The Firebrand Diaries

The verse from Malachi about "Esau I have hated" has long been used to say "See? God hates real live individual people!" I think Esau gets a bad rap from this, but I think he's all right about it, since such slanders don't affect him anymore.:-) I think we shall see him in heaven.

In Malachi, God says "Esau I have hated, and laid waste his mountains...". God is making reference to Esau's land and his descendants, naming them Esau. When we take note of the behavior of the man Esau in Genesis, we find a man who has given up on his scheming ways and his grudges by the time Jacob returns to the land. He seems quite happy to now submit to the decree of God with regard to Jacob. He's helpful, he's happy, he's satisfied with his lot in life, he's not in rebellion anymore. He even is around to help bury old dad when the time comes. Looks like a repentant man to me.

My ass is so skinny that it might as well not even be there. I wonder if that's why I have so much trouble with the ladies.

Isn't it amazing how a little "fat ass" humor can inject some much needed levity into a situation? I'm gonna try that at the next congregational meeting. Mebbe even at GA.

What I really need to do is start going to the Southern Cali OPC presbytery meetings and make jokes like that. I bet they'd love me. They'd probably kick me out of the OPC too, including my church even though:

a. I'm not IN the Southern California Presbytery
b. my church here in Chattanooga wouldn't leave the OPC if I got kicked out, they'd just wave me on.
c. I grew up with all the theonomist fella's

I love we presbyterians. Not only do we shoot our wounded, we shoot the really healthy ones also. It's like, warped darwinism or something. Survival of the status quo or something.

I have no idea what this comment has to do with anything. I'm on my new laptop, and really excited I finally got it online.

God hates everyone except me.

I also should make a confession. My ass has been getting fatter, too, lately.

I know I said that I was out, but I need to make a quick comment about something.

I noticed on Kevin's blog that his 'concession' that, on his view, ultimately God just wants us to sin was meant to be taken ironically. I apologized on his weblog and now I am apologizing to all who have been keeping up with the discussion for pinning such a view on him. I still don't think that he can get out of such a committment, but nevertheless I shouldn't have mocked him for holding a view that he never claimed to hold.

Josiah:

If you ever call me a 'modernist' again, it's going to get ugly. :-)

And thanks again for working on getting Chattablogs back in action.

Yeah, you know Josiah Q is right here (well, to a degree).

It's good that this discussion has ended.

On to more important matters.

(See how inane the question actually was?)

Wow, 116 comments. Unbelievables.

1. It's silly to try to divine the Divine mind. I'm fairly certain that God wants us to obey His commandments (and this doesn't make Him impotent) and He wants/desires something.

2. You're all a buncha modernists, defining your faith according to your epistemological method. That's a psychological assertion, btw.

3. Given 2, there's no "reason" to think that either side is going to ever concede any point made by the opposition. But you know, kick against the goads n' all that.

4. I think you should all try on paradox for size.

5. I like Wayne & David. Both are asses.

6. I'm an ass too. I even have a fat ass.

7. I'm sorry 'bout Chattablogs being down the last few days.

Wow. I'm away for a few days from the discussion and it looks like I missed the bar fight, as it were.

Will look over the latest installments over the weekend, and respond as I think I should.

Kevin, I did note your comments and am thinking over a reply.

Wayne,

I have never said this to anyone in the blogosphere, but you are an ass. You have no skill in rhetoric other that incessantly claiming you are right and everyone else is dumb. Normally I enjoy philosophers (although sometimes I must laugh at their propensity to use Quantum Mechanics and the Uncertainty Principle as if they actually understand them).

Pedantry, ignorance, and poor manners—that is quite the trifecta.

Kevin:

Well, I guess I'll make this my final word (and, I confess, without sorrow).

[1] I realize that the main point of the discussion concerns what sorts of views are consistent with reformed theology. This does not mean, however, that anything that does not specifically fall under 'what reformed theologians believe' is not relevant to the discussion. In my previous post I mentioned that I found it hard to believe that any reformed theologian would endorse your view because of how absurd I thought your view to be, so demonstrating the absurdity of your view was relevant to the discussion.

[2] I did not claim that your view would not be endorsed by any sound, reformed theologian; I only mentioned that I could hardly imagine that any would. And what is more, even if I did venture to whip up some documentation, as I alluded to earlier all of my reformed systematics and commentaries are 1400 miles away, so my access to reformed resources is severely limited in scope. You, on the other hand, are claiming that your view is consistent with reformed theology. Therefore you need to furnish evidence that it is, which you have not done. I will not take your word for it. Yet whatever the case, I don't really care anymore (1) because I have long grown weary of this discussion and (2) because of point [3].

[3] You wrote:

God's desires (emotional longing) fall under his decretive will- God really [desires] (decretive will) you to sin.

So I will concede the point. God has decreed my sin; therefore, God wants me to sin. I will not concede that God authors my sin, that he commands my sin, that he has a judicial expectation that I sin, or that he is pleased when I sin.

I never said that God authored your sin nor commanded it nor had a judicial expectation that you sin. I only said that you are committed to what you just conceded, that God wants you to sin.

So there you have it, folks. According to Kevin consistent, reformed theology teaches that God wants you to sin. Oh, but don't be fooled; for He yet forbids it and takes no pleasure in it nor has a judicial expectation that you sin. Yes, God wants none of that, only that you sin, which is clearly distinct. So the next time you sin you may rest at ease knowing that, even though you are guilty for the sin in question, God just must have really wanted you to sin though without compelling you to sin, for such was God's decree.

Kevin, both you and Heddle are perhaps some of the best arguments against calvinism. I mean, with guys like you, who needs to take issue with calvinism point by point? Of course, in the end I do realize that a couple of bad seed run amuck bear no relation to the truth of the position in question, but I do think the point carries at least some weight with it, however one may take it.

What a sad conclusion to such a vigorous discussion. Nevertheless, I am very glad that it has come to an end.

Kevin,

Wayne did not "show me" that the WCF teaches "God decrees sin". All he did was point out the wording of the confession—which was not very instructional as I more or less have had the confession memorized for years. The problem is that the intent of the divines, when they wrote "[God did] ordain whatsoever comes to pass" is something very different from the trivial statement "God decreed that I sin." I stand on my affirmation that "God decreed that I sin" is not a doctrine or position statement of Calvinism.

Wayne,

It has not been my intent to defend the views that upset you so much in your original post, although I do believe them. My objection has always been to your attempt at setting them in opposition to Reformed theology. I have only been tryng to defend them as being a legitimate expression of that system. To counter this claim, you only need to show where these views differ from Reformed theology. Garver did this when he provided the quotes to show me that God's goodness toward everyone can be termed "love" (although room was still left for a special salvific love). You did this when you showed David from the WCF that God does decree sin. I thought we were getting somewhere. But then you made the claim that my contention would not be endorsed by any sound, reformed theologian. If you could demonstrate this, it would make an excellent argument against my position. However, since you have substantiated it with nothing more than your lack of imagination, it stands as a logical fallacy the likes of which cannot be overcome in any rational discourse. After answering your last argument, I will respectfully bow out.

You write, "And since on your account God's desires (beyond bare commands) fall under His decretive will, you are yet forced to concede that God just really wants you to sin..." This would only follow if God's desires were synonymous with his decrees. You have proven this to be the case by process of equivocation.

God commands all to be saved- God desires (judicial expectation) all to be saved.

God desires (emotional longing) all to be saved- God loves all. However, because this kind of desire does not follow from judicial expectation, we cannot derive it from the fact that God commands all to be saved. I was referring to this kind of desire when I said that they fell under his decretive will.

In the next part of your argument, you may have equated "desire" with "want." If you did not, then there is a non sequitor. Just because all of God's desires (emotional longings) are decreed, this does not mean that all of God's decrees are desires. If you did equate the two words, then you equivocated again on the meaning.

God's desires (emotional longing) fall under his decretive will- God really [desires] (decretive will) you to sin.

So I will concede the point. God has decreed my sin; therefore, God wants me to sin. I will not concede that God authors my sin, that he commands my sin, that he has a judicial expectation that I sin, or that he is pleased when I sin.

Kevin:

I don't know that the Bible does assume a philosopy of the will. I believe texts have meaning; meaning determined by authors. And when an author records a speaker and/or God as saying "repent" or "choose" or any number of things, I don't think we need to look for causal joints that affect the will, or schemes of decrees (William Ames) or anything else. The author tells us what we need to know--"whosoever wills may come."

Oh wait, I just remembered I'm not a Calvinist anymore. *sheepishly replaces pants*

Josh:

Good idea (not the one about fornicating). I think I'll take up your suggestion. In fact, tonight I'm going to see Kill-Bill at a theatre that serves food and beer. It will be a much welcomed break from debating renegade calvinists all week.

Kevin:

With all due respect I find your contention to be so absurd that I can hardly imagine that any sound, reformed theologian would endorse it as well.

You wrote:

Yes, I will say that what God really desires is always accomplished and that through his decretive will. I will not concede that I must say, "God really wants me to sin." It is the positive decretive will of God that guarantees the accomplishment of what he desires. Sin falls under the negative decretive will of God. I still don't buy the analogy.

As I pointed out to David, whether or not a decree is positive or negative refers to agency, so relying on such a distinction does not save you from the fact that God still decretively wills sin. And since on your account God's desires (beyond bare commands) fall under His decretive will, you are yet forced to concede that God just really wants you to sin, even if you are the proximate cause of its existence. In other words, God wants you to sin, but rather than bringing it about Himself (positively) He graciously has decided to let you be the active agent in doing so (negatively). I need not remind you that, according to Westminster 5.2, "in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly." And yes, as pointed earlier, this includes your sin. Even though it is decreed negatively, it is nonetheless decreed so that it comes to pass "immutably, and infallibly."

So either concede that God just really wants you to sin, or the analogy still holds.

Since God doesn't desire me to walk in his commandments, I will now commence fornicating.

You know what I did last night? I had a bowl of chili & cheese and a pint of Franziskaner Dunkel. Then I washed it down with a pint of Pilsner-Urquell. It was damn good, and I suggest you all try it.

Joel,

The Bible may not elaborate on any particular philosophy of the will, but it does assume one. The elaborations come when Christians engage in legitimate discussion as to which philosophy that is. Nor have you escaped assuming a philosophy of the will when you write, "the Bible does assume that an individual can 'have faith' and 'repent'; that is implicit in its appeal to do so." This is the idea that commandment implies ability. One philosophy of the will affirms this; the other denies it.

Wayne,

I did say that you were free to disagree with my limited definiton of "desire" as it relates to God. The question of whether or not your analogy works will depend upon whether or not a Reformed audience will accept your expanded use of the word. You don't deny the validity of the decretive and preceptive wills, but superimpose another kind of desire onto the preceptive will. Your goal is to show that God loves all because he desires all to repent and be saved. I will concede the connection.

You're claim in arriving at this conclusion is that when God commands something, he desires that commandment to be obeyed. This is not going to work. When God commands something, it is in order to get what he desires; however, it does not follow that what he desires is obedience to the commandment. God, in order that his name might be proclaimed in all the earth (something he desired), hardened Pharaoh's heart. Not until the final repetition did God desire Pharaoh to let Israel go. God's name is proclaimed both in mercy and in wrath. He desires both of these to take place and, consequently, both do. The command to repent does not imply that God desires all to repent, but that God desires to display his mercy on those who do and that he desires to display his wrath on those who don't. While God expects obedience in both cases, only in the former does he desire obedience.

You write, "you can reply that what God really desires always gets accomplished, i.e., God's true desires find expression only through His decretive will, but then you're committed to saying in answer to the above question, 'Yes, God just really wants you to sin,' since, after all, God, on a reformed account, has decreed sin."

Yes, I will say that what God really desires is always accomplished and that through his decretive will. I will not concede that I must say, "God really wants me to sin." It is the positive decretive will of God that guarantees the accomplishment of what he desires. Sin falls under the negative decretive will of God. I still don't buy the analogy.

Clifton:

Yes, I really am the agent, at least when I sin. I can claim agency because there is a huge difference between John and God. Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were gathered together to do whatever God's purpose determined before to be done. But they were not God.

God cannot be thwarted, and he declares such. It's like when Clement of Rome writes, "By the word of his majesty hath he established all things...When he wills, and as he wills, he shall do all things, and nothing has escaped his will." Or Remigus, archbishop of Lyon: "Nor is it possible for any one elect person to perish, or that any of the reprobate should be saved, because of their hardness and impenitency of heart." Or Augustine, Huss, Venerable Bede, Wycliffe, Tyndal, Luther, Woodman, etc.

And analogies prove nothing. On top of that, the stick has no mind, so it does not have any desires.

We are all bound to something, we are all determined by something, if the word "finite" is going to mean anything. The glove around my hand determines my hand, etc. In this sense, God is surely infinite, because nothing else limits him, and he ultimately determines everything; and when we submit to Christ, we are free from a lot of things (e.g., damnation). So there is freedom, but it's in no way absolute.

Joel:

True, and it's always dangerous to impose divisions on the heart (mind, soul) where none is found. Imagine all of the problems one can get into if he believes that the brain thinks or if he has some generally behavioristic outlook.

just thought I'd jump in here to say that I don't believe the Bible posits (or its authors had in mind) elaborate philosophies of the will one way or the other. both sides of this coin are built inference upon inference and speculate heavily. but the Bible does assume that an individual can "have faith" and "repent"; that is implicit in its appeal to do so.
"And let the one who is thirsty come; let the one who wishes take the water of life without cost." Rev. 22.17

Clifton,

I said that I would return to your understanding of God's immutability as it relates to the preceptive and decretive wills, but, on further reflection, I don't understand how you think the violation is happening. If it's relevant to the discussion, would you mind explaining? I'd rather not second guess myself into an irrelevant response.

On to your last response to me. Because I don't see how it will advance the discussion, I'm going to concede what I said about paralysis of the will in the absence of any inclinations. I still beleive it, but, like David said, it is a gut instinct that I cannot prove. Having said that, the issue is not whether or not we would be able to choose in the absence of inclinations, but whether or not we can choose against our inclinations. I notice that you and David had a brief exchange on total depravity. This is one of the doctrines at the heart of the Calvinists conception of the will. Another is the total goodness of God. Scripture says that God cannot lie. This is a limitation of his own nature because he possesses the attribute of truth.

What do you mean in saying, "said attributes cannot determine God"? What would be an example of God being determined by an attribute? How would he act in order to demonstrate the kind of freedom that you have ascribed to him?

Thanks.

(Just wanted to post the 100th comment.)

That is close -- in a nut shell and at the risk of over simplifying: as a result of the fall we are so depraved that in our natural state we are morally incapable of seeking God.

It does not mean, of course, that we are as bad as we can be.

David:

While I think I may know what that means (that humans are so fallen they cannot but choose evil, or something like that), can you describe it for me?

Clifton,

In my estimation, it is the doctrine of Total Depravity.

Hey:

I have a question for any takers?

What is the lynchpin for Calvinism? What one doctrine, if taken away, collapses the whole project?

My gut instinct (being, if you will, an Arminian and semi-Pelagian/synergist) is that it is the understanding of God's sovereignty in terms of hard determinism.

Am I right on this?

John:

But are you really the agent who writes, if, after all, God is the one who determines your choices? If you are merely an instrument of God's will--and absolutely cannot act against his will--then how can you claim agency? That's analogous to the stick claiming it meant to hit the rock, though it was the hand (and the agent connected to the hand) who was the motive, formal (and perhaps final and material) cause of the action.

If one can freely take on God's will, that is to say, if an agent can acquiesce to the determining will of God, then why is that agent not free to refuse? And if the agent is not free to refuse, in what sense is that person an agent?

Agency must be based on freedom, else we are using empty words.

What sort of argument can you present to prove that agency does not require freedom?

Clifton,

I agree, we can never prove one way or the other--no reason vs. subtle reason. My gut instict is that we would be paralyzed in indicision a la Alice at the fork in the road, but I do not know how to prove it.

How is God culpable? He promised death upon disobedience and He delivered on the promise. The entire race was then condemned. I am pushing it back to Adam and Eve, but no further.

Kevin:

First, you are correct that when I stated, "I am claiming that one is free to choose, even that which one is not inclined to choose" my lack of clarification left a suspicion that I had asserted that the closed door was open. And your clarification that what I intended is there is no antecedent inclination which would determine one's choice is correct in that this is what I assert.

However, I do not assert an absence of inclination. By inclination, of course, I mean those factors, physical and mental, which would in some way assert an influence on our choosing such that we would be more likely to choose one or another of the options presented to us. I think it legitimate to say that we do, indeed, always make our choices within the venue of our inclinations. But I think it illegitimate (and untenable) to say that we always choose in conformity to our inclinations.

The absence of an absolute determination of our choice by our inclinations, however, does not lead to paralysis. Hardly. Re: my diet Coke illustration, it is hardly the case that the absence of any physical or mental (or any other inclination) which would absolutely determine my choice leaves me paralyzed. I assert again, I am not the ass hesitating between two bales of hay. I freely choose, and choose indeterminately. Presented with the same choice on multiple occasions there is no determining cause which limits my choice. I am as absolutely free to choose one or the other. I need no criteria by which to choose between the two cans, aside from an indetermined will.

I do not deny the reality of divine attributes, nor do I create a false dichotomy between them. As I have expressed, there is a reality which I am calling God's absolute freedom, but this reality does not exist outside the Person of God. The Person of God is the font of all divine attributes. And because the Person of God (specifically, the Person of the Father, but that need not detour us into alternative Trinitarians considerations) is the "source" as it were of these divine attributes, said attributes cannot determine God. So though we speak of God's omnipotence, we cannot do so without at the same time and to the same degree of "necessity" speaking of the freedom that stems from God's Person. I'm not dichotomizing, but rather am arguing that it is the Person of God and not some impersonal divine attribute that is at the core of what we must say about God.

And yes, of course, since this is so, I must assert that any knowledge that we have of God is predicated upon his revelation of himself (his Person if you will) to us. This revelation is essentially that given to us in the Son, who freely gave himself, in obedience to the Father's will, for the salvation of the world.

This freedom of the will must, I repeat must, be predicated on the Christology revealed to us in the Son, who himself makes known to us the proper theology of God (or, the Father), and it is only in Christ that we can have a true understanding of humankind. Thus any understanding of biblical depravity (as opposed to Calvinistic depravity, to which I do oppose it) must be met with the reality of the Incarnation, and the reality of a Savior who asked that the cup he was about to drink be taken from him.

David:

You merely assert there is a cause, because you presuppose it to be so. You may argue that I assert the same radical indeterminacy. Fine. But you will have to prove that there is some determining antecedent cause in the scenario I presented, one that is necessary, not just one that might be the case.

With regard to the culpability of our unfree choice, you haven't really solved anything, you've merely pushed it back to Adam and Eve, and, really, not gotten away from God's ultimate culpability.

But I do 'author' my choices. I am the agent who writes down his choices - precisely because God foreordains them.

Actually, I was asking a real question. If I am not willing an action according to some reason, then I don't see how that can be a choice at all. (I am going to the fridge _because_ I want a coke; I want a coke _because_ I am thirsty; I am thirsty... etc., etc.) When I make a choice, I choose something over everything else, and it seems that there must be a reason for my evaluation. But this is probably way too far off topic.

Anyway, if one acts against one's own will, then that person's actions are "involuntary;" but if something (i.e., atoms, socio-economic factors, or God) determines one's will, then his actions, _according_ to that determined will, are completely voluntary (i.e., it's of the will). That person volunteers, chooses, elects, etc. to perform an action. When God hardens someone's heart, it's not as if that person acts against his own desires.

Kevin:

A quick response to the analogy thing.

You're right, I think you have defined the word 'desire' as it refers to God far too narrowly, even on a reformed account. In fact, I would be surprised to see that any mainstream, reformed theologians define it is so strictly as well, even if only because it doesn't do justice to what I take to be a basic use of the word.

You wrote that 'God desires' can be interpreted in one of two ways, either as God's decretive will or as God's preceptive will, and therefore both [S2] and [L2] must be interpreted in terms of God's preceptive will. You then wrote that, though the analogy technically works, it is beside the point because [L2], that it is God's preceptive will that all be saved, has nothing to do with whether or not God loves everyone. But again, I think you've narrowed yourself too thin here.

To say that God has preceptively willed something is to say that God has commanded something. Therefore per your recommendation we amend the propositions as follows:

[S1] God commands that I not sin.
[L2] God commands that all be saved (or repent and be saved).

But since it is perfectly plausible that one can command something he neither desires nor cares for, here I can still legitimately ask, "But does God really desire that I not sin?" especially if we concede that God has indeed foreordained the existence and occurence of sin. My answer, and, as I suspect, most theologians answer, is, "Yes, God really desires that you not sin" and that which is beyond the simple giving of a command. God commands you not to sin and desires that you fulfill that command; the two are not necessarily equivalent and are clearly distinct. I conclude, then, that your restriction of the meaning of 'desire' is too narrow and needs to be more substantive. Of course, you can reply that what God really desires always gets accomplished, i.e., God's true desires find expression only through His decretive will, but then you're committed to saying in answer to the above question, "Yes, God just really wants you to sin," since, after all, God, on a reformed account, has decreed sin. But this is obviously unbiblical and what is more you have effectually obliterated any mystery involved in asserting how it can be that God both decrees sin and desires it's absence. So again, I think you're forced to concede that God both commands that you not sin and desires that you not sin, and that the two are not equivalent in the sense that to desire that you not sin just is to command that you not sin.

Likewise, if we consider the case of God and the salvation of all, I come to the same conclusion: God commands all to repent and be saved, and He desires that all repent and be saved. And I will be quite amazed if you can convince me that God desiring that all repent and be saved does not entail God loving all as well. So I still contend that the analogy holds.

Clifton,

You write that your presupposition about free will is "based on a previous argument related to the Personhood of God. God's omnipotence is predicated on his freedom. It has to be. Either God is absolutely free to do that which he wills, or he is not omnipotent." I agree and can, in fact, claim that my own presuppositions about free moral agency are based on the same thing. So we need to press further back. You go on to distinguish God's person from some "ontologically necessary reality." This is a false dichotomy. It is possible to claim that God is some "ultimate ground of being" while denying his personhood, and we do want to avoid that; nevertheless, it does not follow from this that God's personhood is not an ontologically necessary reality.

A definition is a limitation, but it does not follow that the definition itself imposes some limitation on God. It is not as though God was up there in absolute autonomous freedom doing randomly good and evil things until we decided to define him as "good." The definition describes a limitation already inherent in the nature of God. Furthermore, the attribute of "goodness" is not something that we dreamed up about God, but something that he has revealed to us about himself. To deny the revealed attributes of God on the basis that they are non-personal categories of being or that they would limit God's absolute freedom is to doubt the word of God itself. God is good- but we must maintain God's absolute freedom and say that God is free to choose what is not good. God is omnipotent- but he must be free to give up this ability so that we can be free. Immutable- but only sometimes.

You have only managed to override the attributes of God with another attribute of "absolute freedom." In other words, you have defined (limited) God in accordance with a non-revealed category. Your previous conception of free-will, that, if it must act in accordance with nature it is not really free, has determined your definition of God.

In your comment to David, you write, "I am claiming that one is free to choose, even that which one is not inclined to choose." If, by this, you meant to say that it is possible to choose against one's own inclinations, I need not respond. The statement itself is its own refutation. But you could be denying that there are any inclinations that would determine choice. Yet, lack of inclination leads, not to freedom of the will, but to paralysis of the will. All philosophical untenability aside, this view cannot, despite your objection, be predicated on any biblically revealed theology/christology/anthropology. The denial of inclinations to the will is also a denial of the depravity of man and of the revealed attributes of God.

I will return to your comment that my "distinction between preceptive and decretive will(s) in God violates the understanding of immutability [I] seem to have presented."

Clifton,

One could argue that you did have a reason--maybe one diet coke was closer, or some aesthetic reason such as which choice leaves the remaining contents more pleasingly balanced. The reason may be very subtle--but it is there nonetheless.

God is not culpable--it is not His fault we do not seek Him. It is due the radical change of our nature due to the fall.

John:

It's a strange thing you speak of: choice which is only predicated on God's making you choose what he wants you to choose. The choice cannot be your own because there is no way you authored that choice. If you cannot author your own choice, how is it yours? And if it's not yours, how is it a choice? If the cause for your choice is external, it is involuntary. And if it is involuntary, it is not a choice.

I've illustrated precisely how one may choose without a reason. What's not to get?

Clifton:

To whom is God responsible? Neither men nor angels stay God's hand.

It's impossible for God to be culpable, because whatever he does is good. God determines what is good, and what he tells us is true and right: if God commanded someone to kill his own son, then that person had better set out to kill his own son.

With the hardest of determinism, you still make real choices; but if you do something without a reason, is that even a choice?

David:

But if what we want has been determined by God and we are not free to choose otherwise, then you are putting on God the moral culpability for our sin. How could it be otherwise.

Furthermore, having freedom to choose (apart from any antecdent determining cause) does not violate God's sovereignty if God has sovereignly decreed that such be the case--which is exactly my contention.

Choosing without a reason (or any other determining antecedent causes) hardly results in indecision. For example: I got to the refrigerator to choose a soda. As it happens, I want a diet Coke. There, confronting me, side by side, are two diet Cokes. There is no reason I should choose one over the other. But I do choose one. I am not the infamous medieval ass hesitating between two bales of hay and starving to death.

I agree that free will, as I see it, places us in bondage to our desires. (It is amusing that, on the surface, the complaint is 'being able to choose what you want' is no freedom at all.)

However, I have never encountered a better explantion. If we choose for 'no reason', then we should be frozen by indicision.

If we choose by quantum fluctuations in our brain, then it seems to me we have again violated God's sovereignty.

Furthermore there is a moral problem--it seems to me that to be held morally responsible for our choices it must be because we choose on just one basis-- what we want.

David:

It seems pretty clear, that based on your presuppositions, you have a view of free will that is hard determinism. You assume that free will is wholly determined by antecedent causes (here, ultimately, God). But this leaves no real choice, despite your claim, and no free will. You define free will in such a way so as to speak not of free will, but of will identified as/with want. But if will is to be defined in terms of want, you have not done much more than saying, we want what we want. And since we can only want that which God wants us to want, we are wholly determined and not free.

And if that is the cause, then God is the primary cause of sin. And that, I'm afraid, calls into question God's jutice, holiness and love.

I don't think you have accurately described my stance on choice. I am claiming that one is free to choose, even that which one is not inclined to choose. And that means, I am claiming an ontology (as it were) for free will that has no proper metaphysic--or rather that its metaphysic is predicated on a certain theology/christology/anthropology; it does not stand alone.

Clifton, I think you are mistaking free-will with autonomy. Free will means you are free to choose within the multidimensional space of what you want. It may be an over simplification to say, as some do, you always choose what you want most, but that is at least a good approximation. You will never choose what you don’t want, and what you don’t want before regeneration is God (Rom. 3).

If you are always free to choose what you want, how can that erode free will? It is the very definition of free will.

You want people to be free to choose what they do not want, which is to say make choices for no apparent reason—even random choices. You want autonomy—which violates God’s sovereignty.

Kevin:

It seems, based on how I've understood your argument, that this distinction between preceptive and decretive will(s) in God violates the understanding of immutability you seem to have presented. If it does not, then it is, on its face at least, little different than understanding his will from the standpoint of two distinctive but related intents (as I have been describing).

The difference here, it seems, is that you understand free will in a way that completely erodes the reality of that freedom. In your own description the only people that are truly free to accept Christ are those who God has already determined will be regenerated so as to accept Christ. They are not free to reject Christ (since they are regenerated). Similarly the unregenerate are not only not free to accept Christ, because they do not want to, God has already determined that they will not want to accept Christ. They are not free to accept him. So the free will you describe is not free.

It is true that I bring to this narrow argument a presupposition about free will, but that presupposition is itself based on a previous argument related to the Personhood of God. God's omnipotence is predicated on his freedom. It has to be. Either God is absolutely free to do that which he wills, or he is not omnipotent. But this freedom is an "outgrowth" not on some ontologically necessary reality (God must be omnipotent because he is free, or God must be free because he is omnipotence), but rather an "outgrowth" of his Person. God is a Person, he is not some "ultimate ground of being," nor can he be defined (a limitation) as "utterly simple or good" or as "pure being," or what have you.

Quoting other interpreters of Scripture is not abandoning Scripture, but a recognition that we do not interpret Scripture individually, but as part of a wider community and conversation. It can be a way of being more faithful to Scripture, by honoring the gifts the Spirit gives the church in order to better understand the Word.

By the way, no need to respond "Yes, but He loves them too."

I don’t really like abandoning scripture and digressing into battling quotes, but since that is where we are:

For it may be that God hates a person to the degree more mildly, as not to destroy him, but whom He destroys he hates the more exceedingly by how much He punisheth more severely. Now he hateth all who work iniquity: but all who speak lies He also destroys. (Augustine, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol.3, p.462)

It is therefore declared that God hates those who are set upon the infliction of injuries, and upon doing mischief...He must be the enemy of the wicked, who wrong and are troublesome to others. (John Calvin, Psalms, Vol. 1, 165 on Ps. 11:4-5)

Note the singular opposition of the two sentences. God hates the wicked, and therefore in contrast He loves the righteous...(Charles Spurgeon, The Treasury of David, Vol. 2, pp. 57-58)

The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much in the same way one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked: His wrath towards you burns like fire: He looks upon you as worthy of nothing else but to be cast into the fire: He is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in His sight: you are ten thousand times more abominable in His sight than the most hateful venomous serpent is in ours. (Jonathan Edwards, Sinners In the Hands of an Angry God, July 8, 1741)

Of such (sinners - the foolish, and more especially the foolish boasters:)... such men Jehovah hates: for if He did not hate evil, His love would not be a holy love,” ... “And His soul hates the evildoer and him that delights in the violence of the strong against the weak. And the more intense this hatred, the more fearful will be the judgments in which it bursts forth. (F Delitzsch (Commentary on Pslams), Vol.5, pp.122,189)

There is no abstract sin that can be hated apart from the person in whom that sin is represented and embodies. It is the sinner who is punished, not the sin. (Augustus Strong, Systematic Theology, p.290f)

Hence...at this point...the Holy spirit hates it, and this is indeed an ominous hatred. Thus the Psalm also states: "I hate them with perfect hatred." (139:22). When the Holy Spirit begins to hate and to be angry, eternal death follows. (Martin Luther, Luther's Works, Vol. 2, p. 174)

He is a holy God, and therefore hates them (the sinner), and cannot endure to look upon them; the wicked, and him that loveth violence, His soul hateth... Their prosperity is far from being an evidence of God’s love...their abuse of it does certainly make them objects of His hatred. He hates nothing that He has made, yet hates those who have ill-made themselves. (Matthew Henry’s commentary on Psalms)

Garver,

Thanks for the quotes. They do demonstrate that God's non-salvific goodness is rightly called "love." Berkhof makes the strongest case for a universal love of humanity based on the recognition of his own image in them. More importantly for the present discussion, he does reserve a special love for believers. I will have to read the surrounding context to figure out exactly what he's saying. It's unclear whether or not he recognizes a special love for the elect before they become believers. If the special love exists only as a result of them being believers, then Berkhof does not draw the connection that I do between love and limited atonement. Nevertheless, to say that I am wrong on this account would be an argument from silence. Still, the fact that he does recognize a special love for a particular group would seem to validate the pedagogical use of the question, "Does God love everybody?" Provided, of course, that the teacher bring out these qualifications.

Turretin is willing to extend the label of love to God's goodness to animals. He could just as well have stuck with goodness. I'll also have to read this quote in context. As it stands now, I don't agree with his first sentence. And this appears to be the basis for saying that God has a love other than for the elect. Perhaps I'll change my mind after seeing how he explains himself.

Calvin's quote, upon first reading it, looks like he's capitulated. It's a difficult passage and, currently, I do not have access to the context. This passages is unlike the others. It does not categorize the love of God according to the objects loved, but distinguishes three different degrees of love for the same objects. In the first degree, this love is tied to the atonement. It is "in regard to the redemption that was purchased in the person of him who gave himself up to death for us." The second is for those who sit under the preaching of the gospel. But this is not a different group from the first. It is God testifying that we will be partakers of his atonement, or, as Calvin puts it, "the benefit that was purchased for them by the death and passion of his Son." We also see under the third degree, or bond of love that God caused the gospel to be preached to us. The love of God for us consists in the fact that he purchases our redemption, causes us to hear the gospel proclamation of this redemption, and then causes us to feel the power of this proclamation so that the benefits of this redemption are applied to us. On rereading the passage, Calvin is very much a Calvinist.

What of the statement that "Jesus Christ offers himself generally to all men without exception to be their redeemer"? This is referring to the free offer of the gospel and, as it says, this it to all without exception. The question is whether or not Calvin connects this free offer with God's love. If one were to hear this passage, it would certainly seem that he does. However, filling in those ellipsis marks could change the entire meaning. Do you happen to know what's been left out?

Calvin goes on to claim that the first degree of love "extends to all men." However, unlike the previous "all men," which is qualified by "without exception," this "all men" is repeated and qualified by "both great and small." Calvin is not referring to each and every individual but to all classes of individuals. Insofar as Calvin has connected this love to the atonement, the definition of "all men" in this paragraph must also be determined by the extent of the atonement. And we already know what Calvin believes on that score. That Calvin did not believe "all" had to refer to every single individual can be seen in his commentary on 1 John 2:2, "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world." He writes, "Then under the word all or whole, he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world. For then is really made evident, as it is meet, the grace of Christ, when it is declared to be the only true salvation of the world."

Now to those other comments of yours I wanted to address. You write, "David speculates that many Reformed theologians would differentiate God's love into various types. This is indeed the case, though it must also be recognized that such differentiation is only "denominative," describing created effects from the standpoint of our experience as creatures." I disagree. The special love that God exercises toward the elect is such that he atones for their sins and causes them to hear the gospel and be saved. This love is a different kind of love on God's part inasmuch as it involves him in a different kind of activity. I believe that you're reading too much into the verse, "God is love." It is not intended as an ontological statement of God's substance, but as an emphatic affirmation of one of his attributes. The doctrine of divine simplicity is in reference to his substance. This substance is only communicated between the persons of the trinity. Yet, when John says that God is love, he calls us to emulate this love. This can only be true of a communicable attribute. We cannot emulate the divine substance. This belongs to God alone.

Clifton,

Since I am defining "intent" as God's decretive will, it is, by definition, something that cannot be frustrated. You are obviously defining it differently. How are you defining "intent"? Can you define it so that in saying, "God intends the salvation of all," you have necessarily ruled out the proposition, "It is God's decretive will that only some be saved"?

As to free will, you write that Calvinists deny this "based on the presuppositions of their own premises." But you can't escape the same charge. You believe in free will based on the presuppositions of your own premises. Calvinists believe that, within the limits of natural ability, people are free to do anything they want to do. This is called "free moral agency." When people are forced into doing something that they do not want to do, they are not free, nor are they morally responsible. Unregenerate persons are perfectly free to accept Christ. None of them want to. Hence, the Reformed dictum, "Regeneration precedes faith."

Thus, in Calvinism, it is God's preceptive will that all be saved, but his decretive will that only some are saved. It is his decretive will that all are free moral agents, but it is also his decretive will that only some will have their natures changed so that they want to choose Christ. It is God's decretive will to leave others in their natural state. As a result, none of these will want to accept Christ. The former is an active decree, the latter a permissive decree.

Who ever said that the divine attributes were non-personal categories of being? They are descriptions of God's nature. Just as people are free to act according to their own natures, so is God. The difference is that God's nature is infinitely good. Besides this, your contention that divine attributes cannot necesitate God in any way makes even less sense when it comes to omnipotence. This attribute describes God's ability. It does not mean that God always acts with all of his power, but that God always has whatever amount of power is necessary to accomplish what he wants to do. And if he wants to save someone, he is perfectly able to do that.

Kevin, you're right, of course, that I didn't actually quote anyone.

Since I haven't much time to track down many quotations, I'll just present three from figures I take to be prominent representatives of the Reformed tradition and have at hand: Calvin, Turretin, and Berkhof.

Calvin writes:

It is true, what St John says generally, that [God] loved the world. And why? Because Jesus Christ offers himself generally to all men without exception to be their redeemer...Thus we see three degrees of the love that God has showed us in our Lord Jesus Christ.

The first is in regard to the redemption that was purchased in the person of him who gave himself up to death for us, and became accursed to reconcile us to God his Father. That is the first degree of love, which extends to all men, inasmuch as Jesus Christ reaches out his arms to call and allure all men both great and small, and to win them to him.

But there is a special love for those who sit under the preaching of the gospel: which is that God testifies unto them that he will make them partakers of the benefit that was purchased for them by the death and passion of his Son. And since we ourselves are of that number, therefore we are bound doubly already to our God: here are two bonds which hold us, as it were, tied unto him.

Now let us come to the third bond, which depends upon the third love that God shows us: which is that he not only causes the gospel to be preached unto us, but also makes us to feel the power thereof, so as we know him to be our Father and Savior, not doubting that our sins are forgiven us for our Lord Jesus Christ's sake, who brings us the gift of the Holy Spirit, to form us again after his own image. (Sermons on Deuteronomy)

Turretin writes:

From goodness flows love by which [God] communicates himself to the creature and (as it were) wills to unite himself with and do good to it, bit in diverse ways and degrees according to the diversity of the objects. Hence is usually made a threefold distinction in the divine love: the first, that by which he follows creatures, called "love of the creature" (philoktisia); the second, that by which he embraces all men, called "love of man" (philoanthropia); the third, which is specially exercised towards the elect and is called "the love of the elect" (eklektophilia). (Institutes of Elenctic Theology 3.20.4)

Berkhof writes:

When the goodness of God is exercised towards his rational creatures, it assumes the higher character of love, and this love may against be distinguished according to the objects on which it terminates...Since God is absolutely good in Himself, His love cannot find complete satisfaction in any object that falls short of absolute perfection. He loves His rational creatures for His own sake, or, to express it otherwise, He love in them Himself, His virtues, His work, and His gifts. He does not even withdraw His love completely from the sinner in his present sinful state, though the latter's sin is an abomination to Him, since He recognizes even in the sinner His image-bearer. John 3:16; Matt. 5:44,45. At the same time he loves believers with a special love, since He contemplates them as His spiritual children in Christ. (Systematic Theology, 71)

These are representative of the tradition as a whole, as far as I can determine.

Not too much time to respond here, so here goes...

David:

Nobody ever said that the confessions or reformed theologians have taught that God makes people sin. We have only contended that they teach that God foreordains sin yet without guilt of being its author. The confession makes this distinction clear, and this is what I have been trying to demonstrate to you.

You wrote that I should have quoted the following, which is supposed to refute the claim that even Boettner taught that the existence and occurence of sin fell within God's decree:

When it is known, certainly, that it will be done unless prevented, and there is a determination not to prevent it, it is rendered as certain as if it were decreed to be done by positive agency. [emphasis yours]

I suspect that you think that he is saying that sin unprevented is rendered as certain as if it were decreed without qualification, but that's not what the text says. Notice that he says that unprevented sin looks "as if it were decreed to be done by positive decree." Smith is here employing the distinction between a positive decree wherein God Himself is the active agent in bringing about an event and a negative (permissive) decree wherein God allows some other agent to bring about an event, both of which I tried to explain earlier. In other words, Smith is saying that unprevented sin looks as if it were decreed and carried out through God's active agency, which, of course, he soon denies because on the reformed account God decreed sin not actively but negatively, i.e., permissively. This is the point at which and the purpose for which the confession and reformed theologians bring in locutions like secondary causes and means, so as to remove God from being the proximate agent in anything that might pin the guilt of sin on Him.

Now look at the rest of the text:

In the one case, the event is rendered certain by agency put forth; and, in the other case, it is rendered equally certain by agency withheld. It is an unchangeable decree in both cases. The sins of Judas, and the crucifixion of the Saviour, were as unchangeably decreed, permissively, as the coming of the Saviour into the world was decreed positively.

Notice that Smith renders unprevented sin as falling under the decree of God, though, of course, permissively. Notice also the following distinction:

[1] God decrees. God carries it out actively (i.e., God is the active agent)
[2] God decrees. God carries it out negatively (i.e., permissively - He allows it to happen)

Now if you go back and reread the rest of what I laid before you, you will see this distinction employed. Of course, you may take issue with the language being used, but the idea behind the choice of diction is clear, that God foreordains sin, though only permissively and not actively.

A couple of questions for you if you yet deny that God decrees sin:

[1] When the confessions and reformed theologians say that God has foreordained sin, if they do not really mean that God has foreordained sin, then what precisely do they mean?

[2] What is the precise relationship between God and the existence and occurence of sin in the world? Does God merely know through His foreknowledge the sins men will commit and only then direct them according to His purposes? If so, is not Westminster 3.2 in disagreement with your contention?

Of God's Eternal Decree, 3.2

2. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath He not decreed any thing because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

Kevin:

I plan on responding to your comment about whether or not the earlier proposed analogy holds, but I wanted to use the short amount of time I had to respond to David first. Assuming that we don't get too sidetracked, stay tuned for some interaction.

Kevin:

I'm sorry to say but your argument is not quite so neat as that.

There are two ways to approach this.

First of all, it appears that lurking behind your assertion of the divine attributes of immutability and omnipotence is the assumption that something which is contrary to God's intent either denies his immutability (I suppose that he might intend something different than he first intended) or his omnipotence (that if his intent is thwarted then his omnipotence is negated). But these are non sequitors, at least insofar as I have described my position. In short, I argue that God has two distinct though related intentions: the salvation of all and the free will of each. His intent that all be saved is commensurate with his intent that humans have free will. This is only a "failure" of his omnipotence if you define omnipotence in such a way as to preclude any frustration of God's intent. But the "failure" to accomplish the salvation of all is not a "failure" to accomplish the freedom of all wills. (Calvinists may deny this freedom of will, but they do so based on the presuppositions of their own premises--which is to say, they assume the conclusion in the premise.) Or to say it a bit more straight: God's omnipotence is not called into question if he has willed his own limitation (allowed human will to operate freely).

The other way to approach this is to remember that the so-called "divine attributes" cannot be categorizations of God that necessitate God in any way. One of the dangers of speaking of strictly ontological attributes of God is this negation of the Personhood of God. As a Person (or, more correctly, a Unity of Three Persons) God cannot be necessitated by any non-personal categories of being. To do so would make these rational categories omnipotent and not God, the Triune Person. Or, God, as Triune Person, is utterly free (as are all persons) to do as he wills. It is this freedom which manifests his omnipotence. Thus God can, as it were, limit himself without negating this quality of omnipotence.

Let me try this way. If you ask 100 educated people "What does it mean to say 'God decreed that I sin'" I believe most would interpret it as synonomous with 'God made me sin'. And that is not what the confession nor the Reformed scholars are saying.

David,

It appears that Wayne has ably demonstrated that Reformed theology teaches God decrees sin. Whether Reformed theology is in harmony with Scripture on this count is a different matter. You mention Jeremiah 19:5 in support of your position. At least one translation (ESV) translates the word for "mention" as "decree." Nevertheless, I'm not convinced that this is using the concept of "decree" in the technical sense of the confession. "Command," "mention," and "did [not] enter my mind" is a three-fold emphasis of the same thought: a common technique in Hebrew writing. They are all describing God's preceptive will.

Clifton,

I am reminded of what one of my philosophy professors once said, "One man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens." You deny the connection between intent and accomplishment based on the assumption that God always intends. I deny that God always intends based on the assumption that there is a connection between intent and accomplishment. Both arguments are logically valid so we could go in several circles on this one. The question is whose original premise is true. I've already offered support for mine (God is immutable and omnipotent). Can you show where these divine attributes do not support my position and provide support for your own?

Garver,

There is no problem with quoting mainstream Calvinists or a broad Reformed consensus. However, at least in your response to me, you did not do this. You only provided a list of names. This is hardly the same thing. Nor does it suffice as argument, or even a demonstration that the doctrine of God's particular love is on the fringes of Reformed thought. I may have more to say on your other comments, but I need to go now.

Since some have chosen to be saved (and, according to divine revelation, have been/will be saved), and since Christ's death is not predicated on human responsiveness, then the answer to your question is clearly, no.

Clifton,

A theoretical question: What happens if nobody chooses to be saved? Is it possible that Christ died in vain?

By the way, a passage that I think demonstrates my point is:

They have built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in the fire as offerings to Baal-something I did not command or mention, nor did it enter my mind. (Jer. 19:5)

This, I submit, is at odds with the simple, unqualified assertion "God decrees that I sin"

Kevin:

No, I stand firm on my accusation of previous category denial.

To wit:

God intends that all be saved.
God intends that all have free will.
Not all will choose to be saved.
If not all will choose to be saved, then some will choose against God's intent that they be saved.
Therefore, God's intent that all be saved will not be accomplished.

Wayne,

You could have emphasized this part of Smith's quote:

When it is known, certainly, that it will be done unless prevented, and there is a determination not to prevent it, it is rendered as certain as if it were decreed to be done by positive agency.

Man's sin falls within and cannot thwart God sovereign plan, but still God does not make people sin as your simple statement "God decrees that I sin" implies. No more that God decreed that I shift my weight on my chair as I just did. It falls within his permissive will in as much it cannot thwart his plans.

The concern for bare permission is a proper concern that evil not be viewed as "engaged in a battle" with God, i.e., dualism.

Garver,

The problem, as always, is you reserve for yourself the right to define the broad tradition. The very first time I debated with you, over a year ago on Mark Shea's blog, I quoted Sproul. You response (paraphrasing from memory) was something like "*sigh* I do not consider Sproul to be of any substance". So as I said, as long as you get to define who is mainstream, then your claims are beyond dispute.

Would you point me to where you answered those four questions?

Oh dear. The comments seemed to have multiplied considerably.

Well, only a few further comments in response to a couple of things directed specifically at me.

[1] I'm not sure what the problem is with quoting mainstream Calvinist theologians or some kind of broad Reformed consensus. Part of what we are discussing here is the definition of a particular tradition: the Reformed tradition, its limits and boundaries, as well as the kinds of core affirmations it typically makes.

In that respect, "Heddlean" views are systemically at the fringes of that tradition, at the best. If one thinks they are biblical, that is fine, though I would differ and argue otherwise. But if one thinks they are representative of the bulk of Reformed thought, then one is certainly mistaken.

I don't say that to elevate the Reformed tradition above Scripture, but to make it clear that this is not merely an in-house debate about the minutiae of Reformed theology and to make it all the more clear that this is a debate about one's whole approach to Scripture.

Since one's interpretation of Scripture occurs within a context and, often enough, within a theological tradition, I think we should be all the more self-aware of the choices we make in interpreting Scripture, how we prioritize various sets of verses in relation to one another, and so on.

I also think that if a person is operating outside the boundaries or at the far edges of any cohesive theological tradition, then this is important for their audience to recognize and be alerted to.

[2] David speculates that many Reformed theologians would differentiate God's love into various types. This is indeed the case, though it must also be recognized that such differentiation is only "denominative," describing created effects from the standpoint of our experience as creatures.

After all, in God himself, in light of the doctrine of divine simplicity, there is only one love, which is identical with God himself, who is love.

In every case of God's goodness and love towards his creatures, it is a matter of God's active affection towards his own gifts and image in them. So long as a creature retains some vestige of those gifts, God cannot help but love what is his. After all, creation is, in itself, a good, even if that good undergoes privation through wickedness.

Moreover, the most basic gift is existence itself, a creaturely reflection of the One who is self-existent. Thus for God to cease loving a creature would entail that creature ceasing to exist (as Augustine argues).

We cannot, therefore, drive a wedge between God's potentia absoluta and his potentia ordinata in such a way that God's creative and persevering power is separated from his goodness and love.

[3] As for Mt 7:23 and Jesus' declaration, "I never knew you," one must surely be willing to admit that there is a sense in which Christ surely "knew" these persons since Christ, as God, is omniscient and knows all things.

Whatever the specific complexion of this "knowing" it can't reasonably exclude actual knowledge. Thus, we need to distinguish between a general kind of knowing insofar as Christ knows all things and a specific kind of knowing (with particular attendent effects) that would be excluded in this case.

But this is just what I am suggesting regarding God's love for his creatures. There is a universal love and a more specific love.

[4] With regard to the series of four questions that David addressed to me, I think I have already adequately answered them all before.

David:

There is nothing in what Boettner has said that is inconsistent with what I have been telling you consistent reformed theology teaches, for the reason that you are failing to distinguish between God's decree as decision that something will come to pass and the agent by which what has been decided to come pass actually does come to pass. In other words, on the reformed account God decrees that something comes to pass and God decrees the means by which something comes to pass (which are logically distinct though by no means actually separate), and it is with respect to the means by which God's decrees come to pass whereby they are said to be either positive or negative (permissive) decrees. Sometimes God does it directly through His own agency, other times God simply permits an agent to do what it will in accordance with its own desires. Either way every event has its conceptual origin in the eternal decree of God, including your sin, even if the efficient cause of your sin is you yourself through God allowing you to committ it. This is why both the Confession and Boettner deny that this is a bare permission, which is to distinguish between things happening through chance by God allowing them to happen and things happening because God has decreed to permit them to happen. Again, the issue is one of agency and does not concern whether or not the existence of sin is part of God's decree. This is consistent reformed teaching.

Since we're getting into the quoting game, let me furnish something from the same book from which you quote Boettner:

When it is known, certainly, that it will be done unless prevented, and there is a determination not to prevent it, it is rendered as certain as if it were decreed to be done by positive agency. In the one case, the event is rendered certain by agency put forth; and, in the other case, it is rendered equally certain by agency withheld. It is an unchangeable decree in both cases. The sins of Judas, and the crucifixion of the Saviour, were as unchangeably decreed, permissively, as the coming of the Saviour into the world was decreed positively.

[The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, "That It Makes God the Author of Sin," Section 6 - here Boettner is quoting W. D. Smith]

And from Section 3 of the same chapter:

Even the fall of Adam, and through him the fall of the race, was not by chance or accident, but was so ordained in the secret counsels of God.

And from the very quote that you yourself gave:

Many persons are deceived in these matters because they fail to consider that God wills righteously those things which men do wickedly

From Louis Berkhoff, Summary of Christian Doctrine, Chapter 8.1, 8.1b:

The Divine Decrees

1. The Divine Decrees in General. The decree of God is His eternal plan or purpose, in which He has foreordained all things that come to pass. Since it includes many particulars, we often speak of the divine decrees in the plural, though in reality there is but a single decree. It covers all the works of God in creation and redemption, and also embraces the actions of men, not excluding their sinful deeds. But while it rendered the entrance of sin into the world certain, it does not make God responsible for our sinful deeds. His decree with respect to sin is a permissive decree.

... b. Objections to the doctrine of the decrees... [That] it makes God the author of sin [is the third objection]. It may be said, however, that the decree merely makes God the author of free moral beings, who are themselves the authors of sin. Sin is made certain by the decree, but God does not Himself produce it by His direct action. At the same time it must be admitted that the problem of God's relation to sin remains a mystery which we cannot fully solve.

From "The Five Points of Calvinism," by R. L. Dabney:

Now, it is vain for those to object that God's will cannot have anything to do with sinful results, even in this permissive sense, without making God an author of the sin, unless these cavilers mean to take the square infidel ground. For the Bible is full of assertions that God does thus foreordain sin without being an author of sin.

You say that God does not decree sin. The above shows that on a reformed account you are clearly wrong. So whenever the confessions state that God decrees "whatsoever comes to pass," they most certainly mean whatsoever comes to pass.

Wayne,

You're right. Insofar as you are arguing in support of the kind of Calvinism you can live with, what you believe about Reformed theology is beside the point. Nevertheless, what this theology actually teaches is very much to the point as a defense against the charge that the question at hand is an aberration thereof.

You state that your analogy has not been broken, but I don't see that your reasons are sufficient to support this. To briefly summarize my argument: it is not the case that [L1] is to [L2] as [S1] is to [S2] because [L1] implies ~[L2]. There is also another argument against the analogy. You are using a uniquely Reformed concept- the decree of God- in order to show that [L] can be accepted even within a Reformed context. In so doing, you have committed the entire analogy to a Reformed context. Yet, this means that both [S2] and [L2] must be understood in Reformed terms. There are two possible ways to interpret "God desires." Either, "It is God's decretive will," or, "It is God's preceptive will." [S2] must be, "It is God's preceptive will that I not sin." [S2] cannot refer to the decretive will because this would contradict [S1]. As to [L2], it is both the case that God desires all to be saved and that God desires only the elect to be saved. The former is preceptive will, the latter is decretive will. Technically, your analogy works, but only if [S2] and [L2] are understood in terms of God's preceptive will. But this is entirely beside the point of whether or not God loves everybody. You are, of course, free to argue that the will of God should be broader than decretive and preceptive. However, the nature of this particular analogy is such that you are limited to Reformed terminology.

You gave an accurate and straightforward Reformed interpretation of Acts 4:27-28. I am curious, though. How else could it possibly be interpreted?

I'm not sure of your point that the salvation of the elect is contingent on Adam's sin. If Adam had not sinned, there would be no need of salvation.

Moving on to the violation of the creature's free will, we're not connecting here. You probably already know that a Calvinist is not going to accept your definition of free will. The will is determined by the nature. The creature's nature is always corrupt and will never want anything to do with God. If God decided not to "violate" our wills, no one could be saved. Yet, in the Calvinist conception, he does not violate them. Rather, he elects some and changes their nature. The will freely follows. All to say that Calvinists are not going to accept your account of why God sends people he loves to hell. Unless you have theological objections to it, the argument that Evan offered is much more persuasive. As to (4) and (5) in your answer, I am at a complete loss for words.

David,

Good quote by Boettner, but nothing in it is inconsistent with the idea that God decrees sin (yet so as not to be the author of sin).

Bill,

How many people have perished while you have been engaged in Red Sox and Frigidaire updates? Try not to make your non sequitors so obvious.

Clifton,

I missed this in my last response, so I'll catch it now. God's intent does equal accomplishment. The category mistake is found in denying this. It makes God the same as us. Our intent does not always equal accomplishment because our intent can change (God is immutable) and because we may not be able to carry it out (God is omnipotent).

Bill:

Perhaps some exponential amount more than did when you took the time to look over the discussion and type your response.

Please.

I wonder how many unsaved people perished in the time it has taken to have this obesely pointless argument.

What's worse? Too much education or not enough?

Josh:

"We do not search for the "marks of election" that we may know to whom the Gospel may be given." If you think that's what Calvinists do, then there's really nothing I can say that could convince you otherwise. God's decree works itself out through people's choices; His grace is mediated through the Church's sacraments. Really it would be silly to say anything else.

The words or Reformed Theologian Boettner in his work "The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination"

A partial explanation of sin is found in the fact that while man is constantly commanded in Scripture not to commit it, he is, nevertheless, permitted to commit it if he chooses to do so. No compulsion is laid on the person; he is simply left to the free exercise of his own nature, and he alone is responsible. This, however. is never a bare permission, for with full knowledge of the nature of the person and of his tendency to sin, God allows him or allows him to be in a certain environment, knowing perfectly well that the particular sin will be committed. But while God permits sin, His connection with it is purely negative and it is the abominable thing which he hates with perfect hatred. The motive which God has in permitting it and the motive which man has in committing it are radically different. Many persons are deceived in these matters because they fail to consider that God wills righteously those things which men do wickedly. Furthermore, every person’s conscience after he has committed a sin tells him that he alone is responsible and that he need not have committed it if he had not voluntarily chosen to do so.

This is not lunatic fringe Heddlelean, but from a respected scholar. He says (as is commonly explained) God in His power and foreknowledge can arrange circumstances such that people will sin in a manner that plays its role in God's sovereign plan. His plan cannot be thwarted, but neither does He decree sin.

David and Kevin:

Just to clarify, what I happen to believe about reformed theology need not enter into the discussion, since my goal here is to argue for the sort of calvinism that I can live with. God doesn't love everybody, you say? Nope, can't live with that. God loves everybody and why He only elects some of those to salvation is a mystery? Yep, I can live with that. I still think it's wrong, but that I can deal with.

I am well aware that the Westminster Standards make a distinction between primary and secondary causes, but this does not save you from the fact that God decrees sin to take place nor does it break the analogy that I proposed. And as for merely permitting sins rather than positively decreeing them, when you consider the crucifixion of Christ, David, the idea that God only allowed His murderers to crucify Him rather than foreordaining it to take place is, on reformed grounds, just plain silly; otherwise the crucifixion would be contingent (again, on reformed grounds). How do you think this verse holds up on a reformed account?

"For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur." - Acts 4:27-28

If I were reformed, this is how I would treat this text: there were gathered various people to do whatever God predestined to occur. God predestined His Son to be murdered. Therefore God predestined various people to murder His Son. No bare permission here. Indeed, with bare permission you've just set one foot in the door of the Arminian camp. And yes, that's a fact.

Furthermore, with the fact that the salvation of the elect is contingent on at least one man's sin (i.e., Adam), saying that God only 'permits' sin rather than decree it is, again, just plain silly too (on reformed grounds). The plain fact of the matter is that, in order to be consistently reformed, you need stronger language than that.

And now a word from our sponsor:

Westminster Confession, 5.2-4
Of Providence

2. Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

3. God, in His ordinary providence, maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at His pleasure.

4. The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God so far manifest themselves in His providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering, and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to His own holy ends; yet so, as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God, who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin.

And here is some further clarification about God's providence over the actions of men:

Westminster Larger Catechism, Q/A 18
Question 18: What are God's works of providence?

Answer: God's works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful preserving and governing all his creatures; ordering them, and all their actions, to his own glory.

First, this ought to show you, David, that Kevin is right: whatever sort of permissive will that God has falls under God's decretive will, since according this account everything falls under God's decretive will since, as primary cuase of all things, God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. Notice as well that the confession denies that sin takes place by 'bare permission'. So yes, everything, including your sin, finds its origin in God as primary cause of all things. Of course this doesn't mean that God forces people to sin when you throw in things like secondary causes (again, just playing along here - I don't buy into this), but in doing so He is yet no less the primary cause of all things.

Second, no matter how you slice it, on the reformed account God is still in some sense the cause of all things, regardless of how they may fall out according to secondary causes or means. So, here's the analogy again for clarification's sake:

[L1] God has decreed the salvation of only the elect.
[L2] God desires all to be saved.

[S1] God has decreed that I sin.
[S2] God desires that I not sin.

According to the Westminster Standards God is the primary cause of both [L1] and [S1]. And since both [L1] and [S1] ultimately have their source in God via His eternal decree, it doesn't matter what happens afterwards by way of secondary causes or means; God is still in at least one sense the author and origin of both (and again, here I am not implying that on this account God is the author of sin, though in the 'real world' I would indeed say such). Therefore in both cases God decrees or does not decree what the scriptures say God either does or does not desire, and the analogy still holds.

As for God sending people to hell whom He loves, there's really no problem though as I said before it may be a little perplexing (after all, there's no claim to be able fully to explain everything). Here's my answer, though I know you'll say I'm just speculating blah blah blah blah blah.

(1) God sends those who hate Him to a certain place. We'll call this hell.
(2) God sends them here because God has chosen not to violate the free will of the creature. In this case the creature wants nothing to do with God.
(3) God continues to shed His love on those who are now in hell.
(4) Those in hell continue to despise God and are not able to bear such love.
(5) This is the origin of such torment.

But why allow them to be tormented? Because as I said in (2), God does not violate the free will of the creature. Indeed, they could not truly love Him and enjoy His presence and good gifts without it.

Furthermore, as I have pointed out to you before there is nothing incompatible with God both loving and hating a person at the same time, so you shouldn't find anything incompatible with God sending to hell those whom He loves.

Will you now go back and read my second to last post?

Well, David, now you're in kind of a conundrum, because it would seem then logical to argue that God doesn't decree the damnation of anyone, since to decree damnation is to decree sin and unbelief. This would indicate that in some way, God desires that they believe in Christ, since to believe in Christ is at the very least a good thing to do, is it not? But then Christ is in some way intended for them, is he not, since God wishes them to believe in him? But if there is some real sense in which God offers Christ to them, then God in some sense loves them, does he not, since Christ is God's love incarnate?

Kevin,

I believe that making a distinction between decretive and permissive wills, rather than making the latter a sub category of the former, puts me (for a change) in the majority view among Calvinists. Others may want to comment.

I stand by my assertion that God does not decree sin. He permits it. Sin falls within his sovereign will, but only in the sense that He could prevent it. That is far different from decreeing it.

It's probabaly just a bit premature to accuse David of not understanding Calvinism. I suspect he misspoke or, at least, could have been clearer. You're right, Wayne. The Reformed confessions do affirm that God decrees whatsoever comes to pass; i.e., everything. They also claim that this is done in such a way that God is not the author of sin. And herein lies the difference between [S1] and [L1]. The decree found in [L1] occurrs in such a way that God is the author of salvation. The difference here is strong enough to break the analogy. If we affirm [S1]/[S2] and [L1], there is not a sufficient relationship between [S1] and [L1] to require us to affirm [L2] (this does not rule out the possibility that we may affirm it for other reasons).

The concept of God as the author of salvation does not simply mean that he provides a way to be saved. It means that, from the initial elective decree to the final glorification, God acomplishes the salvation of the elect. There is something that God does for the elect that he does not do for the non-elect. What accounts for this? We could retreat into mystery, but a consistently Reformed answer is love. And, considering the nature of the case, it must be a love that is limited to those for whom God has authored salvation.

You already wrote, "Notice that I never claimed that this is equivalent to God being guilty for your sin or anything similar, though I personally believe such to be true on a reformed account." Consequently, I don't expect you to accept this distinction (between the decree with God as author and the decree with God not as author). Yet, right or wrong, the distinction does exist within Reformed theology. All to say that, while you might have grounds, based on the theology of your own denomination (and the extent to which Eastern Orthodox theology is correct is another discussion altogether), to object to the claim that God limits his love to the elect, you do not have the grounds to distinguish David from the "real" Calvinists. His argument, though perhaps not as clear in some points as it could have been, is consistent with Reformed theology. Consequently, your argument should not be with David, as opposed to the sane and respectable Calvinists; instead, it should be with Reformed theology itself, the consistent application of which you find offensive.

[David, I just read your last response, which you must have been writing concurrenly with this one. Overall, I agree with it, but I don't believe that you have done justice to the language of the confessions. If it happens, it's been decreed. I would include "permissive will" as a sub-category of "decretive will." The difference has already been explained above.]

Wayne,

If you are implying that the confessions teach that if I told a lie today, then God decreed that I should do so, then you are misinterpreting them and ignoring the parts about God not being the author of sin, and free will not being violated, and also the issue of secondary causes.

Deeper studies of God's will generally distinguish among His decretive, preceptive, and permissive wills.

His decretive will cannot be thwarted. God decreed the universe into existence. God decreed that David should be king. His did not decree that David should commit murder and adultery.

Here is a good example of decretive will:

Moreover whom He predestined, these He also called; whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also glorified.(Rom. 8:30)

There is no cooperation of man here, just God's sovereignty at work.

(As an aside, if God's call is for everyone, because he loves everyone, then Rom. 8:30 affirms universalism, because it implies all that He called He justified, so if He calls everyone, everyone is justified.)

His preceptive will is what He commands but does not decree, such as obedience.

Permissive will is no doubt self explanatory.

If you S1 was written

[S1] God (permissively) wills that I sin
[S2] God (preceptively) wills that I not sin

Then I would affirm both.

The "dint" of wacky claims—the only claim I made is "God doesn't love everyone". The basis for which was scripture that reads God hates X. Other Calvinists have made the same claim, I gave some examples earlier.

I am still waiting for anyone to answer how God can send someone he loves to suffer eternal torture. It is a simple question, what is your answer? My answer is very simple: He doesn't.

David:

First your argumentation re: Jn 3:16f. You clearly make a category mistake in your reasoning. You propose that God's intent equals accomplishment. On your own (alleged) Calvinist reasoning, this apparently is true to you, but (relying on Wayne's expert analysis of your views) that Calvinist reasoning is true is another matter.

I take it that God may intend something that, given human free will (which I assume--perhaps incorrectly--is a metaphysical reality you would deny), is never accomplished precisely because the human(s) whom he intends to do/be something of their own free will refuse to do/be that which God intends.

So, God intends that every single person ever to have lived or who is living or who ever will live (i.e., the world) be saved (your charge of universalism), nonetheless, this will not be accomplished since clearly there are those who will of their own free will resist God's intent.

You and I may be closer in general agreement on these points, though clearly we have a significant difference on the specifics. My point here is merely to refute your charge of universalism.

Secondly, with regard to the Church's infallibility, since I stated that those two texts were not the only ones that can/should be discusses and were only the beginning points, then of course I am not using them as proof texts for my assertion. On the other hand, given what you have said with regard to Scripture and its alleged prima facie meaning, then those two texts would certainly begin to establish my assertion. Or in other words, though arguing from my viewpoint re: Scriptural interpretation I am utilizing your arguments to make my case.

Or, more directly, I am not arguing that those texts do not themselves also require interpretation (does Peter mean to speak only to the Old Testament texts? what does Peter mean by "private interpretation"? what does Paul mean to assert that the Church is the pillar and ground of the Truth? does this claim relate to Christ's promise to Apostles that the Holy Spirit would lead them into all truth? is such a promise to be extended to the Church, and if so in what way?). Rather, I am assuming a point and utilizing Scripture in the way you propose it operates to begin to establish that point.

David:

You just proved to me that you have no idea what calvinism teaches and you are therefore not a calvinist or reformed or whatever you want to call it (most would say you're not a calvinist anyway by dint of the wacky claims that you've been making here). Therefore, from now on I will call you a Heddlean.

The London Baptist Confession of Faith, Ch. 3.1

Of God's Eternal Decree

1. God hath decreed in himself, from all eternity, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably, all things, whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby is God neither the author of sin nor hath fellowship with any therein; nor is violence offered to the will of the creature, nor yet is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established; in which appears his wisdom in disposing all things, and power and faithfulness in accomplishing his decree.

The Westminster Confession of Faith, Ch. 3.1:

Of God's Eternal Decree

1. God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

From the Belgic Confession, Article XIII:

Of Divine Providence

We believe that the same God, after he had created all things, did not forsake them, or give them up to fortune or chance, but that he rules and governs them according to his holy will, so that nothing happens in this world without his appointment: nevertheless, God neither is the author of, nor can be charged with, the sins which are committed.

According to these standard accounts of reformed doctrine, God decrees whatsoever comes to pass. Therefore God has decreed that you sin. Notice that I never claimed that this is equivalent to God being guilty for your sin or anything similar, though I personally believe such to be true on a reformed account. But that's not important for this discussion, since we're only working within the confines of a reformed system of doctrine.

To make the example more explicit:

[1] God decreed that people murder His Son.
[2] God desires people not to murder.

There you go. So, are you a calvinist or not? Quite frankly, I think it's embarrassing that one who is Eastern Orthodox needs to teach you, an alleged calvinist, how to be a good calvinist.

And since apparently you only glanced through the majority of my previous comment, I would ask that you go back and read it with the above considerations in mind.

Did God decree the actions of Judas/Pilate/etc.--were those actions sinful? Was the Fall decreed?

Clifton,

Of course I cannot agree that the only infallible interpretation is the Church. Surely you are no citing 2 Tim. 3:15 and 2 Pet 1:20-21 as proof texts of that position?

Let me see if I got this right, according to your words. All scripture requires interpretation. Except those passages that allegedly demonstrate that only the Church has the ability to interpret scripture infallibly. Those passage we take at face value, no interpretation required. Is that your argument?

Let’s talk about John 3:16 and just for fun include the next verse, John 3:17:

(16) "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. (17) For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him.

Then if “the world” means “everyone in the world” we can paraphrase these two (back to back in the same context by the same author) verses as

(16) "For God so loved everyone in the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. (17) For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn everyone in the world, but to save everyone in the world through him.

If we assume Christ did not fail, then if world means “everyone in the world”, we have just affirmed universalism.

Wayne,

I have no idea what you are talking about.

Firstly, I have never retreated from my assertion that God does not love everyone. I stand by that, I merely conceded if by "loving everyone" or "universal love" we are talking about common grace, then that I can affirm.

Second, you wrote

[S1] God has decreed that I sin.
[S2] God desires that I not sin.

And challenged me to deny one of them. That is easy. I do not know of any theology that affirms S1. (I read it five times to make sure you wrote what I thought you wrote.) Certainly not Calvinism. I think for once even garver and I would agree that S1 is not, as you put it, "a basic tenet of calvinist doctrine". God decrees that I sin? May it never be. If God decreed that I sin then He could not hold me accountable for it, for I would powerless to resist a divine decree regardless of my moral state. So God cannot decree sin for at least two reasons, (1) He is holy and (2) it wouldn't be sin anyway since it would be of no moral consequence.

Since a quick glance through the rest of you post seemed to indicate that it was based in large part on my assumed acceptance of S1, I will end my response here.

David:

Your version of God's universal love is too weak. In fact, since you posit that God's seeming benevolence to the wicked is really only for the benefit of the elect, God's universal love turns out to be no love at all. So but for a semantical difference you are for all practical purposes standing by the same position: God does not love everyone. This is, of course, unacceptable. Rather the kind of Calvinism that I can live with (and, admittedly, having considered the matter a bit more what I am now presenting is a bit stronger than what I initially offered) leaves God's love for all and His ultimate choice not to save all a mystery. It goes something like this (and for the record I will continue to hound you until you affirm such):

God loves all: He cares for all, showers them with His mercy and goodness, is not pleased with the death of any, and genuinely offers the gospel to all that they may turn from their sins and to Christ. Yet ultimately God does not give the grace to believe to all. How this can be so is a mystery.

Of course, as the case now stands you deny this, and especially the claim that God desires the salvation of all. But why? Presumably because for you there is something incompatible with the following:

[L1] God has decreed the salvation of the elect only.
[L2] God desires the salvation of all.

But are these really incompatible? And if not, then how could it be that God desires something that He does not actually decree to be fulfilled? In order to shed some light on how we are to think about these questions I offer the following set of propositions as analogous to the first:

[S1] God has decreed that I sin.
[S2] God desires that I not sin.

Are these incompatible? Either these two propositions are perfectly compatible with one another, however perplexing it may be, or you are going to have to deny one of them. The problem, though, is that [S1] cannot be denied since it is a basic tenet of calvinist doctrine, and [S2] cannot be denied on the basis of scripture. I conclude, then (and this is ought to be nothing new to you - just going over it for argument's sake) that you must affirm that [S1] and [S2] are perfectly compatible with one another, if not to the human mind then at least to the mind of God.

So what's the point here? Just this, that there exists an analogous relationship between [L1]/[L2] and [S1]/[S2] such that, given that all four propositions are true, if you affirm one set you must affirm the other and vice versa. To do otherwise is simply ad hoc.

Of course I already anticipate your objection: [L2], that God desires the salvation of all, is false and therefore the analogy breaks down. But is [L2] really false?

I'd like to elaborate further, but here is the short of it: We do in fact have scripture that would lead one (i.e., 99.9% of Christians) to believe that God does not delight in the death of the wicked (Ez. 18:23, 32), that He desires the wicked to turn from his ways and live (i.e., be saved - see previous verses), that God loves the whole world and gave His Son for it (Jn. 3:16), that he desires all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4), et cetera. Now perhaps one could make a slight (and I mean slight) though indefensible case that these verses do not mean that God loves all and desires the salvation of all (though I do not find that at all convincing in the case of Ez. 18:23 and 32), but is this the prima facie reading of the texts in question, especially when God says that He desires not the death of the wicked, the very ones whom Heddle claims God does not love and only hates, but that they should turn and live? And even more so when we consider that God is Love - not hate; that it is fundamental to God's nature to love - not hate; that God's love transcends His hate by infinite bounds? I mean, before the foundation of the world when there was only God, what do you think the three persons of the Trinity were doing all along - cursing each other in a mutual bond of hate? Of course not, they were dwelling with each other in a mutual bond of love. God is love; this is what He does. The conclusion, then, is that the answer to this question is that no, it is not the most obvious reading of the texts, as the history of the Church will testify.

So what would motivate one to ask whether or not words like 'all' and 'world' mean 'all' and 'world', indeed to demand that they do not necessarily mean what we think they mean? Whatever reasons you may give I submit that it is the committment to [L1], that God has decreed the salvation of the elect only, that is the primary reason. It is this committment first and foremost that gives rise to the denial that the verses in question teach that God has a universal love for all and that He desires all to be saved.

So a further question, then, is this: how does a committment to [L1] force a denial of [L2] but a committment to [S1], that God has decreed that I sin, not force a denial of [S2], that God desires that I not sin? Unless, of course, you make a distinction between what God desires and what God commands, but anyone with half a brain can see that this strategy is in no way tenable. And I can't imagine that you would say that in the end God really just wants you to sin.

But again, I anticipate what you will most likely say in response: It is undeniably clear from scripture that [S2] is true; yet it is disputable whether or not the verses in question support [L2]. In fact, you think you can make a good case to deny [L2], even if it is the most obvious reading of the texts that would seem to support it.

But is this really so? What is the case against [L2]? You've tried to claim that [L1] is incompatible with [L2]; yet I have just shown you tha