood or other abortion providers tell women about this?

I don't know. But I suspect that Planned Parenthood would strongly dispute the factual accuracy of your claims about the risks of abortion, and I don't see why Planned Parenthood is obliged to describe risks of abortion claimed by anti-abortion organizations such as Project Rachel that have no recognized medical expertise.

According to government agencies that do have recognized medical expertise (e.g., the CDC), the risk of dying from completing a pregnancy is about ten times higher than the risk of dying from having an abortion. Since you claim to want women to be fully informed, don't you think Project Rachel, and Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and other anti-abortion organizations that promote childbirth over abortion have a duty to inform women of this risk?

Jim:

I suggest you look up the references cited on the Project Rachel site. If there is any dispute about the claims one is obliged to dispute the scientific research done on its own terms. The studies indicated by Project Rachel do, indeed, dispute those claims. I have looked over the statement on the Planned Parenthood site disputing those claims, but find that they neither discuss the actual studies (as does the Project Rachel site), but merely make an assertion with a citation. Given that it is part of my job to grade research papers, I give much greater weight to those papers that actually discuss the research to argue for their conclusions, than merely make an assertion with an accompanying citation. In the former case, it seems clear that the author has actually engaged the research. That may well be the case in terms of the latter, but my suspicions of partisan polemic are raised in such cases and can only be overcome by an actual discussion of the research.

I cannot refute the Planned Parenthood claims on their own terms, but since in the case of contradicting evidence, one argument shows greater engagement with the research, I believe I am justified in giving the weight of my opinion to the one showing itself more trustworthy.

Be that as it may: Do you have any credible argument to dispute the research cited by the authors of the various studies on Project Rachel, or have evidence that Project Rachel's claims do not in fact follow from the research cited?

Jim:

Your argument seems to run thusly:

Fetuses aren't persons, therefore they can be aborted anytime during the pregnancy. In the comments on the other discussion, you claimed that personhood began at the demarcation of live birth. When I drew up some specific examples (partial birth abortion, caesarian section), you indicated that in neither of these cases was the fetus entitled to any legal redress since neither was a person (the partial birth aborted baby for obvious reasons, the caesarian section because the injury occurred during the delivery but prior to actual extraction).

Let me press you further on this point. Let's assume a scenario in which a mother willingly engaged in sex, fully aware that despite the use of contraception, the chance of pregnancy, though statistically small, was nonetheless real. She does, indeed, becomes pregnant, and though conflicted over the pregnancy, does not choose to abort. Let's bring her right up to her due date. The arrival of the baby is immanent. Is there any time, prior to the full extraction of the baby from the womb (either vaginally or caesarian) that it should not be legal to abort the baby? If so, why? If not, can the baby be aborted, even while in the midst of delivery (say the mother's pain becomes too great and she decides to abort), even right up to the point at which the baby fully leaves the womb? If not, why not?

Clifton:

I suggest you look up the references cited on the Project Rachel site. If there is any dispute about the claims one is obliged to dispute the scientific research done on its own terms. The studies indicated by Project Rachel do, indeed, dispute those claims. I have looked over the statement on the Planned Parenthood site disputing those claims, but find that they neither discuss the actual studies (as does the Project Rachel site), but merely make an assertion with a citation.

I don't have the time or the inclination to go through the Project Rachel website in detail, but I see nothing that supports your claim above that "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion." I would like to see quotes from, and preferably links to, the studies that you believe support that statement. I don't see any. Even the quote from Project Rachel you reproduced in another post, containing a laundry list of traumas supposedly induced by abortion, merely asserts that some women may experience one or more of them as a result of having an abortion, which obviously doesn't support the claim that such trauma is widespread, let alone that it is "usual."

The Planned Parenthood website contains a statement that references a large body of research and studies published in highly-regarded medical journals, and conducted by highly-regarded medical authorities such as the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiactric Association, the overwhelming conclusion of which is that there is no serious evidence that abortion is a significant cause of emotional or psychological distress in most women who have the procedure.

PP's statement also contains a fairly detailed critique of research purporting to show negative emotional or psychological effects from abortion, particularly the work of one David Reardon, who seems to be a primary source of such material.

Please identify the studies and research referenced by Project Rachel, or any other source, that you believe effectively refutes Planned Parenthood's conclusion and supports the statement of yours I quoted above.

Clifton:

Let me press you further on this point. Let's assume a scenario in which a mother willingly engaged in sex, fully aware that despite the use of contraception, the chance of pregnancy, though statistically small, was nonetheless real. She does, indeed, becomes pregnant, and though conflicted over the pregnancy, does not choose to abort. Let's bring her right up to her due date. The arrival of the baby is immanent. Is there any time, prior to the full extraction of the baby from the womb (either vaginally or caesarian) that it should not be legal to abort the baby?

The short answer is no. The longer answer is this: I would not necessarily oppose a law that formally criminalized non-therapeutic late-term abortion. I'm not sure exactly what I would define as "late-term," but my guiding principle would be that abortion may justly be prohibited at the point at which delivery would not represent a substantial burden to the pregnant woman over termination. That burden necessarily include threats to the woman's health. Although such a law would formally prohibit some abortions, in practise I believe that it would effectively provide for the right to abortion at any stage of pregnancy. Ultimately, the only workable gatekeeper of abortion is the choices of pregnant women themselves, in consultation with their doctors. At some point, you just have to trust people to do what is right, even though you know that in many cases they will not. Criminal law is simply too blunt an instrument to justly and effectively regulate the practise. If you could somehow prove that a woman or her doctor killed a fetus for no good reason during the process of delivery, I would be happy to join you in declaring their actions morally repugnant and in supporting criminal prosecution. In practise, though, I just don't think that's ever going to happen.

Clifton:

According to government agencies that have recognized medical expertise (e.g., the CDC), the risk of dying from completing a pregnancy is about ten times higher than the risk of dying from having an abortion. Since you claim to want women to be fully informed about risks, don't you think Project Rachel, and Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and other anti-abortion organizations that promote childbirth over abortion have a duty to inform women of this risk?

"How so? IVF plus surrogacy creates a type of pregnancy that never occurs in nature."

It is, however, still a pregnancy in step with normal biological reproduction. This debate is not about IVF and the creation of life through pregnancy, though a normal biological act, is not morally neutral like dialysis. So while the Thompson scenario may involve the normal act of blood filtration by the kidneys, it does not reflect the moral magnitude of conception. Which is why I believe an IVF pregnancy is of equal human value as a natural conception.

"I think there is a moral difference between causing death through active intervention, and causing death through passively failing to intervene, but I don't understand why you think that difference is of such magnitude in this comparison as to justify a significant prison term in one case and no kind of criminal penalty at all in the other."

Again, the Thompson scenario represents an accomplished act which the government had no part in, just as the rape or consensual intercourse that resulted in a pregnancy had no governmental involvement. This state of affairs pre-exists the intrusion of the government. Now, you suggest that I should also be for government compelled tissue donation since I do not believe the government should allow the disconnection in the Thompson scenario. But I believe the connection in the Thompson scenario is a criminal act, so why should I support the government acting in a similarly criminal matter? Believe it or not, I agree that the healthy person in the Thompson scenario has had their rights violated, just as the raped woman has, but that violation is presumably not the fault of the sick person and is certainly not the fault of the fetus, so why should they be punished?

"So if the government may justly compel one person to endure a huge burden to prevent another from dying, and if causing death through failing to intervene in the case of a newborn baby should be a crime, why shouldn't it also be a crime to cause a death by refusing to intervene in the case of blood or tissue donation?"

First, the difference between forced tissue donation and routine feeding & care is obvious so as to be incomparable. Second, if a woman cannot or does not want to take care of her child, there are other options available for her to ensure that her child is taken care of. This represents gross neglect in a manner not at all similar to a refusal to comply with government orders to donate tissue. Third, in the case of tissue donation, there is a risk to the donor. Surgery always risk infection & death. How exactly would the government compensate someone who suffered an eggregious injury or death in a surgery done under government compulsion?

"The risks to mental health from completing a pregnancy are much greater. If you still dispute this, show me your evidence establishing that abortion-induced mental trauma is widespread."

You show me yours and I'll show you mine. :) While Clifton has presented several references showing the psychological trauma of abortion, you have yet to cite a single reference indicating the abundance of mental trauma caused by carrying a baby to term. I urge you in the strongest possible terms to present evidence for this assertion.

"Through the democratic process."

Which we know is always unfailingly moral. Come on, this is no guarantee of doing the right thing at all! Additionally, you would continue to oppose abortion restrictions if democratically imposed, so why pretend that the democratic process is really what you want?

"Why don't you seek first-degree murder charges against the woman, too?"

I used that as an example to demonstrate that the state may recognize a difference in the actions of those participating in an abortion, not as my suggested course of action. Like you, I would appeal to the democratic process to produce reasonable laws for abortion crimes.

"The fact that your position is radical and unprecedented doesn't mean that it's wrong. Obviously, I think your position is wrong, but not simply because it is extreme."

My position has 2 parts - that abortion should be restricted if it is not possible to totally eliminate it, and that parties who engage in abortion should be prosecuted under the law. I don't think for one second that the first part of my position is at all remarkable. Additionally, I don't think the desire to actually prosecute under the applicable laws is remarkable either. That such laws were not enforced in the past is wrong, as I'm sure you would agree that no murder should go unpunished. My premise of the criminalization of abortion is rooted in the grounds that the state finally recognizes the personhood of the fetus, and as such, the fetus should have equal rights under the law. Would you support the selective application of murder or rape statutes? I sincerely doubt that you would. I do not doubt that my belief in consistent application of the law is "remarkable" to you, but I tend to think that many, if not most Americans, would find your insistence on your right to comfort outweighs the life of another person quite remarkable. However, these are clearly our opinions and we probably do not need to continue discussing who's position is more or less remarkable.

Nathan:

It is, however, still a pregnancy in step with normal biological reproduction. This debate is not about IVF and the creation of life through pregnancy, though a normal biological act, is not morally neutral like dialysis. So while the Thompson scenario may involve the normal act of blood filtration by the kidneys, it does not reflect the moral magnitude of conception. Which is why I believe an IVF pregnancy is of equal human value as a natural conception.

Your claim that I am contesting here is that one is "natural" and the other "completely alien." But both phenomena never occur in nature. Both represent the use artificial means to harness natural processes in an "unnatural" way. So I ask again, in what meaningful sense is surrogate gestation "natural" but not surrogate dialysis?

As to your new claim that pregnancy has a "moral magnitude" that dialysis lacks, what is the basis for that claim? It just begs the question of what difference between the two situations creates that difference in "moral magnitude." If aborting the pregnancy is wrong because it would cause a human life to end, why isn't disconnecting the dialysis tube wrong for the same reason, and to the same degree?

Nathan:

First, the difference between forced tissue donation and routine feeding & care is obvious so as to be incomparable.

Asserting that the difference is "obvious" does not explain what that difference is. It is not obvious to me what morally-relevant difference you think there is between these two cases, given your premises. So please explain what you think that difference is.

Second, if a woman cannot or does not want to take care of her child, there are other options available for her to ensure that her child is taken care of.

But turning the child over to someone else to take care of is itself a positive act rather than a passive failure to act. You claimed, with respect to the comparison between active disconnection in the Thompson scenario and passive failure to donate blood/tissue in the life-saving donation scenario, that it is the active/passive distinction that justifies government compulsion in the former case but not the latter. If that is so, if the government may justly punish us for acting to end life but may not justly punish us for failing to act to prevent the end of life, how can the government justly punish the woman for failing to act to save her born baby?

Put it this way: Suppose mother and baby are stranded on a desert island. No one else is available to care for the baby. If the government may justly punish the woman for failing to act to prevent her baby from dying in that situation, why may it not also justly punish her for failing to donate blood or tissue to save the baby from dying? If the government can punish her for failing to feed/shelter the baby on the island, why can't it punish her for failing to donate a pint of life-saving blood back home?

Third, in the case of tissue donation, there is a risk to the donor. Surgery always risk infection & death. How exactly would the government compensate someone who suffered an eggregious injury or death in a surgery done under government compulsion?

In the case of blood donation, the risk to the donor is negligible. In the case of bone marrow donation, the risk is slightly higher, but still very low. In the case of donation of a non-vital organ or tissue like a kidney or a segment of liver, the risk is higher still but still relatively small. Moreover, the risks to a woman's health from completing even a normal pregnancy are certainly much greater than those from blood or marrow donation, and probably lower than those from most kinds of tissue donation. Yet you don't believe that the health risks justify the right to abort, so why do they justify the right to refuse to donate blood or tissue?

Nathan:

How exactly would the government compensate someone who suffered an eggregious injury or death in a surgery done under government compulsion?

I'm not sure. I'm not advocating compelled blood/tissue donations. But you are advocating compelled completion of pregnancies. How exactly would the government compensate a woman who suffered an egregious injury or death from completing a pregnancy under government compulsion?

Nathan:

Which we know is always unfailingly moral. Come on, this is no guarantee of doing the right thing at all!

Of course not. I didn't say it was. You asked me how "the government" evaluates and balances the rights at stake in abortion, and I answered that it does so through the democratic process. Basically, the government's decision reflects, or is intended to reflect, the collective will of the people. I didn't suggest that that will is "unfailingly moral." There are no such guarantees of morality.

Additionally, you would continue to oppose abortion restrictions if democratically imposed, so why pretend that the democratic process is really what you want?

Huh? You asked me how "the government" decides what rights are at stake in abortion and how it balances those rights. I answered "Through the democratic process." I didn't say anything about what I want.

But, yes, I do think the government should reflect the will of the people, through the democratic process. I don't understand why you seem to think that position would oblige me to agree with laws I consider unjust. Belief in democracy as the proper form of government does not imply personal agreement with every law such a government may produce.

I used that as an example to demonstrate that the state may recognize a difference in the actions of those participating in an abortion, not as my suggested course of action. Like you, I would appeal to the democratic process to produce reasonable laws for abortion crimes.

But I didn't ask you how you think the laws should be produced. We apparently agree that they should be produced through the democratic process. I asked why you, you personally, you speaking as a private citizen, do not seek laws that would prosecute women who have abortions for first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder, in cases where the abortion satisfies the criteria for first-degree murder that would be applied if the victim were a born person. So why don't you seek such laws? Generally, the first-degree/second-degree distinction is based on whether or not the crime was premeditated. The vast majority of abortions are premeditated.

Nathan:

My position has 2 parts - that abortion should be restricted if it is not possible to totally eliminate it, and that parties who engage in abortion should be prosecuted under the law. I don't think for one second that the first part of my position is at all remarkable.

The position that abortion should be restricted in some way is not remarkable. Almost everyone agrees that abortion should be restricted in some way. What is remarkable about your position is the nature and magnitude of the restrictions you seek to impose on abortion. Not only do you seek to make abortion a serious crime from the earliest stages of pregnancy, and even in cases of rape, but you seek to make it the crime of murder. As I keep telling you, that position is unprecendented in our legal and cultural tradition. Abortion has never been treated as murder. Where abortion was illegal, it was a much lesser crime than murder. Women who had illegal abortions when abortion was still a crime typically faced no criminal penalties at all. And the penalties imposed on abortion providers for performing illegal abortions were much less than those for the crime of murder. And today, no mainstream anti-abortion organization or group that I am aware of advocates the inclusion of abortion in state murder statutes, or the prosecution of women who have an abortion for murder. Only the most extreme organizations advocate that.

Additionally, I don't think the desire to actually prosecute under the applicable laws is remarkable either. That such laws were not enforced in the past is wrong, as I'm sure you would agree that no murder should go unpunished.

It's not an issue of enforcement. Abortion didn't qualify as the crime of murder in the first place. Illegal abortion was a separate and much lesser crime than murder.

My premise of the criminalization of abortion is rooted in the grounds that the state finally recognizes the personhood of the fetus, and as such, the fetus should have equal rights under the law.

But fetuses have never been held to have the same rights as a person in American law. The consequences of doing so would be monumental. The 14th Amendment, for example, guarantees to all persons the equal protection of the law. If fetuses were to be included in the category "persons," this would oblige states to impose all sorts of draconian restrictions on the liberty of pregnant women that would go far beyond prohibiting abortion. As Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe says in his book Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes:

"It's no wonder that no Supreme Court justice has ever taken the position that fetuses are constitutional persons. The idea that the Constitution protects fetuses just as if they had already been born seems, on reflection, impossible to maintain without accepting consequences for which no one seems willing to argue."

Jim:

"I don't have the time or the inclination to go through the Project Rachel website in detail, but I see nothing that supports your claim above that 'It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion.' I would like to see quotes from, and preferably links to, the studies that you believe support that statement."

I have done so. Now, presumably, being a fair, open-minded and rational individual, you will be able to adequately assess the reliability between the statements of PPA and Project Rachel.

Now, given that each of your objections and rationale have either been refuted by argumentation or provided evidence casting serious doubt on your position, are you prepared to change your view?

Jim:

"The vast majority of abortions are premeditated."

So, then, you admit, women willfully choose abortion. So then there is intent, is there not?

Clifton:

I asked you to substantiate your claim that: "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion." You directed me to the Project Rachel website. I see nothing on that web site that supports your statement. Please provide quotes from the studies, and preferably links to those studies, that you believe substantiate your statement.

Nathan:

While Clifton has presented several references showing the psychological trauma of abortion, you have yet to cite a single reference indicating the abundance of mental trauma caused by carrying a baby to term.

Clifton has provided no references supporting his claim that "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion."

Studies showing that completing a pregnancy is more likely to cause mental trauma than having an abortion include the following:

Brewer, Colin. (1977). "Incidence of post-abortion psychosis: A prospective study." British Medical Journal, 1, 476-477.

David, Henry P., et al. (1985). "Postpartum and Postabortion Psychiatric Reactions." In Paul Sachder, ed., Perspectives on Abortion (pp. 107-116). Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press.

Robinson, G. E., & Donna E. Stewart. (1993). "Postpartum Disorders." In Nada L. Stotland, ed., Psychological Aspects of Women's Health Care (pp. 115-138). Washington: American Psychiatric Press.

Sachdev, Paul. (1989). Unlocking the Adoption Files. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Sachdev, Paul. (1993). Sex, Abortion and Unmarried Women. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

See the Planned Parenthood statement I linked to earlier for further details.

Clifton:

So, then, you admit, women willfully choose abortion. So then there is intent, is there not?

In almost all cases, there is intent to have the abortion (exceptions would include forced abortions and accidental abortions). That doesn't mean there is intent to kill. I've been over this at length in the "legislating morality" thread.

Jim:

I have compared the PPA and Project Rachel studies side by side (or top to bottom as it were) at this link:

http://www.chattablogs.com/aionioszoe/archives/014802.html

The Project Rachel studies deal with the research directly in ways PPA does not; i.e., PPA simply asserts their position then cites a study without giving any real context for the research. Project Rachel is far more honest and forthright in disclosing the nature of the research they cite. It seems to me that PPA demonstrates they have a partisan axe to grind by their polemic and apparent concealing of the tenor of the research they cite. Project Rachel cites research that does solidly back certain of their claims as well as research that only suggests--which they admit--some of their claims.

Who's more honest and forthcoming? I think the answer obvious. Who's comments are more to be trusted? Well, since neither you nor I have the background with which to refute point by point each of the studies cited by the respective organizations, it seems we are only left with the clear attempt at transparent veracity on the part of Project Rachel versus the partisan polemic that conceals more than it reveals over at PPA. (I mean really, abortion foes as "anti-family planing extremists"?! Really. This is hardly some calm, rational discussion of the facts.)

Furthermore despite PPA's claims that nothing has changed since 1989, just in the snippet I've clipped, Project Rachel cites four studies 1989 and later indicating that there is, indeed, significant trauma experienced by women after an abortion. Seems PPA needs to do more research. Oops. No, that would mean backing off their polemic, name-calling agenda.

I mean, come on, Jim: do you really believe that pregnancy and the delivery of a live baby is more traumatic than abortion? You apparently have not talked seriously with women who've had abortions and women who've given birth, and women who've done both. I have. The reality is clear.

I'm sorry its been so long since I posted. One of the kids in my youth group had surgery yesterday, so I spent a fair amount of my day at the hospital with her.

Let's change course briefly to discuss another aspect of this debate. If you would like me to address your points later, I will happily do so, but first let me provide another thought experiment:

Jim, you and I have been elected by our respective groups (pro-life and pro-choice) to hash out a deal on this issue. The Supreme Court is waiting anxiously in the wings to rubber stamp our proposal and Congress is salivating to put it into law. Right up front, I will concede abortion rights for rape, incest & life of the mother. In the case of rape or incest, a police report must be on file for the incident and the fetus' DNA must be recorded to aid in prosecution of the perpetrator. And in the case of life of the mother, it must be defined in such a way as to prevent it becoming a convenient excuse for an abortion - a real medical condition must exist. So hypothetically, I have conceded those 3 areas - what arguments will you use to try to convince me that abortions resulting from a pregnancy between consenting adults should also be legalized? The vast majority of abortions involve those types of pregnancies, so how would you defend abortion rights for them?

Clifton:

I asked you to substantiate your claim that "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion." Note the highlighted word. Nothing in your most recent post addresses this request. Every time I ask, you try to change the subject. I ask yet again, please provide evidence to support your claim that "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion."

Nathan:

I assume that, in line with your previous statements, you would seek to prosecute women who have abortions that do not fall within your exceptions for the crime of murder.

My first question, then, would be to ask why abortion is murder if the victim was conceived through consensual sex, but not murder (or, indeed, any kind of crime at all) if the victim was conceived through rape. The double standard makes no sense.

By the way, I don't really need to convince you. You need to convince me, and people like me. As I have explained before, your position is so extreme as to be unprecedented in our law and culture. If you really want and hope to persuade other people to adopt your view of abortion, you've certainly got your work cut out for you.

Jim:

I've given the evidence for my position. You question the evidence based on evidence that the evidence I present calls into question. (Sorry 'bout the awkwardness of that sentence.) Now, unless you have a valid critique of the evidence I've presented, and I've not seen any thus far, then you may well dispute my claim but you do so from your own disputed position.

On this, then, while I am convinced of the truth of claim (and in particular because of the position from which I approach this whole matter), you are not, and until one can refute the other to the other's satisfaction, we are at stalemate.

I do reserve the right to present the evidence I have thus far presented in the absence of a valid critique of it on its own terms and points.

And by the by, far from changing the subject, I have been challenging you on your own terms. More to the point, I have responded to the question by presenting the evidence I have. You have not successfully refuted the evidence, so there the situation stands. One may just as well presume--which I do not--that you, yourself, are trying to change the subject by returning to a question that has been addressed and answered with the answer lying in an irresoluble dispute.

Jim -

At this point in our scenario, lets focus solely on what the law will allow - what will technically be considered legal. We'll leave aside any questions of penalties or punishment until after we have decided precisely what is legal and what is not. So what arguments are you going to use to convince me that there should be very few, if any, restrictions on abortion?

Jim:

As a test case upon which you and Nathan can base your legal reasoning, let me offer this from the NYT Magazine:

When One Is Enough

By AMY RICHARDS as told to AMY BARRETT

I grew up in a working-class family in Pennsylvania not knowing my father. I have never missed not having him. I firmly believe that, but for much of my life I felt that what I probably would have gained was economic security and with that societal security. Growing up with a single mother, I was always buying into the myth that I was going to be seduced in the back of a pickup truck and become pregnant when I was 16. I had friends when I was in school who were helping to rear nieces and nephews, because their siblings, who were not much older, were having babies. I had friends from all over the class spectrum: I saw the nieces and nephews on the one hand and country-club memberships and station wagons on the other. I felt I was in the middle. I had this fear: What would it take for me to just slip?

Now I'm 34. My boyfriend, Peter, and I have been together three years. I'm old enough to presume that I wasn't going to have an easy time becoming pregnant. I was tired of being on the pill, because it made me moody. Before I went off it, Peter and I talked about what would happen if I became pregnant, and we both agreed that we would have the child.

I found out I was having triplets when I went to my obstetrician. The doctor had just finished telling me I was going to have a low-risk pregnancy. She turned on the sonogram machine. There was a long pause, then she said, ''Are you sure you didn't take fertility drugs?'' I said, ''I'm positive.'' Peter and I were very shocked when she said there were three. ''You know, this changes everything,'' she said. ''You'll have to see a specialist.''

My immediate response was, I cannot have triplets. I was not married; I lived in a five-story walk-up in the East Village; I worked freelance; and I would have to go on bed rest in March. I lecture at colleges, and my biggest months are March and April. I would have to give up my main income for the rest of the year. There was a part of me that was sure I could work around that. But it was a matter of, Do I want to?

I looked at Peter and asked the doctor: ''Is it possible to get rid of one of them? Or two of them?'' The obstetrician wasn't an expert in selective reduction, but she knew that with a shot of potassium chloride you could eliminate one or more.

Having felt physically fine up to this point, I got on the subway afterward, and all of a sudden, I felt ill. I didn't want to eat anything. What I was going through seemed like a very unnatural experience. On the subway, Peter asked, ''Shouldn't we consider having triplets?'' And I had this adverse reaction: ''This is why they say it's the woman's choice, because you think I could just carry triplets. That's easy for you to say, but I'd have to give up my life.'' Not only would I have to be on bed rest at 20 weeks, I wouldn't be able to fly after 15. I was already at eight weeks. When I found out about the triplets, I felt like: It's not the back of a pickup at 16, but now I'm going to have to move to Staten Island. I'll never leave my house because I'll have to care for these children. I'll have to start shopping only at Costco and buying big jars of mayonnaise. Even in my moments of thinking about having three, I don't think that deep down I was ever considering it.

The specialist called me back at 10 p.m. I had just finished watching a Boston Pops concert at Symphony Hall. As everybody burst into applause, I watched my cellphone vibrating, grabbed it and ran into the lobby. He told me that he does a detailed sonogram before doing a selective reduction to see if one fetus appears to be struggling. The procedure involves a shot of potassium chloride to the heart of the fetus. There are a lot more complications when a woman carries multiples. And so, from the doctor's perspective, it's a matter of trying to save the woman this trauma. After I talked to the specialist, I told Peter, ''That's what I'm going to do.'' He replied, ''What we're going to do.'' He respected what I was going through, but at a certain point, he felt that this was a decision we were making. I agreed.

When we saw the specialist, we found out that I was carrying identical twins and a stand alone. My doctors thought the stand alone was three days older. There was something psychologically comforting about that, since I wanted to have just one. Before the procedure, I was focused on relaxing. But Peter was staring at the sonogram screen thinking: Oh, my gosh, there are three heartbeats. I can't believe we're about to make two disappear. The doctor came in, and then Peter was asked to leave. I said, ''Can Peter stay?'' The doctor said no. I know Peter was offended by that.

Two days after the procedure, smells no longer set me off and I no longer wanted to eat nothing but sour-apple gum. I went on to have a pretty seamless pregnancy. But I had a recurring feeling that this was going to come back and haunt me. Was I going to have a stillbirth or miscarry late in my pregnancy?

I had a boy, and everything is fine. But thinking about becoming pregnant again is terrifying. Am I going to have quintuplets? I would do the same thing if I had triplets again, but if I had twins, I would probably have twins. Then again, I don't know.

Clifton:

I've given the evidence for my position.

I see no evidence for your position. I see evidence that some women may experience trauma from an abortion, but nothing that supports your claim that: "It is unusual for a woman not to experience some sort of trauma from an abortion."

Please provide evidence to substantiate this claim. Specific citations and/or quotations.

Jim:

You clearly see no evidence because you don't accept it in the first place, as you've made clear from the beginning. You claim that the evidence I submit doesn't support my claim. Well, then, read the studies cited, refute the arguments on their own terms and have done with it, and show that it does indeed fail to do what you say.

As you well know, "usual" refers to a state of affairs that one can expect to happen for the most part. This is not to say, given human nature, that one can expect it in every instance. So, there may, indeed, be anecdotal counterexamples, even counterexamples that may trend in certain ways. But this does not negate the normal expectations one may have.

I am prepared to assert, on the basis of the research, that it would be normal to expect that a woman going through an abortion would experience one or more of the following:
*Low self-esteem
*Grief (mild to profound)
*Depression (sometimes to the point of suicidal thoughts and attempts)
*A sense of alienation from family and friends
*A feeling of being 'numb,' not able to feel joy from activities that used to be pleasurable
*Isolating self from others to avoid discussing the abortion experience with them
*Guilt and shame
*Difficulty concentrating
*Anger toward self, or the child's father, or others involved in the abortion decision
*Sleep disorders
*Abortion-related nightmares, flashbacks or even sounds of a baby crying
*Alcohol and drug problems, to dull the sorrow
*Desire for a 'replacement' baby
*Anniversary reactions of grief or depression on the date of the abortion or the baby's expected due date
*Problems bonding with her other children (being over-protective but emotionally distant)
*Fear that God will punish her, or is punishing her
In some cases, these experiences will be what we might call "mild." Others will be more severe.

I frankly don't see what's so difficult to accept about this. Even you are troubled by the morality of some aspects of abortion. If abortion is the moral evil I assert that it is, should it be so surprising that women who have abortions would experience the normal consequences of those acts done by them and to them?

I find the assertion of PPA, that women who abort are actually better off emotionally than women who choose to give birth, so far from reality--and unsubstantiated, I might add--as to severely discount their credibility.